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As mentioned in other comments, you have to trust Apple to hand you the correct public keys. They could easily MITM you and decrypt the messages on the server if they misrepresent the other party's public key. Additionally, the iMessages you send are signed by your private key, which is probably not something you want.
Why not?
As mentioned in other comments, you have to trust Apple to hand you the correct public keys. They could easily MITM you and decrypt the messages on the server if they misrepresent the other party's public key. Additionally, the iMessages you send are signed by your private key, which is probably not something you want.
More to the point, they could be forced under court order (or FAA 702 order etc.) to MITM. This is a cousin to the Lavabit scenario. Nothing wrong with end-to-end encryption, folks. Why don't we have more of it?
Complacency and laziness. There is no excuse.
The way Apple could "read" the messages is by sending a keybag down to the person sending the messages with another public key, one that Apple holds the private key for. For example if you have 3 devices (iPhone, iPad, MBP) and someone goes to send you a message, they have to re-encrypt the message three times because Apple would have sent them three public keys. Now if Apple were evil because of a government order,…
Lawful intercept isn't evil.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Users get both a push notification and email when a new device is added to the key bag. So additionally this step would need to be maliciously skipped.
And since Apple owns the infrastructure and we can't validate anything about it, there is little reason to believe they couldn't maliciously skip steps.
Author isn't very clever about crypto attacks. Sending device grabs all of the recipients public keys (as well as all of their own keys for other devices, which allows the conversation to be replicated on all of their own devices as well) hosted by Apple. Sending device has no way to verify those keys belong to the intended recipient . User has no way to verify which, or how many devices they are sending to. User doe…
Users get both a push notification and email when a new device is added to the key bag. So additionally this step would need to be maliciously skipped.
If you're spoofing the keyserver, it's invisible to Apple. If you're the FBI and serving a warrant on Apple, Apple does not send the message telling you that "FBI's MacBook Pro has logged in to your iCloud Account."
That sounds great and super secure, but all I wanted was a single line goto statement fixed asap. Took forever and basically made my phone, tablet, personal laptop and gifts I gave for Christmas insecure for a long time.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
And since Apple owns the infrastructure and we can't validate anything about it, there is little reason to believe they couldn't maliciously skip steps.
Actually, is it not possible to do a count on the key bag?
Think of an SSH client that never verifies host keys and never warns you when they change. That's basically what iMessage is.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
More to the point, they could be forced under court order (or FAA 702 order etc.) to MITM. This is a cousin to the Lavabit scenario. Nothing wrong with end-to-end encryption, folks. Why don't we have more of it?
> Nothing wrong with end-to-end encryption, folks. Why don't we have more of it? Complacency and laziness. There is no excuse.