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CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

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Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#91
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Coding is a purely ancillary function to my day job; I am not a developer.

"I hate coding" would be a problem for us, but "I ship software every day", not so much.

How about "I really enjoyed microcorruption and the crypto challenges, but am mostly working as a mechanical engineer"?

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#92
post #91
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"I hate coding" would be a problem for us, but "I ship software every day", not so much.

How about "I really enjoyed microcorruption and the crypto challenges, but am mostly working as a mechanical engineer"?

"Really enjoying Microcorruption and the crypto challenges" puts people pretty high up on my priority list.

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#93
post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is also important to always remember that a crypto app isn't like other apps. If the protesters in Turkey rely on shoddy crypto today, it might cost them their lives a few months from now. I sincerely hope it doesn't come to that but it is a realistic example. Always be sure of what you are doing, rely on external review and never, I repeat, _never_ overstate the security of your crypto system.

This point cannot be emphasized enough. In the extreme case, which Cryptocat marketing materials have employed, secure communications software is life safety critical on a level similar to medical or aviation software. As such, the admit-your-mistakes-and-fix-them-later model of development isn't agile, open, or any of those buzzwords. It's a way to get people killed.

Cryptocat has always provided ample warnings that no software can ever be trusted with your life. These warnings appear every time you launch Cryptocat, on the website and in various guides and blog posts.

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#94

This is most alarming. CryptoCat's OTR implementation on all platforms allows a chat peer to change their OTR key during a chat session without user notification. An attacker performing a man-in-the-middle attack against the client's XMPP or HTTPS stream can inject their own OTR key in the discussion after a user has authenticated their peer's OTR fingerprint. This permits the attacker to decrypt all messages that foll…

This issue (or one with very similar effect) was also found by the Least Authority audit: https://github.com/cryptocat/cryptocat/issues/607

(The 'issue E' that it references is https://github.com/cryptocat/cryptocat/issues/606 .)

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#95
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Speaking of the vulnerabilities that our team found, here is our blog post about it and a link to our report and the github issue tickets that we opened: Here is our blog post about our audit of Cryptocat, which was also announced today: https://leastauthority.com/blog/

There is great stuff in here, including the CTR nonce reuse bug that Nadim wrote about earlier. Ouch.

Thanks! I'm very proud of our work in this audit.

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#96
post #82
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I just reviewed all open and closed bugs in TextSecure's Issues page and didn't see a single crypto protocol bug. Admittedly, I looked quickly and casually. Could you point us to one?

"I just reviewed all open and closed bugs in TextSecure's Issues page and didn't see a single crypto protocol bug. Admittedly, I looked quickly and casually. Could you point us to one?" You could not have reviewed all open and closed bugs in 8 minutes ;) Issue 1073: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure/issues/1073 Another one: Just sent an encrypted photo to someone? The photo is stored unencrypted on your ph…

These are bugs, but I'm not sure they are what you think they are. I would be worried if TextSecure indicates a message is going to be sent securely, but it is sent insecurely. This bug, however, is an edge case where TextSecure indicates that it is going to send a message insecurely, and that's what it does.

It's also true that until recently we didn't have an encrypted group chat protocol, but at no point in the past did TextSecure ever indicate that group chat was encrypted. Just the opposite.

It's important to realize that TextSecure is simultaneously a standard unencrypted SMS app as well as an encrypted chat app.

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#97
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Generally 10-50k is a good starting point for this level. Most firms are full up on work most of the time, but will often try to get interesting new companies or projects even if they're less profitable since 1) they can grow into better stuff 2) good for reputation and for retention of their own employees. Compliance-only is usually cheaper; you can buy rubber stamps for <$10k.

It's important to distinguish that the places offering the Places like that are just running a scanner against your website. In the case of an app like this (which was an iOS app), you might find a cheap place to run it through a source code analyzer (either through a cloud-hosted service like Veracode, or by running an app like AppScan). Assuming you wanted to hire a "respectable" firm to actually perform a real app…

Right -- a $10k real audit is a "deal" of some kind -- either a firm trying to win future business with a discount, or an individual doing it directly (especially from overseas, or as a side job).

You can also get a better deal if 1) you're open source, and the audit becomes part of someone's portfolio 2) you provide really clear documentation, security model, etc. to make the process more efficient 3) your app is already well-architected so the security-critical part is small, and you only audit that part.

There's probably a 100x bigger pool of people capable of doing "IT audits" and "hosting environment audits" well vs. appsec for webapp or mobile app (or especially desktop app).

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#98
post #82
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I just reviewed all open and closed bugs in TextSecure's Issues page and didn't see a single crypto protocol bug. Admittedly, I looked quickly and casually. Could you point us to one?

"I just reviewed all open and closed bugs in TextSecure's Issues page and didn't see a single crypto protocol bug. Admittedly, I looked quickly and casually. Could you point us to one?" You could not have reviewed all open and closed bugs in 8 minutes ;) Issue 1073: https://github.com/WhisperSystems/TextSecure/issues/1073 Another one: Just sent an encrypted photo to someone? The photo is stored unencrypted on your ph…

I'd also add as a TextSecure user that I assumed both of those scenarios were plausibly insecure until the recent release with secure group messengering. They're pretty open about the weak points in the application generally speaking.

I will agree with you about the UI design until the revamp in the latest release, though.

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#99
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Was it commissioned by you? The audit I saw had the Open Technology Fund's logo on it. OTF is a US Government effort driven by Radio Free Asia and the Broadcast Board of Governors. OTF, again (smartly) using US taxpayer dollars, funds audits of a variety of privacy technologies. For instance, they also funded a good-sized chunk of the Truecrypt audit.

Hi Thomas, OTF provides a form projects like ours can fill to commission this type of audit. So basically, we asked OTF to commission it for us and they accepted. TextSecure, a great encryption app that I've seen you recommend, also approached OTF and obtained an audit from iSEC via this same process. However, TextSecure decided not to publish their audit results. You can read about OTF's reaction to these audits her…

To clarify, these audits aren't a choice, they are a contractual obligation as part of receiving grant funding from OTF. Projects are allowed some flexibility in terms of when they schedule it, but it has to be done. I think it's a great idea.

Also, during the period of time when TextSecure received audits from firms as part of an OTF grant, publishing the results was not an option that was contractually available to us. It's not something we "decided."

Re: CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]

#100
post #99

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hi Thomas, OTF provides a form projects like ours can fill to commission this type of audit. So basically, we asked OTF to commission it for us and they accepted. TextSecure, a great encryption app that I've seen you recommend, also approached OTF and obtained an audit from iSEC via this same process. However, TextSecure decided not to publish their audit results. You can read about OTF's reaction to these audits her…

To clarify, these audits aren't a choice , they are a contractual obligation as part of receiving grant funding from OTF. Projects are allowed some flexibility in terms of when they schedule it, but it has to be done. I think it's a great idea. Also, during the period of time when TextSecure received audits from firms as part of an OTF grant, publishing the results was not an option that was contractually available t…

Since I am familiar with the process, I know for a fact that OTF asks every project whether they'd like to publish their audits, including TextSecure.

That being said, what is stopping you from publishing the audits today?

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