The thing is that they already have the framework to do this. A senator is immune from prosecution for anything state on the floor of the senate. If Wyden is on the senate floor, he could read off the nuclear launch codes and there's not a damn thing that the executive can do about it. Furthermore, the senate has closed sessions. They had one just a couple of years ago for the START treaty. A senator could take the f…
Is the senate floor secure from advanced eavesdropping? Can't you bounce a laser off of the marble and listen in?
I believe they can have a senate session in a more secure location if it becomes necessary. More worrying is what happens when you now have 535 publicity-seeking people knowing about it. See AnimalMuppet's comment upthread, which I think sums the situation up pretty well.
Or you could read Cryptonimicon, which is a lot slower, but more fun: http://www.amazon.com/Cryptonomicon-Neal-Stephenson/dp/00605... Startups and science fiction... that book is a favorite of mine.
It's more historical fiction than science-fiction.
Yeah, but it still feels like science fiction for some reason.
Schneier links to a Wikipedia article about Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and explains that he wanted to speak to the members of Congress in such a facility, but could not do so because he is denied access to such facilities as someone without the appropriate security clearances. And that puzzled me, and prompted me to read the Wikipedia article after reading Schneier's blog post submitted here, because I had been told years ago, when I definitely did not have the appropriate level of clearance for a SCIF (as I have never had and probably never will have) that I did have access to a special hearing room for one of the congressional intelligence oversight committees. I was inside the room at the time, with foreign visitors. (I was there as the interpreter for the foreign visitors.) I saw the hearing room back in the 1980s, as I recall, as part of a people-to-people program funded by the United States government that brought over people from other countries to look at how society works in the United States. The look inside the secure room was part of learning about how intelligence agencies in the United States are overseen by Congress. It was represented to us that when the room in the Capitol was closed up, it was impervious to any then-known form of surveillance. So now what Schneier says has me puzzled about whether or not there is any level of secure room between what he calls a "regular room" and a room that a United States citizen can only enter with a very high level of security clearance. It seems to me that there ought to be some kind of in-between room like that, precisely for meetings like the one Schneier just had. That would be better for effective congressional oversight, I think.
Schneier links to a Wikipedia article about Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and explains that he wanted to speak to the members of Congress in such a facility, but could not do so because he is denied access to such facilities as someone without the appropriate security clearances. And that puzzled me, and prompted me to read the Wikipedia article after reading Schneier's blog post submitted he…
There are standard processes in pretty much every government organization for escorting uncleared personnel into a SCIF. The fact that they chose not to in this case might indicate that they aren't taking this seriously.
Schneier links to a Wikipedia article about Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and explains that he wanted to speak to the members of Congress in such a facility, but could not do so because he is denied access to such facilities as someone without the appropriate security clearances. And that puzzled me, and prompted me to read the Wikipedia article after reading Schneier's blog post submitted he…
The whole security clearance thing is rather over-rated. Many people are immediately disqualified during the background investigation because they missed a payment on something once, or changed jobs too often, or were arrested, yet never convicted of a crime.
So the fact that someone does not qualify for a security clearance says very little about them as a person.
"...Congress has such a difficult time getting information out of the NSA that they have to ask me." THIS PEOPLE! THIS is why the Snowden revelations are such a big deal! We have a rogue branch government with arguably little to no oversight!
They might not know what the NSA is up to, but they sure as hell created the mechanisms that led to that predicament.
Schneier links to a Wikipedia article about Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and explains that he wanted to speak to the members of Congress in such a facility, but could not do so because he is denied access to such facilities as someone without the appropriate security clearances. And that puzzled me, and prompted me to read the Wikipedia article after reading Schneier's blog post submitted he…
The whole security clearance thing is rather over-rated. Many people are immediately disqualified during the background investigation because they missed a payment on something once, or changed jobs too often, or were arrested, yet never convicted of a crime. So the fact that someone does not qualify for a security clearance says very little about them as a person.
There are people that have filed for bankruptcy that managed to get a TS. It would be highly unusual to be rejected for missing a single payment, provided you are current while the investigation is going on. It would also be extremely unlikely that one gets rejected for changing jobs frequently, unless one of your former employers alleged misconduct of some sort.
It makes sense that you need TS/SSBI and the correct SAP read-in to be inside a given SCIF belonging to a SAP; otherwise one might leave a recording device or otherwise damage the integrity of the SCIF. Plus, the SCIF would need to be cleared of all sensitive materials before you entered. Clearing a SCIF, letting someone inside, then recertifying it would probably be the correct choice; It could be done, of course, b…
You don't need all of that to be escorted on a single occasion. It really wouldn't be difficult at all to sanitize a conference room. People aren't likely leaving piles of classified documents on the table between meetings and if they are they need to have their own clearances suspended.
> A truly free people don't keep secrets. > What the NSA 'should be' is a National Communications Agency, wherein all harmful human activity they observe are communicated - to all and sundry! Openly! Publicly! Without any barrier to delivering full awareness - for all! This is ridiculous hyperbole. There are all kinds of legitimate secrets: trade secrets, private sexual kinks, personal financial or medical records, e…
The thing you must understand is that I do not actually consider a society with any investment in state secrecy to be actually functioning. Actually, a society ruled by secrets is little more than a mafia, playing charades. But I see you are limiting your viewpoint to 'what is real' and not to 'what could be done differently about the situation'. That's okay with me, to 'keep it real'. But I have no desire to live in…
You have blinded yourself in your understanding of a "secret" to those that have gotten coverage. And of course those secrets have been damaging and damning. Otherwise, the personal risk of exposing them is not worth the reward. And even if it was, the media would find little interest in covering them.