OpenSSL Security Advisory
openssl.org
OpenSSL Security Advisory
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Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#2The large volume of vulnerabilities coming out of OpenSSL are worrying, but it likely reflects the increased effort being put into auditing and fuzzing the code after Heartbleed. What is more worrying is the many other critical pieces of software that have nowhere near the level of scrutiny that OpenSSL is receiving currently.
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#3[deleted]
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#4The large volume of vulnerabilities coming out of OpenSSL are worrying, but it likely reflects the increased effort being put into auditing and fuzzing the code after Heartbleed. What is more worrying is the many other critical pieces of software that have nowhere near the level of scrutiny that OpenSSL is receiving currently.
Yes, the current situation is (probably) bad.
The Core Infrastructure Initiative is starting to address that: http://www.linuxfoundation.org/programs/core-infrastructure-...
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#5CVE-2014-0224 looks the worst of this bunch.
It seems openssl will accept ChangeCipherSpec messages much too early. CCS in TLS means "we've finished handshake/renegotiation and will now start using the new keys".
It looks likely that a MITM can send CCS to both ends during handshake, and have them agree on the empty master secret (and therefore trivial application data encryption keys). This is pretty bad as far as TLS bugs go (as bad as "goto fail", but not as bad as "heartbleed").
Given that accepting TLS messages only within the right constraints is fundamental to correctness of TLS and openssl seemingly can't get this right (this, and heartbeat messages before/during handshake), it seems likely this isn't the last problem of this kind.
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#6The large volume of vulnerabilities coming out of OpenSSL are worrying, but it likely reflects the increased effort being put into auditing and fuzzing the code after Heartbleed. What is more worrying is the many other critical pieces of software that have nowhere near the level of scrutiny that OpenSSL is receiving currently.
Searching for vulnerabilities is just like mining for gold: you go for the richest veins first and OpenSSL is deployed widely enough and in enough places where it really matters that it is currently a priority item.
I guess until a couple of weeks ago OpenSSL was 'one of many other critical pieces of software that have nowhere near the level of scrutiny that WordPress (and I know you don't meant Wordpress) is receiving currently'. So we'll see a re-focusing on other software when people feel that either the OpenSSL well of exploits has at least temporarily dried up or when something else that is crucial breaks.
But as long as vulnerabilities in OpenSSL are discovered at this rate it seems to be an effort well-spent, and we will all reap the benefit of that effort.
Heartbleed really shook the IT world, I don't know anybody in operations that was not affected by it. (And I can hear them collectively sighing right now). If there was a Richter scale for exploits it would have rated a '9'.
It's a bit like the news cycle, these things tend to burn out. But right now OpenSSL exploits are very much in the spotlight, and guarantee almost instant fame for the person discovering one. So I think we'll see a few more of these before it will quiet down. (I actually hope that we won't see more of these but given the past couple of weeks that hope is not very realistic).
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#7Red Hat advisory for RHEL6 seems to be already available: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2014-0625.html
Edit:
They also released a blog entry about the CCS injection issue: https://access.redhat.com/site/blogs/766093/posts/908133
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#8I feel like there is a (potentially bad) typo in the second paragraph of this advisory.
Servers are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution.
It seems to me that users on versions earlier then 1.0.1 would be advised not to upgrade since they stated in the sentence before that 1.0.1 is vulnerable.
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edit: Oops, I feel kind of dumb. Literally the next line is describing the recommended upgrade for 0.9.8 users:
OpenSSL 0.9.8 SSL/TLS users (client and/or server) should upgrade to 0.9.8za.
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#9I feel like there is a (potentially bad) typo in the second paragraph of this advisory. Servers are only known to be vulnerable in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta1. Users of OpenSSL servers earlier than 1.0.1 are advised to upgrade as a precaution. It seems to me that users on versions earlier then 1.0.1 would be advised not to upgrade since they stated in the sentence before that 1.0.1 is vulnerable. ------ edit: Oops,…
They say, versions earlier than 1.0.1 might be vulnerable, we're not sure, so upgrade to the latest (presumably a newer version than 1.0.2-beta1).
Re: OpenSSL Security Advisory
#10CVE-2014-0224 looks the worst of this bunch. It seems openssl will accept ChangeCipherSpec messages much too early. CCS in TLS means "we've finished handshake/renegotiation and will now start using the new keys". It looks likely that a MITM can send CCS to both ends during handshake, and have them agree on the empty master secret (and therefore trivial application data encryption keys). This is pretty bad as far as T…
as bad as "goto fail", but not as bad as "heartbleed"
Thank you for this excellent description for we who recognise this must be a problem, but lack the area knowledge to immediately appreciate how bad (or not) it may be.