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Dead Man's Switch

deadmansswitch.org

41–50 of 101 posts

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#41

Excellent way to make money :) Just run this service for a few years without actually encrypting the data, then charge $20/month to NOT release the information.

This reminded me of the old Monty Python sketch "Blackmail"[1] where they charge people to not release information. The longer you wait the more it costs you. Very funny stuff. :)

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZgwNutwK0Y

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#42

30 days seems long, but I guess if I am in a hurry I could set up 10 of them with 3 days in between so that it is always 72 hours out...

You'd need to only answer every email 27 days after receipt, which can be easily automated (no the answer, but you could delay it being shown in your inbox, or fowarded to your main or something) but it would be a pain to keep it up and not reveal info that could be harmful to the still-living you. and when you die... spam everywhere? Is that really how you'd like to be remembered? :)

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#43
post #17

This is something I've thought about, and as I see it a lot of the problems common to crypto software are manifest in this space as well. Specifically with regard to security vs useability/ease-of-adoption issues. This particular implementation transmits sensitive data in the clear and does the encryption server-side, so it's hard to take it seriously except as a remote (and unsecure) notification service. Aside from…

In any protocol, how would you manage the decryption keys? If the file's owner is dead, s/he can't provide the keys. So that means the keys must be transmitted to some trusted party before the owner's death.

That party could be the dead man's switch service, but do you want to trust them? I wouldn't. (Nothing against the operators of this site. It's just inherently risky to trust a website operator in this type of situation.)

Alternatively, the key can be given in advance to the files' intended recipients via some secure channel. For example, suppose Alice wants Bob to receive the files upon Alice's death. Alice can deliver the decryption key(s) to Bob in person, electronically with PGP, or in some other sufficiently secure manner. But in this scenario, Bob has to know about Alice's deadman's switch in advance.

So I'm wondering: Is there any way to do this a) with encryption, b) without entrusting the keys to the operator of the service, and c) without informing the recipients in advance?

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#45
post #20

I wish there was a better way of determining whether you were alive or not. There's an endless number of possibilities as to what could happen in order for me to not be able to go online and verify with that link. Why would I put myself through the stress of potentially forgetting and now I have to worry about the secrets of my dying breathe being released to the public while I'm still around. If I wanted anything to…

The problem that isn't being considered is the same as people who say "I don't care if I die from a stroke (or heart attack)". It doesn't take into account that you might get either issue and not die but be incapacitated.

Consequently anything that relies on a reply to determine if someone is still alive (even with notifying relatives) simply isn't going to end up solving the problem.

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#46

This seems like a good option if I am ever in an action movie and I need to tell the bad guy that all of the information will be released to CNN and the NYT if anything happens to me. If I come up with something I can't tell my wife while I am alive, I will probably just put it in my will.

What prevents the bad guy from torturing you until you disable the DMS, then kill you?

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#47
post #43
post #17

This is something I've thought about, and as I see it a lot of the problems common to crypto software are manifest in this space as well. Specifically with regard to security vs useability/ease-of-adoption issues. This particular implementation transmits sensitive data in the clear and does the encryption server-side, so it's hard to take it seriously except as a remote (and unsecure) notification service. Aside from…

In any protocol, how would you manage the decryption keys? If the file's owner is dead, s/he can't provide the keys. So that means the keys must be transmitted to some trusted party before the owner's death. That party could be the dead man's switch service, but do you want to trust them? I wouldn't. (Nothing against the operators of this site. It's just inherently risky to trust a website operator in this type of si…

I wonder if you can split things between several switches. In the most simple scenario, DMS #1 would receive an encrypted file to be sent to Bob in case of Alice's death. DMS #2 would receive a passphrase for the encrypted file, also to be sent to Bob (or they can be sent to Ben, who would have to meet Bob and both of them together get access)

DMS #1 and #2 (Assuming there are several 'providers' in the 'market') would need to collude or both get hacked in order to compromise the secret.

If there are more DMS services, the key can also be split between them. And I believe there are some key-splitting algorithms that even help this process further.

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#48
post #43
post #17

This is something I've thought about, and as I see it a lot of the problems common to crypto software are manifest in this space as well. Specifically with regard to security vs useability/ease-of-adoption issues. This particular implementation transmits sensitive data in the clear and does the encryption server-side, so it's hard to take it seriously except as a remote (and unsecure) notification service. Aside from…

In any protocol, how would you manage the decryption keys? If the file's owner is dead, s/he can't provide the keys. So that means the keys must be transmitted to some trusted party before the owner's death. That party could be the dead man's switch service, but do you want to trust them? I wouldn't. (Nothing against the operators of this site. It's just inherently risky to trust a website operator in this type of si…

Yes, that's what PGP is for. Encrypt whatever you want to the recipient(s)' public keys, done.

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#49
post #17

This is something I've thought about, and as I see it a lot of the problems common to crypto software are manifest in this space as well. Specifically with regard to security vs useability/ease-of-adoption issues. This particular implementation transmits sensitive data in the clear and does the encryption server-side, so it's hard to take it seriously except as a remote (and unsecure) notification service. Aside from…

An alternative is a personal instance of a DMS for each person. Maybe a Github repo linked to a service provider, like Heroku, where each person manages their own switch.

One may say this is too complicated and the layman wouldn't know how to do this, but laymen wouldn't have the need for this. Anyone who is not satisfied with the given service, must have the power and will to change it to their needs.

Re: Dead Man's Switch

#50
post #20

I wish there was a better way of determining whether you were alive or not. There's an endless number of possibilities as to what could happen in order for me to not be able to go online and verify with that link. Why would I put myself through the stress of potentially forgetting and now I have to worry about the secrets of my dying breathe being released to the public while I'm still around. If I wanted anything to…

A week seems like a short amount of time. If you're dead, we're not talking about safety here—urgency is less important. I think even a mail every month would be sufficient.

That's what http://www.deadmansswitch.net/ (disclosure: I wrote it) does, it also has configurable intervals so you can make them as short or as long as you want. It sends you an email every interval, and, if you don't reply to any of them, it sends your messages.
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