Earlier quoted context omitted.
Knoppix was my first introduction to Linux. The boot-from-CD aspect amazed me. At first the only thing I used it for was recovering data from a screwed up Windows install but eventually I got more into it and started installing other distress (starting with Ubuntu I think).
For some perspective, this was back in the days where it was actually quite a bit of work to get get linux configured and running correctly on your at home desktop. Knoppix was quite a miracle.
Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
61–70 of 83 posts
Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#62One important and often overlooked feature of Tails is when you shut it down it wipes your system memory/RAM using sdmem. Your encrypted data and sensitive files are often accessible via memory forensics even if you shut your computer down. Including the websites you visited. Your encryption keys can be in your computers memory for weeks and is easily accessible via a memory dump. This is why people say that with phy…
Data can be retrieved from DRAM not after weeks (your claim is "even if you shut your computer down (...) Your encryption keys can be in your computers memory for weeks") but only http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack "in the seconds to minutes after power has been removed." The reason is explained here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_refresh And even the electrons from SRAM, which doesn't need refreshes…
This is why it's good to power down or sdmem when you're finished working with sensitive data.
On a full shutdown persistence is not as big of a risk, as the other commenter pointed out, cold boots are mitigated by DDR3 similar to how modern SSDs with TRIM make deleted data-recovery nearly impossible (such as Swap data which may also contain encryption keys).
Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#63Earlier quoted context omitted.
Data can be retrieved from DRAM not after weeks (your claim is "even if you shut your computer down (...) Your encryption keys can be in your computers memory for weeks") but only http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_boot_attack "in the seconds to minutes after power has been removed." The reason is explained here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_refresh And even the electrons from SRAM, which doesn't need refreshes…
Thanks, this is true. Encryption keys can exist in memory for up to a week [edit: or longer] in live memory with power on. This is well after they've been used on the machine, or say after you close your Truecrypt volumes. The vast majority of people rarely shutdown their laptops for extended periods of time and often just suspend to disk, instead of a full power-off. This is why it's good to power down or sdmem when…
No. After some high-enough RAM area contained the keys and you keep it powered and your OS uses much less physical RAM than physically available there's no hard limit. Just forget the "week."
Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thanks, this is true. Encryption keys can exist in memory for up to a week [edit: or longer] in live memory with power on. This is well after they've been used on the machine, or say after you close your Truecrypt volumes. The vast majority of people rarely shutdown their laptops for extended periods of time and often just suspend to disk, instead of a full power-off. This is why it's good to power down or sdmem when…
> Encryption keys can exist in memory for up to a week in live memory with power on. No. After some high-enough RAM area contained the keys and you keep it powered and your OS uses much less physical RAM than physically available there's no hard limit. Just forget the "week."
Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#65Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#66Even wired don't know what an OS is. Or rather the definition of OS has changed. A strange time when your industry jargon enters the popular lexicon but always slightly twisted. You can't even call yourself a Troll in the UK now without people thinking you go on Facebook and mock the dead to their nearest and dearest.
What is Tails, if not an operating system?
Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
How would you have found the bug without it being open source? You think companies pay for these open public audits on proprietary software ?
The vulnerability was first found by a fuzzer, which would have worked equally well on closed-source software. And I believe the fuzz tester (part of Codenomicon's "Defensics") is also closed-source.
Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#68One important and often overlooked feature of Tails is when you shut it down it wipes your system memory/RAM using sdmem. Your encrypted data and sensitive files are often accessible via memory forensics even if you shut your computer down. Including the websites you visited. Your encryption keys can be in your computers memory for weeks and is easily accessible via a memory dump. This is why people say that with phy…
I don't really trust their tests, but DDR3 memory kind of makes this attack useless. The $FEDAGENCY also plans arrests so you're cuffed with everything turned on and no way to push buttons or yank out cables like Ross Ulbricht or Max Vision
Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#69Another Debian based boot-from-CD OS that used to be quite popular is Knoppix [1]. I remember that was a big thing in the times of Win98 viruses when people used it for system recovery. In Germany they distributed it as add-on to computer magazines. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knoppix
Re: Inside the Operating System Edward Snowden Used to Evade the NSA
#70It's worth noting that Tails doesn't make you impervious. Tails uses Tor, and Tor is vulnerable to NSA and GCHQ attacks. Specifically, they have the capability of deanonymizing individual targets. I hypothesize that this capability works by monitoring Tor traffic worldwide, then performing a timing correlation between an origin and an endpoint. Here's an example: Let's say (for the sake of example please) that the NS…
> One way is to record the fact that from your home computer originated some Tor traffic at almost the same time the Google search took place. This either implies someone already suspects you and are monitoring you or that you are the only person searching on Google using Tor at that particular moment. I find the latter hard to believe. Even if it is true, it can be mitigated by more people using tor at the same time…
Would not take long to grep ISP logs and find the known Tor bridges, Obfsproxy bridges, relays and who might have used them.
If you tunneled Tor traffic through a VPN exiting Russia then your local ISP has no Tor timing metadata to give, unless you're Snowden and your adversary is global. Running an internal relay would help obfuscate your own traffic too if you can connect to it on a local network it would be a lot harder to prove you logged into IRC channel #blowuptheembassy on the Al Qaeda IRC freenode server.