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One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

lauren.vortex.com

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Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#81
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With blackjack and hookers?

he's not wrong about SSL being poor.. rather, the CA system is what I consider to be poor. there was the idea of notaries that never took off, but that would be ideal imho.

yes notaries + alternative DNS. problem is really the root (literally). its the same thing: somebody running a server and making decisions based on profit/power what goes into that server. I mean you choose whether you go to GoDaddy or Comodo, but that's about it. with .com you don't even have a choice but verisign. DNSsec add insult to injury, by making domain regs the CA's. and this 'proposal' is really the height of absurdity. AT&T shouldn't be writing the trust protocols.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#82
post #6

There was another article on here a week or two ago effectively blasting the http/2.0 wg for doing stupid things. I think it was the "HTTP 308 incompetence expected" article. Now this. I'm beginning to wonder if I want anything to do with HTTP/2.0.

Both this article and that one were impressively alarmist. Speaking as someone who has implemented a HTTP/2.0 client stack it's really nothing like as bad as either of these articles makes out.

For once, I invite you to fully read the comments on this post and the one you're referring to. Or, alternatively, take a read of the draft RFCs and the WG mailing list, which is totally open.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#83
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The web is long overdue for a method to specify an exact resource, by content-hash, from one-of-whatever-sources. Those sources can then be other less-secure protocols, even those unanticipated by the referrer, because the client got the necessary verifier via the secure-path.

That's actually a very good idea... Browsers could load the jquery file in your cache by its hash, rather than its URL. No more having 100 copies of jquery.min.js in your cache just because they're from different URLs.

It might have privacy issues, though. Say you copy the HN logo to your server, and then serve it with an hash. You can then tell if the person has visited HN by seeing if their browser asks for the logo.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#84
post #53

I've become increasingly more disgusted with IETF since I found out they have at least a few NSA agents working with them on protocols, and more importantly refusing to kick them out - even after all the Snowden revelations with NSA trying to subvert and undermine encryption protocols: http://mirrors.dotsrc.org/fosdem/2014/Janson/Sunday/NSA_oper... Then I find out that they've been working with Cisco on another simil…

If you consider a standards body corrupt because they have a single member you disagree with, you might be failing at politics.

It's not like they are just some "ordinary" bad guys, like A&T, who just want to make some bucks. The NSA is one of the most dangerous enemys to free speech and the freedom of the Internet. There is a high chance that they are going to undermine all our efforts to make a free and secure internet.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#85
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Really? That's a special kind of evil and should be illegal. Nah, no need to make it illegal. He's referring to AT&T's "GigaPower" gigabit service in Austin... the same service that's available from 2 other providers for the same, or cheaper, as what AT&T's charging for their data-mined bullshit. AT&T will have a fun time getting customers when Google and Grande point that out in their attack ads. :D

Unless Grande and Google eventually decide to do the same thing. Why not, from their perspective?

Frankly, I would be surprised if this was not in Google's ToS from the start, considering that Google's core business model is mining of big data. I suspect there wouldn't be an option to turn it off, not even by paying extra.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#86
I'm not an expert in internet security or crypto. Some of the comments below raise some interesting points both defending the intent (and implementation) of it and pointing out the flaws. However, as an unsophisticated person interested in my data security, this sounds absolutely awful. Hopefully more clarity on this emerges.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#87
post #71

Er, actually reading the specification, it's about proxying http resources, not https ones. This proposal is strictly better than the transparent proxying that's common on the internet today. To distinguish between an HTTP2 connection meant to transport "https" URIs resources and an HTTP2 connection meant to transport "http" URIs resource, the draft proposes to register a new value in the Application Layer Protocol n…

I think the crucial thing to understanding this is this diagram - UserAgent Proxy Server TLS Session #1 TLS Session #2 HTTP which makes it clear that the point is to be able to say "I trust this proxy sufficiently that I'm ok with it acting as an intermediary, but I still don't want my stuff in the clear between me and the proxy or between the proxy and the far end server." So it's about enabling the user to trust -o…

If your definition of "better" is simply "faster", then yes, it is better. If you care about security of your data, end-to-end, this is worse (as others have pointed out because of your ISP being a MitM). In addition, now we are introducing another vector of attack for bad guys to exploit - how enticing does it sound that every ISP becomes a root certificate authority, essentially?

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>if I own a device, No-one should legally be allowed control over it? Then tech companies might start leasing out their devices: you technically don't own it, so you're not allowed to do what you want to it. Not that the Right to Root wouldn't be nice, but the change in attitude has to come first. And we need to somehow convince the likes of Apple that their DRM is bad for business.

Wasn't that written from a mac/ipad?

errrr... yes. My iphone actually. (How could you tell? Or was that a lucky piece of sarcasm)

If the signatories to the US constitution owned slaves, I can use an iPhone while still wanting the Right to Root.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#89
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not that simple. If you are going to use HTTPS, you need to use it for all content on that domain. Otherwise if you load for example a large javascript file over HTTP, the attacker can just poison that file and control your whole page. Even if you loaded an image from the same domain, your credentials would sent sent as a cookie in plain text. You could use a separate domain for content as explained here: http:/…

The web is long overdue for a method to specify an exact resource, by content-hash, from one-of-whatever-sources. Those sources can then be other less-secure protocols, even those unanticipated by the referrer, because the client got the necessary verifier via the secure-path.

To solve this problem in the context of HTTP proxying you'd need more than just a way to refer to arbitrary content (which, honestly, doesn't need to be a crypto hash, it just needs to be an arbitrary identifier unique to the user and session). First, consider why we use HTTPS (in an overly-simplistic view):

1. Integrity

You want to make sure the data you're getting is from the source you expect, and that it hasn't been compromised. HTTPS does this with PKI by enabling you to verify the destination host is really who they say they are (Certificates) and to only trade data with them. Anybody who doesn't pass the signed-certificate-verifying test, doesn't get to give us data.

2. Secrecy

We don't want anyone else knowing what our data is because it may contain sensitive information. Once we verify the identity of the sender, each session is independently encrypted to prevent later decoding.

So what would we need to cache our content and retain its integrity and secrecy? The simplest thing would be encrypted blobs of data signed by our destination host's certificate. A proxy could keep data for a set amount of time, perhaps each piece of data encapsulated in a different session. All our client would need to do was connect once and initiate a session, and the server could deliver a copy of the encrypted/signed payload to the proxy.

With some magic flags in the new protocol our client could be instructed that the server allows the client to make a 'proxy request' to the destination for content. This request could be made in such a way that it allows a proxy to intercept this request from the client (which could be plaintext actually), get the encrypted chunk from the destination (which could also be done plaintext), and the proxy could deliver the chunk to the client, similar to what it does now with HTTP. Since the chunk was signed and encrypted by the destination, the proxy can't do anything but deliver the exact copy the destination gave it. Our client receives the data it wants from the proxy and verifies it's from the destination, unpacks it and loads it.

  1. Client requests content from server (HTTPS)
  2. Server replies back that server allows proxy requests (HTTPS)
  3. Client sends request again with proxy-request flags and arbitrary content identifier & session identifier (HTTP)
  4. Proxy receives request, gets content from server (HTTP)
  5. Proxy replies to client delivering content from server (HTTP)
  6. Client verifies content was signed by server
Of course this would be limited in its usefulness compared to plaintext caching; it would be user and session specific, so only lots of requests by the same client in a session would benefit from this. But it would theoretically save on bulk requests of encrypted content while preserving integrity and secrecy.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#90
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the crucial thing to understanding this is this diagram - UserAgent Proxy Server TLS Session #1 TLS Session #2 HTTP which makes it clear that the point is to be able to say "I trust this proxy sufficiently that I'm ok with it acting as an intermediary, but I still don't want my stuff in the clear between me and the proxy or between the proxy and the far end server." So it's about enabling the user to trust -o…

If your definition of "better" is simply "faster", then yes, it is better. If you care about security of your data, end-to-end, this is worse (as others have pointed out because of your ISP being a MitM). In addition, now we are introducing another vector of attack for bad guys to exploit - how enticing does it sound that every ISP becomes a root certificate authority, essentially?

indeed - but I think its even worse than that, because even "faster" is rather contextual.

proxies can inject dog leg routes, single points of failure, computational and i/o bottlenecks and they make lovely centralized dos and data theft targets. They also often downgrade you out of performance enhancements that the client and server would have negotiated if they had been speaking directly (e.g. some actually block compression negotiation so they can observe the content of more flows with less cpu).

Sometimes they do make things faster though - its just not clear to me why we want to continue to centralize that approach rather than distributing it across the network given all the baggage proxying carries.

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