61–70 of 176 posts
Cryptography Snake Oil Warning Sign #9: Cracking contests. https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9902.html (1999)
From that page: > [...] the contest is fair because 1) the algorithm is completely specified, 2) there are no arbitrary definition of what winning means, and 3) the algorithm is public domain
The cryptanalysis community, in particular, has a small group of experts that can credibly critique your ideas. They would probably love to pick apart a new system...seriously in the hopes that it advances the art, but critically in the case that it doesn't.
Claims of some kind of "tightly knit" cabal of closed minded people excluding you would be a warning sign. (It sounds like creationism. Not that this is what these guys did. I'm just saying.)
Maybe instead of a competition they could have just approached some of the cryptanalysis community for an early look? Those guys could kick the tires and pass it on to others that they know. That really seems to be how this area works.
The problem with this test is that there are many encryption systems I would consider fundamentally broken where I could not claim this prize. To make this a slightly fair challenge, we should at least be allowed to get the clear text of our choice also encrypted with the same key.
Cryptography Snake Oil Warning Sign #9: Cracking contests. https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9902.html (1999)
This Telegram contest may seem superficially similar to that fair contest, but it differs in some important ways. First, this contest isn't rewarding "best effort". Second, this contest doesn't meet those criteria, because their central server isn't being tested here. The goal of a product like Telegram is to defend against adversaries like governments, and hence governments will be able to probe their servers for weaknesses. You may say that we, too, can do the same, but if that's the case, a test server should be made available and the contest should explicitly try to get as many people as possible to break it.
This contest is interesting, but it's too artificial. As just one example of why that's the case: breaking real-world crypto often relies on side channel attacks, for instance timing attacks, and there's no opportunity of employing those attacks here due to the artificial nature of the contest.
Once again, if people here are interested in a secure alternative to Telegram that doesn't rely on public stunts for cryptanalysis, then check out TextSecure. It was designed by cryptographers, is open-source, and has been studied in detail for years. https://whispersystems.org/
EDIT: It appears Telegram is also vulnerable to MITM attacks. This is the NSA's preferred method of gathering info, so this is the most likely attack vector against Telegram. Due to the design of the protocol, there seems to be no defense. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6931892
Telegram's response is "we protect against this because if you've initiated a secret chat previously, then you're protected." However, this isn't true. 1) a global adversary like the NSA can (and will, if they become interested in Telegram) simply MITM every secret chat session when they're first initiated; therefore if you use Telegram, you should assume the government has your data anyway, since this protocol offers no protection against mass snooping. 2) Secret chats aren't even the default type of chat in Telegram anyway, making it very unlikely that users will be protected by it. The defaults need to be secure.
References:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6931892
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6931961 (Telegram's response, which seems to verify that secret chats can be MITM'd on first initiation.)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6931903 (Demonstrates that Telegram seems to be misunderstanding why someone breaking into the central server can MITM your chats.)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah, it's probably against the rules of the competition and will get you arrested if you try. But I think if someone does break into their central server and wins the competition that way, they should still be paid out.
I'm afraid breaking into Telegram's central server (by the way, there is no such thing) will hardly enable you to decipher end-to-end encrypted secret chats. But certainly worth trying anyway.
At least they'll put their money where their mouth is. I'm excited to see someone call out the naysaying masses on HN and stand by their product in this regard.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Agreed, but the tone of the previous discussion was definitely more along the lines of "This could never work, you guys don't know what you're doing." If it proves resilient over 2.5 months of highly motivated attacks (motivated by both the money / "I-Told-You-So" factor), I think that's a fairly strong statement in their favor.
Excluding an entity like the NSA, who cares nothing for $200,000 (literally a rounding error in their budget), but everything for the information available for the taking.
Logan's law: In any given discussion tangentially related to security, the thing presented as "secure" will be soon declared "definitely not secure"... because...NSA.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think it means its 200k in "bitcoin" thats near impossible to cash out at such volumes. So I think this is a PR stunt and nothing more. Rolling your own encryption has always been proven to be the worst idea.
If you don't like BTC and other cryptocurrencies, we will be happy to transfer regular 200,000 USD to you after you win. It's up to you.
I personally think it's great that people are trying various solutions. Disclaimer: I know little about cryptography