Ask HN: How bad is it to use a self-signed SSL certificate?

Post by Spittie » Sat, May 31, 2014, 10:06 PM UTC

rhizome wrote: post #71

Spittie wrote: post #13

https://www.startssl.com/ gives out free SSL certificates. Just don't expect much on their part, given it's free. For example, they refused to reissue certificates for free after Heartbleed. Also you can't use them on commercial sites. otherwise https://www.gogetssl.com/ is probably as cheap as it gets.

Not to mention their inscrutable information and documentation. I was caught out trying to renew a StartSSL cert 6mos ago and could not even access the renewal site. Apparently they use personal certs (or the cert I got?) as authentication? I don't know, because there was no explanation, anywhere. I had no idea whether this is security by obscurity or what, but f-them. I wound up paying $5 to Comodo and having a some…

Post by Spittie » Sat, May 31, 2014, 10:09 PM UTC

chimeracoder wrote: post #66

mindslight wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unauthenticated SSL does provide security against passive attackers , which is what mass surveillance in developed countries is. If the NSA ever insists on widespread MITM of connections, we have much bigger problems. I agree the UI needs to be properly worked out so that eg a bank can't be downgraded to an unauthenticated certificate.

I don't understand why they don't just use different colors for self-signed SSL connections. CA-signed: Green lockpad Self-signed: Yellow lockpad, with question mark superimposed over it Regular HTTP: Orange, no lockpad (insecure) Invalid or revoked cert: Red, "stay away" displayed within tags. The current UI that most browsers present implies that self-signed certificates are worse ("scarier") than regular HTTP, whi…

Post by webhat » Sat, May 31, 2014, 11:24 PM UTC

Spittie wrote: post #101

rhizome wrote: post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not to mention their inscrutable information and documentation. I was caught out trying to renew a StartSSL cert 6mos ago and could not even access the renewal site. Apparently they use personal certs (or the cert I got?) as authentication? I don't know, because there was no explanation, anywhere. I had no idea whether this is security by obscurity or what, but f-them. I wound up paying $5 to Comodo and having a some…

They use browser certificates (I'm not sure if this is the right name), which is actually pretty cool. When you create an account, a certificate is generated in your browser, and then you can login with it. The big problem is that since it's almost not used, browsers implement it but haven't done any job in making it user friendly (for example, you can see the certificates currently stored in your browser in Firefox…

  Proof of data integrity is typically the easiest of these requirements to accomplish.
  A data hash, such as SHA2, is usually sufficient to establish that the likelihood
  of data being undetectably changed is extremely low. Even with this safeguard, it is
  still possible to tamper with data in transit, either through a man-in-the-middle
  attack or phishing. Due to this flaw, data integrity is best asserted when the
  recipient already possesses the necessary verification information.

Post by stcredzero » Sat, May 31, 2014, 11:38 PM UTC

rch wrote: post #24

stcredzero wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree with your answer, but I don't recall ever seeing a post mortem write-up of such an attack. So, if you know how MITM operates, tell me: How would the server operator ever know?

Reports of user data being compromised could lead to a consultant being hired to figure out where the security problem is, for instance. (I'm assuming the site requires a login or perhaps even takes CC information - the kind of stuff a user might notice a third-party using)

Post by dvanduzer » Sat, May 31, 2014, 11:55 PM UTC

ds9 wrote: post #104

dvanduzer wrote: post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Could you elaborate on what you find meaningful about the authentication a CA provides? Another neat trick is creating your own CA, and putting your root into the local trust stores of client nodes that you care about. (Be sure to permanently airgap your root key, and create intermediate signers.)

I meant that sending logon + password is somewhat pointless if it's plaintext over the internet, while if you have some encryption going on, someone intercepting the data in transit would have a harder time using it to trick the client or the server. In that sense authentication is more meaningful with a certificate -- even though using a CA still allows interception by a government actor. It narrows the range of tho…