Anyone know if this has any impact on AWS Load Balancer?
OpenSSL Security Advisory
81–89 of 89 posts
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#82Anyone know if this has any impact on AWS Load Balancer?
It did, and it's being patched. http://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/openssl-se...
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
as bad as "goto fail", but not as bad as "heartbleed" Thank you for this excellent description for we who recognise this must be a problem, but lack the area knowledge to immediately appreciate how bad (or not) it may be.
I would even dispute it being as bad as goto fail. For this to work both client and server must be vulnerable and the attacker must be in a privileged network position. A malicious server can do it, but it's significantly more difficult to exploit this than goto fail. Edit: agl has a good writeup of the bug and what it might take to exploit https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/05/earlyccs.html
Privileged network positions are sort of a joke with the current state of wifi security.
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#84Earlier quoted context omitted.
> it can reliably refuse to forward ARP packets for other MACs claiming to be the gateway. I thought most wireless lans acted as an (shared medium) ethernet, that is, they allow clients to send packets directly client to client? That is, I thought [ed:naughty]-client could just broadcast ARP packets directly to the clients? Or does perhaps (ethernet) broadcast traffic go through the gateway? None of this helps with a…
In infrastructure mode, all WiFi traffic goes through the access point. Whether or not, from a configuration perspective, the access point lets you meddle with traffic that passes through it is a separate question, but I don't think there's anything wireless-protocol-wise that precludes it.
How does a client actually authenticate a packet coming from the AP versus something else? The only info is a preshared key so it doesn't seem possible to have any true security there.
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#85Earlier quoted context omitted.
In infrastructure mode, all WiFi traffic goes through the access point. Whether or not, from a configuration perspective, the access point lets you meddle with traffic that passes through it is a separate question, but I don't think there's anything wireless-protocol-wise that precludes it.
How does a client actually authenticate a packet coming from the AP versus something else? The only info is a preshared key so it doesn't seem possible to have any true security there.
I believe the AP has separate session keys per client (the shared secret is used for authenticating with the AP and setting up a session -- and yes, I guess that means if you know the shared secret the client expects you to use (eg: a note in a cafe) you can probably impersonate the AP at the point of client association) -- but the group key is special.
But as demonstrated up-thread I clearly need to refresh my knowledge of 802.11*...
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
In infrastructure mode, all WiFi traffic goes through the access point. Whether or not, from a configuration perspective, the access point lets you meddle with traffic that passes through it is a separate question, but I don't think there's anything wireless-protocol-wise that precludes it.
How does a client actually authenticate a packet coming from the AP versus something else? The only info is a preshared key so it doesn't seem possible to have any true security there.
The PSK is used to derive pairwise keys between each station and the AP. However, if the attacker knows the PSK, it's theoretically impossible sufficiently advanced attacks. That's why enterprise networks use RADIUS for enhanced security.
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#87Looking at all the attention openSSL is getting these days, I'd use another solution in my production servers (if security was an important concern).
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#88Since most(1) web browsers do not use OpenSSL, CVE-2014-0224 is not going to be a big concern for people browsing using SSL, but it is a concern for machine-to-machine communication where using OpenSSL on both ends will be common. Given that this also affects 0.9.8 there are going to be lots of backend systems that need upgrading. (1) Apparently Chrome on Android is the odd man out in using OpenSSL, but I don't know…
Is libcurl affected by CVE-2014-0224?
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#89It seems that both Heartbleed and this MITM vulnerability were introduced by Robin Seggelmann [1], which will surely drive a lot of speculations...
[1] http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/HP-Security-Research-Blog/ZDI-1...