The Great Firewall of Yale
91–100 of 135 posts
Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#92There is no way that a valid copyright claim can be made over the underlying data because it is a statement of fact . Such a work is not eligible for copyright protection.
D&B and Lexis-Nexis have aggressively defended the copyright status of various aspects of their respective databases of facts, for example.
Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#93I thought my school was bad but reading this makes the administration at my school look like angels. When I launched a similar service at UNC Chapel Hill, the IT dept blocked requests from my server to theirs for scraping latest data. They claimed I was creating excess load, which is silly because if they really did the math, given how many people were using my service I was probably saving them resources.
the people that decide the policies that IT services implement are usually the ones that know least about IT.
Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#94I thought my school was bad but reading this makes the administration at my school look like angels. When I launched a similar service at UNC Chapel Hill, the IT dept blocked requests from my server to theirs for scraping latest data. They claimed I was creating excess load, which is silly because if they really did the math, given how many people were using my service I was probably saving them resources.
To me it feels like people protecting their little kingdoms within a large organisation. There is no market in which you have to compete against the new (superior) competitor so the only tool you are left with are fallacies like referring to regulations and proper protocol.
Also this incident makes Yale look really bad... This could end some careers.
Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#95Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#96Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#97Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#98I thought my school was bad but reading this makes the administration at my school look like angels. When I launched a similar service at UNC Chapel Hill, the IT dept blocked requests from my server to theirs for scraping latest data. They claimed I was creating excess load, which is silly because if they really did the math, given how many people were using my service I was probably saving them resources.
UNC invested in what was initially planned to be the most expensive academic ERP system ever, and which then went way over budget and schedule. The result? An even older version of PeopleSoft (which apparently is Oracle's second-tier offering) than what was being sold to other universities in prior years. It's barely useable at all. It's utter shit-ware. The prior in-house system, which was early-90s HTML presumably…
I'm also well aware of the grading scandal as I still run a grade distribution site called blinkness.com which is heavily used on campis(even though I left unc years ago). We have a feature on the site called "Top A classes" and the professor in question always ranked very highly :)
Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#99"Universities are a bastion of free speech." LOL.
Re: The Great Firewall of Yale
#100Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It doesn't matter whether you control the user environment to covertly install the MITM certificate. You simple notify your network users this is happening with instructions on how to install the certificate. Respectfully, I disagree. This is certainly possible, but from an operational perspective this would be a nightmare. Even setting aside the likely backlash that would follow in response to such a sweeping poli…
For what it's worth, at my university, UNC Chapel Hill, there are two networks, one of which requires you to install a custom root certificate, and is the network that the university prefers you connect to. For devices on which this is not possible, there is another network which only requires that you register your device's MAC address to your university id for access. Regardless of which option you choose, you are…
I've always been leery of the mitm cert, not only from the users' perspective, but also from that of the organization. If a rogue administrator used the cert to set up a "real" mitm for a local bank's site, I think the school would be on the hook for that. That's just one example; one could imagine other variations on that theme. Whereas, if the school simply acted as a normal ISP, that whole class of vulnerabilities simply doesn't apply.