Earlier quoted context omitted.
Feel no pity whatsoever for the sysadmins. Feel pity for the users, who are unwittingly using a vulnerable service.
Maybe the sysadmin took a vacation. Fuck him, why should he spend time with his family?
Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
21–30 of 78 posts
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#22Will these automated tools work on vulnerable Android devices? If so this seems a little irresponsible, I mean it is one thing to stick it to lazy sysadmins but making it easy to exploit peoples phones seems evil.
Or is this only relevant when you're running a server on your client device?
Is OpenSSL always running as a server on Android?
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#23Will these automated tools work on vulnerable Android devices? If so this seems a little irresponsible, I mean it is one thing to stick it to lazy sysadmins but making it easy to exploit peoples phones seems evil.
I'm confused how openSSL on Android is a problem... isn't openSSL a server technology? Do the clients use a heartbeat for something? Or is this only relevant when you're running a server on your client device? Is OpenSSL always running as a server on Android?
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
Maybe the sysadmin took a vacation. Fuck him, why should he spend time with his family?
Well if you're the only sysadmin for a company and they let you travel without the ability to both contact you and have emergency work done, you're pretty lucky. I would hope no company would let their one and only fulltime sysadmin take a vacation without having backup personnel on-hand
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#25This should be a useful tool on its own, but I wrote it primarily because the pattern-matching rules for Snort are inadequate. IDS vendors won't fix their stuff until I can prove they are inadequate. Ugh. In the old days the mantra of full-disclosure was "well, if we don't make exploit tools, then the vendors won't issue patches." And then it became "well, if we don't make exploit tools, then the sysadmins won't patc…
By the way, this isn't really related to or damning of the concept of full disclosure in any way. It still remains the most widespread philosophy. The CVE lists would be drastically smaller, if it were otherwise.
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#26This should be a useful tool on its own, but I wrote it primarily because the pattern-matching rules for Snort are inadequate. IDS vendors won't fix their stuff until I can prove they are inadequate. Ugh. In the old days the mantra of full-disclosure was "well, if we don't make exploit tools, then the vendors won't issue patches." And then it became "well, if we don't make exploit tools, then the sysadmins won't patc…
I would imagine the motivation is less about money and more about having fun breaking stuff (and bragging rights). I agree though. Hard to argue that this particular security issue needed any extra attention in order to get it fixed.
If you went back in time two years and fixed the Heartbleed bug, no one would be writing newspaper articles about you.
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#27I have a few ubuntu servers. When I do a "check for heartbleed" check with various tools, it says they are not vulnerable. However, these servers were installed 6 months ago and not updated for at least 2 months. How can they not be vulnerable?
It very much depends which variant you have installed. 10.04 is not vulnerable at all as it runs with 0.98.something (with some backported fixes, not including the exploit). 12.04 was vulnerable (it carries OpenSSL v1.0.1). There is a very similar situation with Debian's OldStable and Stable, and no doubt with the stable/long-term-support releases from RedHat and everyone else.
It also depends what they are testing: some things might be complied against GNUTLS instead of OpenSSL. That has had a vulnerability in recent months too, but is completely unaffected by this one.
If you are not using HTTPS (or other TLS wrapped protocols) at all on those servers then you are never going to be susceptible to this particular attack at all. OpenSSH apprently does not use OpenSSL in a manner that exposes he problem, so if all you expose is HTTP and SSH then you are fine (though if your users are sending anything sensitive over plain HTTP they are at risk from other problems).
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#28I have a few ubuntu servers. When I do a "check for heartbleed" check with various tools, it says they are not vulnerable. However, these servers were installed 6 months ago and not updated for at least 2 months. How can they not be vulnerable?
The time surface of the Heartbleed attack is a lot smaller than what most think. Debian and the BSD projects moved to v1.0.1 earliest, around March/April last year.
Ubuntu only upgraded two months ago (in 12.04.4) on the 6th of Feb:
http://fridge.ubuntu.com/2014/02/06/ubuntu-12-04-4-lts-relea...
Redhat with 6.5 in November 2013:
https://access.redhat.com/site/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_E...
CentOS Feb 26th 2014:
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#29Will these automated tools work on vulnerable Android devices? If so this seems a little irresponsible, I mean it is one thing to stick it to lazy sysadmins but making it easy to exploit peoples phones seems evil.
I'm confused how openSSL on Android is a problem... isn't openSSL a server technology? Do the clients use a heartbeat for something? Or is this only relevant when you're running a server on your client device? Is OpenSSL always running as a server on Android?
Re: Heartleech: Automated OpenSSL private key extraction tool using Heartbleed
#30This should be a useful tool on its own, but I wrote it primarily because the pattern-matching rules for Snort are inadequate. IDS vendors won't fix their stuff until I can prove they are inadequate. Ugh. In the old days the mantra of full-disclosure was "well, if we don't make exploit tools, then the vendors won't issue patches." And then it became "well, if we don't make exploit tools, then the sysadmins won't patc…
I would imagine the motivation is less about money and more about having fun breaking stuff (and bragging rights). I agree though. Hard to argue that this particular security issue needed any extra attention in order to get it fixed.