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OpenSSL.org hacked?

openssl.org

61–70 of 98 posts

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#61
post #28

For when the page is fixed, it currently says: TurkGuvenligiTurkSec Was Here @turkguvenligi + we love openssl _

Yeah I dont see it at this point, so fairly fast turnaround.

I've wondered this for quite a while but why isn't there a standard for browsers like Download with check I mean no one ever checks them anyways so it's not like they're useful. The second step would to be to provide a reputable repo of software version -> checksum lookups so I didn't have to trust a given server for that. This is me thinking and drinking and I'd love comments.

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#62
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah I dont see it at this point, so fairly fast turnaround.

I've wondered this for quite a while but why isn't there a standard for browsers like Download with check I mean no one ever checks them anyways so it's not like they're useful. The second step would to be to provide a reputable repo of software version -> checksum lookups so I didn't have to trust a given server for that. This is me thinking and drinking and I'd love comments.

You run right back into if you don't already trust the signer of the checksum, you can't trust the checksum, either.

The next logical step is some kind of third party authority, and then you right right into the Certificate Authority problem set, including code signing licenses like Apple and Windows use.

Some F/OSS systems are starting to use similar systems, like the newer Python package distribution systems.

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#63
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. HSTS prevents SSLStrip attacks when the intended destination is always meant to be in SSL.

SSLStrip does not work on valid HTTPS requests. If you request an HTTPS page, it can not be subverted into HTTP. If it could, HTTPS would be pointless. So, yes, HSTS is not required for a valid HTTPS request. This is not some semantic argument, or some sort of side channel attack crap. HSTS is not necessary for HTTPS requests, period.

It's necessary for HTTP requests. Are you being deliberately obtuse?

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#64
I said this in a lower thread but I figured it's better up here.

Why is there not a standard for links of this type in browsers. Eg OpenSSL

That's a simple way to go but I really think it's as generally insecure as reading a signature form a url that is advertised by a website. It's also why I rarely bother.

But if browsers were good about this then it could be done in a much better way which is to sign the application with a real peer verifiable signing method. Such as the SSL cert that covers the site behind the open source project .

now this only works for projects that have SSL certs. Another method would be to have a clearing house that can do 1-1 with github et al and a re cert, like a oss cert organization. A final good way would be to use the beauty of git and use the source checksums and a repeatable build process (which is fricking hard) and come up with a way to give a signature for oss applications based on a git commit and check that back to the public git repository.

really I think knwon public keys for oss projects and branches would be the real answer. And the security gating for newbs would be like windows and linux which check the public signature of the application before they run them from the web and make the end user feel safe instead of doing nothing.

Browsers have a good share in this responsibility as well. Standard domain security should work well here as well. Better than what we have.

I leave this to more entreprenurial minds to make this work and I'd love some real telegraph style sinkers to point out the flaws. This is must me talking after a belated xmas dinner. but I think I'm kind of on course.

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#65
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah I dont see it at this point, so fairly fast turnaround.

I've wondered this for quite a while but why isn't there a standard for browsers like Download with check I mean no one ever checks them anyways so it's not like they're useful. The second step would to be to provide a reputable repo of software version -> checksum lookups so I didn't have to trust a given server for that. This is me thinking and drinking and I'd love comments.

Please see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6978605 as my box was moving incredibly slowly when I wrote this. Laptops are not meant for data mining.

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've wondered this for quite a while but why isn't there a standard for browsers like Download with check I mean no one ever checks them anyways so it's not like they're useful. The second step would to be to provide a reputable repo of software version -> checksum lookups so I didn't have to trust a given server for that. This is me thinking and drinking and I'd love comments.

You run right back into if you don't already trust the signer of the checksum, you can't trust the checksum, either. The next logical step is some kind of third party authority, and then you right right into the Certificate Authority problem set, including code signing licenses like Apple and Windows use. Some F/OSS systems are starting to use similar systems, like the newer Python package distribution systems.

Yes I agree. See my more fully fleshed out statement parallel. But checksums are currently pointless from a secuirty standpoint.

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#67
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. HSTS prevents SSLStrip attacks when the intended destination is always meant to be in SSL.

SSLStrip does not work on valid HTTPS requests. If you request an HTTPS page, it can not be subverted into HTTP. If it could, HTTPS would be pointless. So, yes, HSTS is not required for a valid HTTPS request. This is not some semantic argument, or some sort of side channel attack crap. HSTS is not necessary for HTTPS requests, period.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security...

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#68
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's the use in a static website or a read-only FS when you can overwrite what's in RAM, or just attack routing or DNS? Security is a little more complex.

The point is to minimize attack surfaces. If you're serving static content that's one less path for an attacker to potentially exploit. With only static files exploits are limited to those contained in the web server or the OS network code. With a read only filesystem certain classes of privilege escalation are eliminated. Attacks on routing or DNS are more difficult to deal with, but at least it isn't your server be…

Thanks for also seeing the bigger picture. In the future, I will only submit complete production conf mgmt repos uuencoded in my comments. Readability is overrated.

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#69
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, all-volunteer. There are no ongoing commercial sponsors for that project.

As it should be. There was a story in HN a few weeks ago about why open source projects better not run on funding. Something with making it obligatory to work on the project and add features just to do something. And of course the people "donating" have some say in what's going on. I'm not saying backdoors per se, but should we want any sort of pressure this way?

Sounds like there is a need to sponsor OSS writers and not the actual projects. Kind of like having tenure but of course it would have to be voluntary, merit-based, etc.

Re: OpenSSL.org hacked?

#70
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The point is to minimize attack surfaces. If you're serving static content that's one less path for an attacker to potentially exploit. With only static files exploits are limited to those contained in the web server or the OS network code. With a read only filesystem certain classes of privilege escalation are eliminated. Attacks on routing or DNS are more difficult to deal with, but at least it isn't your server be…

Are you kidding me?! At the very least suggest Grsec, SELinux, containers! Who gives a shit about "certain classes" of privilege escalation? Are you securing your webserver against 5th graders or actual hackers? If you want to minimize your attack surface, what he suggested is quite possibly the least effective possible thing anyone could do. I point out just a few of the more important issues to consider first, and…

You're missing the bigger point: enumerating every possible defense is beyond the scope of a comment AND does not exclude any technique by omission. If you'd like to raise technologies in a civil manner, please. Just don't start getting defensive and name calling. [1]

[1] http://ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html

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