11–20 of 28 posts
"A n hashing algorithm"? That struck me as odd, is this valid in any accent other than Cockney? EDIT: Oh, he's a fellow Greek. That explains that.
Reminds me of some native English speakers who say "an historic ..." Pretty common even in accents that won't drop the H. Seems like that word is an outlier though.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
"an hashing algorithm" is also valid as a way to say "one hashing algorithm". I find myself adding a "n" to "a" quite a bit since a lot of times it seems to flow better than using "a".
Only if you don't pronounce the "h", which is pretty nonstandard.
"A n hashing algorithm"? That struck me as odd, is this valid in any accent other than Cockney? EDIT: Oh, he's a fellow Greek. That explains that.
I'm confused how this is valid, since he seems to be using the OpenSSL code without the patch[1] that actually makes Dual EC work and his patch doesn't (to my C-ignorant eyes) include the fix either. Does it fix it in another way? [1] http://marc.info/?l=openssl-announce&m=138747119822324&w=2&x... [2] Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6949652
perhaps it is related to this point, since that bug causes the algorithm to get "stuck". Why wasn't this bug caught in the FIPS 140-2 validation testing? - --------------------------------------------------------------- Not only the original validation (#1747) but many subsequent validations and platforms have successfully passed the CAVP[5] algorithm tests ... several hundred times now. That's a lot of fail. In test…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
perhaps it is related to this point, since that bug causes the algorithm to get "stuck". Why wasn't this bug caught in the FIPS 140-2 validation testing? - --------------------------------------------------------------- Not only the original validation (#1747) but many subsequent validations and platforms have successfully passed the CAVP[5] algorithm tests ... several hundred times now. That's a lot of fail. In test…
Honestly I don't know why. I generate 60 bytes of pseudorandom and that worked on first try.
Has that changed ?
I found this note interesting. How big is the secret value used to compute the Q constant? Is it a single static value or does it vary? Would it be possible to brute force this? I'm not a crypto expert and want to understand this a bit better.
One of the big arguments about the NSA introducing weaknesses into these algorithms is "this makes them insecure for everyone and flaws exploited by the government could be exploited by anyone", but this makes it sound like ONLY the NSA could exploit this.
I'm not saying this is better. I just think, if true, it's an interesting discussion point in the debate.
[Cross-posted and answered at /r/netsec]: http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/1u5jvw/dual_ec_drbg_...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Honestly I don't know why. I generate 60 bytes of pseudorandom and that worked on first try.
My understanding thus far has been that openssl has gotten a pass because their implementation was always broken ... so nobody was at risk. Has that changed ?
I do not use the reseed functionality either, because I only generate two or three output blocs and never call an explicit reseed.
"I did not break the official algorithm. I do not know the secret value used to compute the Q constant, and thus cannot break the default implementation. Only NSA (and people with access to the key) can exploit the PRNG weakness." I found this note interesting. How big is the secret value used to compute the Q constant? Is it a single static value or does it vary? Would it be possible to brute force this? I'm not a c…
"I did not break the official algorithm. I do not know the secret value used to compute the Q constant, and thus cannot break the default implementation. Only NSA (and people with access to the key) can exploit the PRNG weakness." I found this note interesting. How big is the secret value used to compute the Q constant? Is it a single static value or does it vary? Would it be possible to brute force this? I'm not a c…
Right. I think the big issue is that we are one NSA key leak away from breaking every product that uses this type of encryption. It introduces a single point of failure.