The new "Security through trust in big corp" model.
also known as feudal security, where the serfs just have to trust their lord knows whats best for them.
Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
101–110 of 126 posts
Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#102More so that its rivals, Apple has consistently put forth a greater effort to explain their technology to its customers. Apple has remained keen to point out the difficulties of hardware and software development. Perhaps this is one reason why people outside of the technology sector perceive Apple products as superior. People think Apple has gone the extra mile.
Perhaps not how I'd phrase it, but I do love reading Apple's documents and whitepapers. They're all designed and laid out so well for reading the information. It's amazingly rare for that kind of stuff. I read the entire document and found it fascinating.
Apple Style Guide
https://help.apple.com/asg/mac/2013/ASG_2013.pdf
Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#103Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, maybe not. Web of Trust has serious scaling issues. https://bitcointalk.org/oldSiteFiles/byzantine.html Blockchain based key distribution may let you anchor trust to a decentralized process.
I am really curious why/how you think the byzantine link relates to key distribution and the web of trust?
The byzantine Trust issue is really just all agreeing on a a value. A handle/name and public key pair is such a value. We can distribute public keys in a block-chain. This pushes MIM attacks down to the last mile between a block-chain server and client and to the identifier exchange. The user can run their of own Block-chain server and authenticate via sneakernet if need be and we can at least be assured that you are communicating with the person who's handle matches the key (even if it might not be the person we think it is).
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A Blockchain makes a good backed for a web of trust because it lets us use the above to link an identifier with a public key and server. One of the primary scaling issues with a web of trust based authentication is that names get long fast: PersonA.PersonB.PersonC.Otherguy. A blockchain allows for a universal naming scheme and a central place to store high confidence links that is faster then querying the peers I trust and asking if they have a link to an arbitrary node.
Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#104Earlier quoted context omitted.
They could publish the source, but how do you know that source is running on your iPhone?
Compile it yourself or get some trusted party to it for you, and sideload it. "But you can't sideload iOS apps!" Well, then we're back to what Apple could do.
Which was my point...
Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#105Earlier quoted context omitted.
Compile it yourself or get some trusted party to it for you, and sideload it. "But you can't sideload iOS apps!" Well, then we're back to what Apple could do.
Which was my point...
What was your point? All I said was that they could prove it. If allowing sideloading is required, so what?
Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#106Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#107Talk is cheap, show the code
Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#108The combination of dislike for Apple and paranoia in this thread makes for a pretty potent combination. Every communication channel has it's flaws. Once upon a time, the post office was opening mail to read it, or wiretaps on telegrams and telephones. Now, it's iMessage. Every channel has potential exploitations, and if you can't agree with the ones that a channel comes with, don't use it. iMessage is optional. SMS is optional. Don't open your mail. Whatever.
Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#109Much better than I expected, it may not be perfect but it seems like the most secure of the mainstream chat services. I would love to also have seen forward security but that's asking for quite a bit.
Re: Apple Explains How Secure iMessage Is
#110Earlier quoted context omitted.
And it's far better than other messaging services where messages can be read by the server (e.g. Google talk). If they/the government wanted to read your messages, at last they'd have to jump through some hoops.
A single, very easily jumpable hoop: sending a lawyer to the nearest friendly judge, asking him/her to sign a warrant.
Better than no hoop.