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About the security content of iOS 7.0.6

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Re: About the security content of iOS 7.0.6

#34
post #27

Looks like they weren't checking the hostname in the certificate. This would allow anyone with a certificate signed by a trusted CA to do a MITM attack on iOS devices. Very very bad vulnerability.

It seems to be a bit more than that, as I've verified that iOS 7.0.4 and Mac OS X 10.9.1 both refuse to connect to a server with a certificate for a different hostname. Sounds like verification is somehow different when connecting to a raw IP address. Safari treats that case differently, anyway: if I try to connect to a hostname that's different from what the certificate says, it simply refuses to establish the conne…

Maybe due to lots of appliances that run HTTPS with a self-signed cert to "productname", but are often accessed via an IP?

Re: About the security content of iOS 7.0.6

#35
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can do that but you'll be throwing certificate errors everywhere if they're self signed. By the sounds of it this is a bypass or method of getting around the CA altogether.

Yes, normally certificate errors would be thrown. In this case Apple is not performing the domain validity checks on the presented cert. This allows an attacker that is performing an mitm attack to present a valid cert for another domain and establish an SSL connection with the victim.

Ugh, that's unbelievably awful.

Re: About the security content of iOS 7.0.6

#36

If I believe [1], 4% of all the iOS devices are still on versions earlier than 6, and will not be patched to this specific issue. This is pretty severe. I wonder (but presume not) if Apple is going to issue patches for earlier versions. [1] http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/12/31/ios-7-now-installe...

iOS 6 gets a fix too: http://arstechnica.com/apple/2014/02/apple-releases-ios-7-0-...

Really old devices are probably out of luck, though. I think that would encompass the original iPhone, the 3G, the corresponding iPods Touch, and (probably most importantly) the first generation iPad. That's assuming, of course, that the bug is in iOS 4/5 in the first place, but if it dates back to iOS 6 I'd give good odds that it dates back farther still.

Re: About the security content of iOS 7.0.6

#37
post #10
post #9

[deleted]

https://gist.github.com/rmoriz/fb2b0a6a0ce10550ab73 http://i.imgur.com/CoALymQ.png (i've not checked that on iOS or Apple TV just on OSX. Maybe it's another issue but the update description pretty much fits too well ;-)

Interesting: bare IP addresses as you demonstrated but they do still appear to catch mismatched hostnames:

https://213.133.107.227.xip.io/

Still an epic QA failure but much less of a threat if it doesn't allow arbitrary MITM attacks.

Re: About the security content of iOS 7.0.6

#38

Does anyone know if this is an issue at the Foundation API level (affecting any apps using NSURLConnection, for example) or if it's a Safari issue?

It's actually the reverse: Safari at least performs additional checks and does not appear to be affected, which would explain why this wasn't noticed faster. The big question is whether those checks are specific to Safari or to a higher-level API which most Cocoa apps would use.

Re: About the security content of iOS 7.0.6

#40
post #16

It's not just cURL. It's much bigger, and much worse. http://pastebin.com/Yb6pUvr6

So, I'm not sure about that one. Apparently s_client ignores the error and completes the connection because it's intended to be used for debugging.

> Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.

https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/s_client.html

https://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-users@openssl.org/msg71...

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