I received a phishing email from the author. I guess he must have scraped my email address from a blog post I wrote about bitcoin and coinbase. While I am glad he has made attempts to contact Coinbase, I felt like live execution of the attack was spammy, so my first instinct was the block the domain of the sender's email, which Coinbase passes through to me. In execution of his proof of concept, the author is likely…
Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
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Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#12I received a phishing email from the author. I guess he must have scraped my email address from a blog post I wrote about bitcoin and coinbase. While I am glad he has made attempts to contact Coinbase, I felt like live execution of the attack was spammy, so my first instinct was the block the domain of the sender's email, which Coinbase passes through to me. In execution of his proof of concept, the author is likely…
Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#13Granted it is not a critical flaw, but is having no limits over time really necessary for Coinbase API users?
Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#14Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#15I am curious why Coinbase is not rate limiting that API call (temp-fix) or addressing this yet (even privately)? Granted it is not a critical flaw, but is having no limits over time really necessary for Coinbase API users?
Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#16I am curious why Coinbase is not rate limiting that API call (temp-fix) or addressing this yet (even privately)? Granted it is not a critical flaw, but is having no limits over time really necessary for Coinbase API users?
What do rate limit by? There's billions of IP addresses a spammer could use, captchas can be solved by offshore farms, there's almost nothing to go by.
Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#17I didn't see any suggestion from the author, did I miss it?
Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#18I am curious why Coinbase is not rate limiting that API call (temp-fix) or addressing this yet (even privately)? Granted it is not a critical flaw, but is having no limits over time really necessary for Coinbase API users?
What do rate limit by? There's billions of IP addresses a spammer could use, captchas can be solved by offshore farms, there's almost nothing to go by.
Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#19Why do people spend extensive time [1] documenting security flaws like this [2] and going to the trouble of informing the company. And then if that doesn't work take more time to write up a blog post to get the info out?
What do they gain by doing so exactly? Is this a play for internet notoriety? Or a way to gain attention that results in future fame that leads to something later?
Or, is it as simple as it just makes them feel good (like "hey why do you play poker") or is it they believe they are making the world a better place?
[1] Because this took considerable time.
[2] Yes I know the OP indicates he is a "Information Security Enthusiast".
Re: Coinbase design allows for mass, targeted phishing of its users
#20API rate limiting seems to be their best course of action, and it's disappointing that they're ignoring you.