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Science and the Demise of Philosophy

robertpriddy.com

61–70 of 72 posts

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#61
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>what is _really_ true IS what makes the best predictions. Otherwise in what sense is it true? That is the anti-realist position, but it could be true in the sense that it corresponds to the actual nature of reality, if you are a realist. > You have only one data point: your own consciousness. Yep, and that is the data point that physicalism doesn't seem to be able to account for.

you're covering it up with the term "actual" what does that mean? your second assertion doesn't make any sense either. "account" would imply that pzombies would be different from "normal" normal people I guess?

No, you could delete "actual" and it would still convey the right sense.

Yes, p-zombies are different from normal people (by definition).

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#62
post #55
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Yes. You only say it's crazy because it doesn't work. How could I be saying that it's crazy because it doesn't work when I'm considering a hypothetical scenario in which it does work? That doesn't make any sense. It's crazy because we can't construct even the hint of an explanation for why it should be an effective method. Of course, you might in turn imagine a scenario in which we succeed in constructing some kind…

> ... but there is no guarantee that any such explanation could be constructed, and I am considering the scenario in which it can't. Are you serious?

Yes. From the fact that a method works, it doesn't follow that there must be an explanation for why it works.

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#63
post #59
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I apologize for not responding sooner. This is after all a discussion, and not a forum for simply venting. As for logicians as philosophers, perhaps I am in the minority when I disassociate them soley based on their results. Maybe that is perhaps defining the problem set based on the solution. But in general logicians follow the rigor of mathematics, and as a result their accomplishments are timeless. But when they a…

> Maybe that is perhaps defining the problem set based on the solution. Yes, it is. You're just defining anything that makes progress as science or mathematics rather than philosophy, so your claim is a tautology. I can't really make any sense of your last paragraph. I'm sure some philosophers are assholes, but that doesn't mean that philosophy isn't worth doing.

Yes, it would be a tautology if I had defined it in terms of progress. But progress is the result of the methods and intention of the endeavors of science; falsifiability being one of them. Another is applicability, which often comes in the form of being subject to experimentation.

Logic is a great tradition of in both science and philosophy; and even now there is a working community with practitioners of the field with both titles. But when I was entered graduate school I left for the mathematics department specifically because formal logic was relegated to the unfashionable corner of most philosophy programs.

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#64
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What you consider a "complete" simulation of the brain will differ depending on whether or not you are a materialist in the first place. (I.e., will the simulation include feelings as part of its model? If it doesn't, aren't you begging the question in favor of physicalism?) Do we care? The non-materialists would argue that there's no possible way to simulate the brain completely, because of Teh Magic that surrounds…

>Do we care? The non-materialists would argue that there's no possible way to simulate the brain completely, because of Teh Magic that surrounds it. Right, so you are begging the question by assuming materialism in the first place. The simulation shows nothing if you do this -- it's a red herring, to disguise the fact that you are merely asserting your position without argument. >Since a simulation of the brain is on…

Right, so you are begging the question by assuming materialism in the first place.

Sure, you got me: "materialism" to me means "doesn't contain random bullshit that by its very definition can't even be investigated."

The moment someone offers a theory that says something concrete about any effect, it becomes "materialism." Most people pushing non-materialistic "techniques" really mean that we should throw our hands in the air and claim that we can never know how a thing works. And this is justified by claiming that modern science fails to explain mystical "effects" that nobody can even measure in a concrete way.

Put another way, suppose you're wrong, and there's no such thing as experience, and it's just an illusion of the brain that makes you believe there is - is this consistent with all of modern science? AFAIK, it is, in which case I see no justification to claim that modern science has failed.

Myself, all the evidence I've seen says that the functioning of the human brain (which is physically undistinguished, containing nothing that pushes the limits of the physics that we understand very well today) is governed by laws that we actually have a shot at understanding. I'd place good money on the fact that nothing about the brain's inner workings is influenced to any meaningful degree by any physical effect that we don't already have equations for. The only trick is understanding the large scale behavior, due to the incredible complexity.

The simulation shows nothing if you do this

Such a simulation would prove plenty - it would prove that we can approximate human behavior as accurately as we want to without including magic in the equation. You may still claim that we haven't accurately modeled the magic parts of the brain, but if they're unobservable from the outside, nobody doing anything useful really cares about the difference, and the onus is on you to prove that there is one at all, not on me to prove that there isn't.

Realize that you're claiming something extraordinary, that there is a fundamentally non-physical effect at work in the brain. This type of claim requires a lot more than a person's assertion that they experience it themselves to be credible, because people's claims about their inner states are notoriously misguided even about far less philosophical things.

If you irrationally deny that we can "measure" (i.e. establish) the existence of our own conscious experiences, and then refuse to incorporate any notion of experience into your simulation, you are clearly rigging the game in favor of materialism at the outset, not providing any argument for it.

Irrational? I disagree.

How might I "measure" the existence of subjective experience? Introspection absolutely does not measure it; rather, introspection measures my belief that I have experience, and the human brain believes a lot of things that are not true, so I can't put too much weight in that.

There's a crucial difference between the existence of a state of experience and the belief in the existence of a state of experience. I have yet to hear any coherent argument that provides evidence of the former, and the latter would be trivial for a good brain simulation to achieve.

It has to be said, though, that the idea that any straightforward notion of "observability" plays a role in science has been known to be highly problematic since the 20s, for basically the reasons that Quine and Duhem identified.

Without going too far into the details of Duhem-Quine, I'll just mention that this may bother philosophers of science, but physicists have elucidated many more useful, exploitable truths in the past four centuries by observing the world than the philosophers have over several millenia by thinking about it.

I am observing my own conscious experience right now.

Not really. What you are doing is believing that you are observing your own experience right now. That's it. Since there's no definition of "your own experience" on the table, I can't really comment on whether or not your belief that you are observing it has any correlation to the existence or non-existence of the state. But the burden of proof has to be placed on the person arguing for the introduction of a new effect, not on the person arguing against it, and I would claim that current (materialistic) theory has already adequately accounted for your belief in subjective experience.

In other words, introspection doesn't prove anything other than that you hold a particular belief. The messed up thing is, this doesn't only apply to my thoughts about your inner state, it has to apply to my thoughts about my own inner state as well; I can be no more sure that I have any extra-material subjective experience than I am that you do based on your assertion that it is so.

We have as yet no hint of a physical explanation for why I should be having such an experience.

True enough. But we have plenty of perfectly good physical explanations for why you might believe you're having such an experience, and without some other evidence that you're actually having that experience, we have to assume that the simplest and most likely explanation is that your belief is just wrong.

Just to be clear: I'm not altogether opposed to the idea that we can accept "subjective experience" as "real", for a certain definition of each term. But I do have a problem assuming that there's something that's even worth modeling or theorizing about; as best as I can figure, the most sense I can give to its reality is that it is as real as we believe it, and that the "experience" is really just the self-aware organization of information inside our brains, not some mystical interaction with an external entity or anything like that. Behaviorally speaking, both result in the same observable effects, and one requires fewer assumptions to explain the same observations, so...

Then again, Occam's Razor is another point where philosophers and scientists clash - philosophers want proof that every ludicrous possibility could not possibly be true, whereas scientists are just looking for evidence of what is actually the case, within a certain approximation. IMO the scientific POV has led to far greater successes, but YMMV.

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#65
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

constantly asserting that "it just isn't" does nothing for your case. hypothesis must be differentiable via making different predictions about the world. otherwise they're not really different.

Neither will saying "it just does." How do you think that seeing a detailed brain scan would tell you what it is like to see red? It's extraordinary that you think the burden of proof is on those who simply deny the near-inconceivable possibility that it would. The problem is precisely one of predictions. Physicalism doesn't predict the existence of conscious experience. (And if you really think its necessary to give…

Physicalism doesn't predict the existence of conscious experience. (And if you really think its necessary to give an argument for the existence of these experiences other than "we all have them and know that we have them," I am not sure what to say -- you are simply in denial.)

It is absolutely necessary to give an argument for the existence of these experiences.

I know that you believe you have them, and that I believe I have them, but that doesn't mean that they have any tangible reality, it just means that our brains store things in a way that they will respond "yes, I have conscious experience."

Alternatively, should I accept as real everything that a person believes they experience? A schizophrenic's voices are real? A memory of a past trauma that is, in fact, a false memory, proves that the past trauma is real? This is a very dangerous path to walk, accepting the validity of introspection as a means of investigating the world...

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#66
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Do we care? The non-materialists would argue that there's no possible way to simulate the brain completely, because of Teh Magic that surrounds it. Right, so you are begging the question by assuming materialism in the first place. The simulation shows nothing if you do this -- it's a red herring, to disguise the fact that you are merely asserting your position without argument. >Since a simulation of the brain is on…

Right, so you are begging the question by assuming materialism in the first place. Sure, you got me: "materialism" to me means "doesn't contain random bullshit that by its very definition can't even be investigated." The moment someone offers a theory that says something concrete about any effect, it becomes "materialism." Most people pushing non-materialistic "techniques" really mean that we should throw our hands i…

Addition to my last post: my feelings on this particular issue (the mind-body problem, the soul, experience, or however you want to cast it) are pretty close to Hofstadter's as outlined in I Am A Strange Loop, which is a great read no matter what your stance on the issue (he doesn't take a strong stance either way, but pretty clearly indicates that he thinks it's the computation that's important, not the substrate).

I think there's something very special about perception, and it's a very deep, tricky, and important matter that we don't really understand well enough yet; however, I am agnostic towards any metaphysical details. Even if they do exist (I personally don't think there's any evidence for that anyhow, but...), I don't think there's anything much worth say about them because they are not open to investigation.

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#67
post #63
post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Maybe that is perhaps defining the problem set based on the solution. Yes, it is. You're just defining anything that makes progress as science or mathematics rather than philosophy, so your claim is a tautology. I can't really make any sense of your last paragraph. I'm sure some philosophers are assholes, but that doesn't mean that philosophy isn't worth doing.

Yes, it would be a tautology if I had defined it in terms of progress. But progress is the result of the methods and intention of the endeavors of science; falsifiability being one of them. Another is applicability, which often comes in the form of being subject to experimentation. Logic is a great tradition of in both science and philosophy; and even now there is a working community with practitioners of the field w…

>Yes, it would be a tautology if I had defined it in terms of progress.

And you did -- how else could you exclude developments in logic from the history of philosophy?

> But progress is the result of the methods and intention of the endeavors of science; falsifiability being one of them.

No-one has really thought that falsifiability is a contentful constraint on scientific theory formation for some time now (even Karl Popper basically abandoned the view in all but name).

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#68
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Do we care? The non-materialists would argue that there's no possible way to simulate the brain completely, because of Teh Magic that surrounds it. Right, so you are begging the question by assuming materialism in the first place. The simulation shows nothing if you do this -- it's a red herring, to disguise the fact that you are merely asserting your position without argument. >Since a simulation of the brain is on…

Right, so you are begging the question by assuming materialism in the first place. Sure, you got me: "materialism" to me means "doesn't contain random bullshit that by its very definition can't even be investigated." The moment someone offers a theory that says something concrete about any effect, it becomes "materialism." Most people pushing non-materialistic "techniques" really mean that we should throw our hands i…

>Sure, you got me: "materialism" to me means "doesn't contain random bullshit that by its very definition can't even be investigated."

You should stop and think about that. You're essentially saying that your notion of materialism has absolutely nothing to do with any notion of "material". Isn't that kind of odd? It's certainly a long way from the materialism of the 17th century (pre-Newton) which actually had some content to it (i.e. contact mechanics).

>Realize that you're claiming something extraordinary, that there is a fundamentally non-physical effect at work in the brain.

If by non-physical I mean "not accounted for by current laws of physics", then why is this extraordinary?

>How might I "measure" the existence of subjective experience?

I think measure is just an odd verb to use in this context. How do I "measure" whether or not there is milk in the fridge? Well, I look and see. Same with my subjective experience.

>Not really. What you are doing is believing that you are observing your own experience right now.

Ok, and I'm not really seeing the desk, I'm just believing that I'm seeing the desk. Skepticism about perception is fine, but why be more skeptical about your perception of your conscious experience than of your visual or other perceptions?

The other issue here is that believing that you are having a conscious experience is itself a kind of conscious experience, so you can't really wriggle out of it that way. I might be mistaken about the object of my perceptions (ok, maybe it's not really a desk I'm seeing, or maybe I'm dreaming), but I can hardly be mistaken that I am seeing something, or that I am having a conscious experience of something.

>In other words, introspection doesn't prove anything other than that you hold a particular belief.

This obviously leads to a vicious circularity. If we can never perceive anything other than our own beliefs, then perception can provide no external ground for any of our beliefs and we must all be crazy! I just can't agree with this doctrine of yours, I'm afraid. Particularly because it would imply that scientific investigation is based on introspective observation of our own beliefs, rather than observation of the world around us -- which seems fairly anti-scientific to me.

>But we have plenty of perfectly good physical explanations for why you might believe you're having such an experience

In fact we do not. At least, I have never seen one. Do you have a reference? In this area, people often confuse a sketch of what an explanation might look like with an actual explanation.

>and that the "experience" is really just the self-aware organization of information inside our brains, not some mystical interaction with an external entity or anything like that.

I would mostly agree with that. But I'd just point out how we currently have no physical explanation of how a self-aware organization of information could lead to a conscious experience. You are cheating a bit by introducing the term "aware', which of course could not be stated in purely physical or mathematical terms while retaining its normal connotations.

>Behaviorally speaking, both result in the same observable effects

Again, only because you irrationally (and frankly, insincerely) insist on denying that you have conscious experiences. Or admit that you have them but say I'm not allowed to consider this fact in my reasoning. I'm not sure which.

>philosophers want proof that every ludicrous possibility could not possibly be true

This is just not true. Philosophers aren't like that at all, and I don't see any great divide between scientists and philosophers over this issue. Both are taking a scientific point of view.

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Right, so you are begging the question by assuming materialism in the first place. Sure, you got me: "materialism" to me means "doesn't contain random bullshit that by its very definition can't even be investigated." The moment someone offers a theory that says something concrete about any effect, it becomes "materialism." Most people pushing non-materialistic "techniques" really mean that we should throw our hands i…

Addition to my last post: my feelings on this particular issue (the mind-body problem, the soul, experience, or however you want to cast it) are pretty close to Hofstadter's as outlined in I Am A Strange Loop , which is a great read no matter what your stance on the issue (he doesn't take a strong stance either way, but pretty clearly indicates that he thinks it's the computation that's important, not the substrate).…

If you're agnostic regarding the metaphysical details then you're not a materialist. Materialism is a strong metaphysical position, not a form of agnosticism.

Re: Science and the Demise of Philosophy

#70
post #67
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, it would be a tautology if I had defined it in terms of progress. But progress is the result of the methods and intention of the endeavors of science; falsifiability being one of them. Another is applicability, which often comes in the form of being subject to experimentation. Logic is a great tradition of in both science and philosophy; and even now there is a working community with practitioners of the field w…

>Yes, it would be a tautology if I had defined it in terms of progress. And you did -- how else could you exclude developments in logic from the history of philosophy? > But progress is the result of the methods and intention of the endeavors of science; falsifiability being one of them. No-one has really thought that falsifiability is a contentful constraint on scientific theory formation for some time now (even Kar…

"No-one has really thought that falsifiability is a contentful constraint on scientific theory formation for some time now"

This quote is a textbook case of someone parroting the fashions of philosophy to make noise instead of a point. To wit: it talks about undefined general opinion, it has dropped a "name" in lieu of evidence, and by focusing upon a vague "formation" of ideas instead of the "methods and intention" as quoted above, it could be interpreted as being being confined to a narrower scope than the original statement and thereby attempts avoid the statement it is attempting to supersede.

Most importantly, it digresses from what goes on in reality without bothering to consult it. Within the scope of the original statement, which is talking about the scientific method, the community is actively engaged in this discussion: http://www.google.com/search?q=is+string+theory+falsifiable

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