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One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

lauren.vortex.com

41–50 of 95 posts

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#41
There are some kinda legitimate uses for this in certain environments -- enterprise DLP, various kinds of filtering, etc. Potentially even caching and stuff on the distant end of really weird network connections (when I go to Mars in ~30y, I'd like to have as much cached as possible, and converted to message-based vs. connection-oriented protocols).

We have good enough workarounds for this right now (putting wildcard CA certs on devices and proxying that way), but they're not awesome. So, if there were a way to keep this from being used for evil, it could make some existing non-evil activities easier.

But, on balance, the risk of evil might be too high.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HTTP/2 changes the meaning of the http:// scheme. All connections will now be TLS-encrypted. (Edit: Maybe not. See hobohacker below.) http:// means that the endpoint has not been verified using the CA system and is using a self-signed certificate (and is thus trivially vulnerable to a MITM should certificate keys not be checked out-of-band). The purpose is to provide confidentiality to the vast majority of traffic, e…

HTTP/2 does not change the meaning of http:// . That's the opportunistic encryption proposal: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nottingham-httpbis-alt-svc-... . For more information, you can see https://insouciant.org/tech/http-slash-2-considerations-and-... .

Thanks for this correction; I was under the impression that opportunistic encryption had already been chosen based on HTTP/2 descending from SPDY, but I clearly am not following the WG all that closely.

Is a fair reading of your blog post that it has a high likelihood of succeeding?

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#44
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HTTP/2 changes the meaning of the http:// scheme. All connections will now be TLS-encrypted. (Edit: Maybe not. See hobohacker below.) http:// means that the endpoint has not been verified using the CA system and is using a self-signed certificate (and is thus trivially vulnerable to a MITM should certificate keys not be checked out-of-band). The purpose is to provide confidentiality to the vast majority of traffic, e…

Can you elaborate on those AT&T plans?

It's part of GigaPower (their 300Mbps, soon-to-be 1Gbps FTTH service they rolled out quickly after the Google Fiber announcement). AT&T does a good job of obscuring it on their website[0], but if you click "See offer details", you'll find that the $70/month price is a "special" that requires you opting in to "AT&T Internet Preferences", which is their euphemism for DPI. It's not explained there, but if you opt out, you lose the "special" and your price goes to $99/month.

From just a random googling, here's the first news article I found detailing the plan.[1] (See the last three paragraphs.)

[0]: http://att.com/gigapower

[1]: http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57615246-94/at-t-delivers-g...

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#45
I've become increasingly more disgusted with IETF since I found out they have at least a few NSA agents working with them on protocols, and more importantly refusing to kick them out - even after all the Snowden revelations with NSA trying to subvert and undermine encryption protocols:

http://mirrors.dotsrc.org/fosdem/2014/Janson/Sunday/NSA_oper...

Then I find out that they've been working with Cisco on another similar thing to this one for "legal intercepts", a.k.a "trusted backdoors", like we're seeing above.

https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-10/Cross_Tom/Bl...

With NIST being already corrupted by the NSA, and now W3C becoming corrupted by MPAA, too, I think we're seeing the decay and fall of the "standard bodies", because I don't believe the Internet will tolerate these moves. The Internet will ignore them, do its own thing, and make it popular. I think future standards will be built from the bottom-up, and if I'm not mistaken most of the Internet so far has been built that way anyway.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#46
The specification indeed is about proxying http resources, not https ones. So it's not initially as alarming as some other proposals discussing trusting proxies to intercept SSL connections. For more details, you can refer to https://insouciant.org/tech/http-slash-2-considerations-and-....

This specific proposal is interesting because it specifically is related to opportunistic encryption proposals, in particular, the one that allows sending http:// URIs over an unauthenticated TLS connection: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nottingham-httpbis-alt-svc-.... The problem here for proxies is, if you mix http and https (authenticated) traffic on the same TLS connection, the proxy cannot tell if it can safely MITM the connection. The proxy vendor would like to know if it can do so, probably for network management / caching / content modification reasons. Of course, the point of the opportunistic encryption proposal is to increase security (although its actual effective impact is controversial: https://insouciant.org/tech/http-slash-2-considerations-and-...). But if you believe in opportunistic encryption's security purposes, then it doesn't seem to really make sense to make the MITM'able traffic identifiable so proxies on the network path can successfully MITM them without detection.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HTTP/2 does not change the meaning of http:// . That's the opportunistic encryption proposal: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nottingham-httpbis-alt-svc-... . For more information, you can see https://insouciant.org/tech/http-slash-2-considerations-and-... .

Thanks for this correction; I was under the impression that opportunistic encryption had already been chosen based on HTTP/2 descending from SPDY, but I clearly am not following the WG all that closely. Is a fair reading of your blog post that it has a high likelihood of succeeding?

Only time will tell. It's all still in progress. Of all the major browser vendors (Firefox, Chromium, IE) present at the Zurich HTTP/2 interim meeting, only Patrick McManus (Firefox) has expressed interest. Notably, he's a co-editor of that Alternate-Services internet-draft.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HTTP/2 changes the meaning of the http:// scheme. All connections will now be TLS-encrypted. (Edit: Maybe not. See hobohacker below.) http:// means that the endpoint has not been verified using the CA system and is using a self-signed certificate (and is thus trivially vulnerable to a MITM should certificate keys not be checked out-of-band). The purpose is to provide confidentiality to the vast majority of traffic, e…

> http:// means that the endpoint has not been verified using the CA system and is using a self-signed certificate (and is thus trivially vulnerable to a MITM should certificate keys not be independently checked). Right. I understand that. The lack of certificate verification for the http scheme means that ISPs can MITM HTTP traffic with or without this proposal, just like they can with HTTP/1.1. So how does this pro…

> Really? That's a special kind of evil and should be illegal.

Nah, no need to make it illegal. He's referring to AT&T's "GigaPower" gigabit service in Austin... the same service that's available from 2 other providers for the same, or cheaper, as what AT&T's charging for their data-mined bullshit.

AT&T will have a fun time getting customers when Google and Grande point that out in their attack ads. :D

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#49
post #3

Another stab at using 'Trusted proxies' huh? I thought we had learnt that lesson a while ago.. Can we move on please, internet?

The fact is "trusted proxies" are a real thing right now. Plenty of private networks require that you trust one or more private CA roots and all SSL are intercepted and filtered. It is sort of a pain to do. You have to use something like Microsoft System Center to push the root onto all managed computers.

This IETF proposal just formalizes it.

Re: One of the Most Alarming Internet Proposals I've Seen

#50
The amusing thing about this is that MITM can also be used to one's personal benefit -- I run a local filtering proxy that strips off most of the crap on the majority of sites, and I've had to do a bit of hex editing to be able to do that without the browser complaining.

Look at it another way: With browsers becoming more and more unconfigurable and nearing the point of being user-hostile, it is any wonder that the content providers would want their content, whether or not the user likes it, to be delivered unchanged and forced upon the user? All the Snowden stuff has made us feel that way, but what I'm saying is that the one who is doing the MITM isn't always malicious.

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