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US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

theguardian.com

31–40 of 94 posts

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#31
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"...testing deployed systems without authorization is always risky..." While what you describe may be the sad reality, it makes zero sense. If a legit researcher, 'specially one that's being transparent about it, researches any domestic system, then that's got to be better than the Iranians, Russians or Chinese doing it (which they do anyway). But hey, what do we know anyway. There's probably some benefit that makes…

I disagree that it makes zero sense. There are reasonable concerns at play here: * Security testing is extremely disruptive to production systems, most especially if those systems haven't been hardened in any way. Security testers are not as a rule good at predicting how their tests can screw up a production system. * No matter how much effort you put into a security program (Google and Facebook put a lot of effort i…

And as someone who has been on both sides of doing security research and systems administration. Generally, this kind of "pro bono" work isn't telling us anything we don't know, and since its not coordinated with the target it'll potentially get system/network/security adminstrators up at 3am in their morning to respond to your probes, and will drain company resources. You're also demanding that the company address whatever it is that you find, in short order, when it may actually not be the most important thing to the business -- particularly when you announce it to the world rather than follow responsible disclosure.

When "researchers" then flip around and talk to the press and don't follow responsible disclosure, then what you're dealing with really is a hacking attempt. You're walking up to the doors and windows of a business and jiggling then to see if they're open and taking notes on what kind of locks they're using and how they could be bypassed -- without any kind of approval from the business owner. Then you're turning around and damaging the business by talking to the press about it.

Back when I was more interested in computer security (roughly '94 just like tptacek), I knew that scanning systems that I didn't own without permission would get me in trouble. We seem to have devolved a bit in our collective maturity where we think we can just fly the flag of "security researcher" and that this gives us permission to initiate what look just like attacks on systems.

If you don't own a system and don't have permission for it then don't attack it, and don't put the government in the position of trying to discriminate between a foreign government launching attacks and a "security researcher" with pure motives... And don't be too shocked if the government and legal institutions have issues in distinguishing between those two cases and throw you in jail for 15+ years. The way to avoid that outcome is not to do it. Only attack and probe systems that you own or have permissions to attack and probe. Just because you're a "security researcher" who is egotistical enough to think you can save the internet from itself, that doesn't mean you're going to get treated differently from a foreign national with less pure motives. Stay away from shit that isn't yours (and the security of the entire internet is not your sole responsibility).

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#32
post #27

Monied interests want you to play in their safe playground without rocking the boat, the legal and technical enforcement is closing in. Slowly, but the ratchet only turns one direction. I worry that the only reason it hasn't closed in entirely is that smart people exploring is more beneficial to business than not. For now. Over the last few weeks I've been wondering when the scale flips and general purpose computing…

Does it really only turn in one direction, though? I hear that kind of talk a lot, usually about taxes and government programs. It seems incredibly depressing, for one thing. It's fundamentally saying that you can never win, just delay the inevitable loss. Fortunately, it doesn't seem to be true, whether it's taxes or computers. Computers might be getting squeezed a bit now, but there have been far worse periods, fol…

I think my favorite example of things going the other way was when we more or less won the battle on export control laws which restricted the distribution of cryptography.

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#33
post #28

I think this article is misleading to British English readers. > HD Moore, creator of the ethical hacking tool Metasploit and chief research officer of security consultancy Rapid7, told the Guardian he had been warned by US law enforcement last year over a scanning project called Critical.IO, which he started in 2012. British might confuse "warning" for what's known in Britain as a "police caution", which is a extra-…

> ...judged summarily by police... Wikipedia claims [1] that the offender can't be summarily judged by the police because they must agree to be cautioned: > In order to safeguard the offender's interests, the > following conditions must be met before a caution can be > administered: > * there must be evidence of guilt sufficient to give > a realistic prospect of conviction; > * the offender must admit the offence; >…

Only if you think a guilty plea (in a court of law) doesn't result in a summary judgement because the offender agreed to it.

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#34
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree that it makes zero sense. There are reasonable concerns at play here: * Security testing is extremely disruptive to production systems, most especially if those systems haven't been hardened in any way. Security testers are not as a rule good at predicting how their tests can screw up a production system. * No matter how much effort you put into a security program (Google and Facebook put a lot of effort i…

And as someone who has been on both sides of doing security research and systems administration. Generally, this kind of "pro bono" work isn't telling us anything we don't know, and since its not coordinated with the target it'll potentially get system/network/security adminstrators up at 3am in their morning to respond to your probes, and will drain company resources. You're also demanding that the company address w…

For what it's worth: I can't think of anyone who has done "15 years" for CFAA violations. Is there someone who fits that description?

(Don't get me wrong; any prison time for good-faith vulnerability research, no matter how negligent or ill-advised the research is, seems like a travesty).

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#35

Monied interests want you to play in their safe playground without rocking the boat, the legal and technical enforcement is closing in. Slowly, but the ratchet only turns one direction. I worry that the only reason it hasn't closed in entirely is that smart people exploring is more beneficial to business than not. For now. Over the last few weeks I've been wondering when the scale flips and general purpose computing…

[deleted]

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#36
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And then someone called the police when they found someone random was in their house without authorization. And the intruder said "I was only there to shut the door for them."

Which parallels white hats getting arrested for legitimate security research. Hence my analogy stands.

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Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#37
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And then someone called the police when they found someone random was in their house without authorization. And the intruder said "I was only there to shut the door for them."

Which parallels white hats getting arrested for legitimate security research. Hence my analogy stands.

Yes, your analogy does stand. And it stands to reason that the intruder should be punished, and/or sued, for trespass. It is not a legitimate reason to be in someone else's house.

Going around trying to open everyone's doors is a similar analogy to some other security research. And while its not as clear-cut, in fact arguably not a commonly cognizable crime, it certainly is suspicious and its reasonable for law enforcement to investigate such activity.

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#38
post #3

Note that this concerns the subset of security research that involves actively talking to computer systems owned by other people, presumably in production, on the public Internet. Most security research does not in fact work this way. Consider, for instance, virtually any memory corruption vulnerability; while it was once straightforward (in the 90s) to work out an exploit "blind", today, researchers virtually always…

"...testing deployed systems without authorization is always risky..." While what you describe may be the sad reality, it makes zero sense. If a legit researcher, 'specially one that's being transparent about it, researches any domestic system, then that's got to be better than the Iranians, Russians or Chinese doing it (which they do anyway). But hey, what do we know anyway. There's probably some benefit that makes…

How would you feel if I broke into your place of business, made a list of all of the things you were doing that were out of compliance with federal and state laws and regulations, then left you my card and offered to let you hire me to do legal compliance work for you?

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#39
post #3

Note that this concerns the subset of security research that involves actively talking to computer systems owned by other people, presumably in production, on the public Internet. Most security research does not in fact work this way. Consider, for instance, virtually any memory corruption vulnerability; while it was once straightforward (in the 90s) to work out an exploit "blind", today, researchers virtually always…

"...testing deployed systems without authorization is always risky..." While what you describe may be the sad reality, it makes zero sense. If a legit researcher, 'specially one that's being transparent about it, researches any domestic system, then that's got to be better than the Iranians, Russians or Chinese doing it (which they do anyway). But hey, what do we know anyway. There's probably some benefit that makes…

[deleted]

Re: US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers

#40
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree that it makes zero sense. There are reasonable concerns at play here: * Security testing is extremely disruptive to production systems, most especially if those systems haven't been hardened in any way. Security testers are not as a rule good at predicting how their tests can screw up a production system. * No matter how much effort you put into a security program (Google and Facebook put a lot of effort i…

And as someone who has been on both sides of doing security research and systems administration. Generally, this kind of "pro bono" work isn't telling us anything we don't know, and since its not coordinated with the target it'll potentially get system/network/security adminstrators up at 3am in their morning to respond to your probes, and will drain company resources. You're also demanding that the company address w…

"...this kind of "pro bono" work isn't telling us anything we don't know..."

That's scary right there. If you're deploying something you know has vulnerabilities you have bigger problems than losing sleep at 3am. Same for operating something you know is vulnerable. You (collective, not you, personally) totally deserve to get up at 3am. It's grossly irresponsible, because what you probably don't already know is how that harmless XSS vuln you know about is really a leaf in a 7-level deep threat tree that results in information disclosure. I can just imagine that such a cavalier attitude is how the Sony PSN network got owned.

My point stands. Attack from Iran or probe from a researcher (your points in your following paragraph noted and notwithstanding)?

"...If you don't own a system and don't have permission for it then don't attack it."

That's loud and clear, for sure.

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