121–126 of 126 posts
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I cant understand anything that you wrote. Yes you can distribute keys in a blockchain. After Alice grabs a key out of the blockchain how does she know it is Bob's key and not Eve's?
This is a better summary then I can hack together: http://namecoin.info/ I have issues with their implementation, but in general the message is right.
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This is a better summary then I can hack together: http://namecoin.info/ I have issues with their implementation, but in general the message is right.
How does Alice attest to Carol's key so that Bob (who trusts Alice) can identify/use Carol's key for communication?
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Because they can be used against you and you won't be able to deny the message has originated from you, which is a desirable security/privacy property in a messaging app setting. OTR, and mpOTR[1] in particular, try hard to remove non-repudiability from messages. [1]: http://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/pubs/mpotr.pdf
I always thought non-repudiability was desirable and what whistleblowers need is anonymity. Thanks for that link.
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Most of these points are completely wrong. > * Text messages and most other chat protocols require that you trust multiple hardware vendors, multiple software vendors, and multiple telcos. By comparison, iMessage only requires that you trust a single company, Apple. This is incorrect. It requires you to trust Apple, every company who operates a CA, every government who can compel any CA to mint a certificate (read: y…
Every one of your objections relies upon the assertion that iMessage is vulnerable to certificate forging attacks. Do you have a citation? Has this been demonstrated, or is it theoretical?
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Every one of your objections relies upon the assertion that iMessage is vulnerable to certificate forging attacks. Do you have a citation? Has this been demonstrated, or is it theoretical?
Now you're just being willfully ignorant.
Citation, please?
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The NSA's intercepts are a lot different from this. The problem with PRISM and the FISA courts that the NSA is intercepting all the data they think they'll ever need, then they need a warrant to query it. It inverts the intention of what warrants are for, which is to require just cause before any surveillance happens. With iMessage, if the FBI gives apple a warrant to include their snooping pubkey as an additional en…
My comment to which you replied was tongue-in-cheek, responding to the fellow who was defending lawful intercept. The point is that the NSA's intercepts, though controversial, have not halted nor have they been declared unlawful. (Not talking here about 215 programs.) You're correct about iMessage, which is an important point to make. But you're not correct about PRISM; see my article from last summer: http://news.cn…
I made no claim that about direct access to servers, but I guess since the rumors of direct server access and "PRISM" are synonymous in popular news articles, it was misleading to use the term. My point still stands if you replace "PRISM" with "NSA's dragnet surveillance", which is surely happening.