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How to steal Bitcoins that are protected by weak passphrases

palkeo.com

11–20 of 97 posts

Re: How to steal Bitcoins that are protected by weak passphrases

#11
Slightly different Q :

Say I have a private key with some money. All I have to do is type 'importprivkey ' in a new client and the money shows up (am I missing something)? If everyone randomly starts entering a couple of completely random combinations, is there a finite possibility that someone might simply steal a wallet? Is it like spinning a wheel of fortune?

Found a very interesting analogy here : http://www.reddit.com/r/BitcoinBeginners/comments/1uhuge/wha...

"Imagine you hide some money in a hole in the ground, and take note its GPS coordinates. Now imagine someone publishing a list of all valid GPS coordinates on the planet, down to 10cm resolution. In that list, there will be also the position of your money."

Re: How to steal Bitcoins that are protected by weak passphrases

#12
Oddly enough, the website brainwallet.org which is used to create most brainwallets seems to be in itself malicious. nullc on reddit makes an interesting comment about it.

 > "Yes, the creator of Brainwallet.org got his start with password based private keys by cracking them. Here is an old IRC log extract I pulled out for someone else who didn't believe this: https://people.xiph.org/~greg/brainwallet.txt*

  More recently he really was in IRC asking for information on faster cracking mechanisms, right after whining about needing money. But uh, he might have just been trying to further convince himself that brainwallets really are secure and that it's really the users fault (or a MITM on the site) when they get robbed.

  I'm less inclined to assume malice, and more inclined to assume that he's clueless— both of the insecurity of these schemes, the acceptability of blaming the victims when users inevitably choose poor keys, and how scammy his own actions look. But thats just my own impression.

  When you choose to use something like that you should start with the assumption that the creator is malicious and ask yourself why its safe to use anyways. For the Bitcoin reference software you can point to the large amount of open public review, processes which prove the binaries agree with the source, etc. For brainwallet.org? Not much.

  So if ever you find the prospect that the creator of something might be a bit black-hat and this concerns you thats potentially a red-flag."

Probably more concerning, the first "random" key the website displays is "correct horse battery staple", which people get their funds stolen from almost constantly.

http://blockr.io/address/info/1JwSSubhmg6iPtRjtyqhUYYH7bZg3L...

Re: How to steal Bitcoins that are protected by weak passphrases

#13
post #4

Or: why not to use brainwallets.

What about a high entropy set of 4 words for the passphrase? This should give you fairly decent security.

Right idea, but 4 is not enough.

  echidna:~ gwillen$ wc -l /usr/share/dict/words
    235886 /usr/share/dict/words
You get something like 17 bits of password strength per word, depending on the size of your dictionary. (The relevant xkcd estimates more like 11 -- which makes sense because /usr/share/dict/words has a lot of obscure words, shitty words, and alternate forms of words, that you would probably exclude when generating a password.)

So if you want a passphrase that's secure against brute force, you'd want more like 7-12 words.

Re: How to steal Bitcoins that are protected by weak passphrases

#14
post #11

Slightly different Q : Say I have a private key with some money. All I have to do is type 'importprivkey ' in a new client and the money shows up (am I missing something)? If everyone randomly starts entering a couple of completely random combinations, is there a finite possibility that someone might simply steal a wallet? Is it like spinning a wheel of fortune? Found a very interesting analogy here : http://www.redd…

There's 2^160 different public keys, the chance of hitting one of this accidentally is so vanishingly small that it doesn't even warrant thinking about it. The improbability of this event is literally the basis of all cryptology; big keyspaces are difficult to bruteforce without unlimited resources and unlimited energy.

Re: How to steal Bitcoins that are protected by weak passphrases

#16
post #14
post #11

Slightly different Q : Say I have a private key with some money. All I have to do is type 'importprivkey ' in a new client and the money shows up (am I missing something)? If everyone randomly starts entering a couple of completely random combinations, is there a finite possibility that someone might simply steal a wallet? Is it like spinning a wheel of fortune? Found a very interesting analogy here : http://www.redd…

There's 2^160 different public keys, the chance of hitting one of this accidentally is so vanishingly small that it doesn't even warrant thinking about it. The improbability of this event is literally the basis of all cryptology; big keyspaces are difficult to bruteforce without unlimited resources and unlimited energy.

If you analyse it as probability it makes a lot more sense than intuitively thinking about it. A login & a password combination can also be seen as a unique string combination and so is 2FA i.e. a 3 string combination. Not really multiple levels of security mathematically.

Re: How to steal Bitcoins that are protected by weak passphrases

#20
The human mind can't generate enough entropy to create a secure brainwallet in that way. However, the reverse is permissible: use Bitcoin Armory or Electrum to generate a wallet, and then you should memorize the BIP39 mnemonic: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawi...
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