Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The mental leap here is subtle, but substantial. Since I have been told I can't use US selectors , I assume the system enforces this. As such, US citizens have nothing to worry about. I think it's fair to say most rank and file NSA employees are honest and actually do believe in their mission. The far scarier thought is how things may work at an extremely senior level (contractors included), where there's literally…
> That said, "US selectors" shouldn't return the results that they do in the first place. Determining if a "selector" is tied to a U.S. person is actually a very subtle and very hard problem. Let's take a phone number +1 (212) 555-1234 Is this a US selector? It's a selector for a phone in the US, but that's not the same thing as a phone number tied to a US citizen. Let's say I'm following a senior North African pirat…
However, my statement was not intended to be read in isolation, but in context of "domestic collection programs that intentionally capture the full contents of nearly all domestic communications within the United States." I was referring to the bulk interception and subsequent long-term retention of data on US persons.
The implication of my statement was: assuming this type of collection didn't exist, selectors related to potential US persons (for whatever reason) would simply return intercept data beginning from the time said selector was invoked.
Contrast that to the present, where selectors are capable of retroactively returning the sum total of a US person's digital (and by some extension physical) life for the past 5+ years.
It's commendable that the procedures for accessing the data of potential US persons are so stringent, but at the end of the day there is still an incredibly intimate and detailed picture of almost every single US citizen's private life being retained on a long-term basis.