Live data from Hacker News

The NSA: An Inside View

lorensr.me

181–190 of 323 posts

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#181

This article is transparent propaganda. Author is not a patriot. Author is an enemy of the people.

If the author is indeed the patriot he claims he is, would he be so kind to explain why the Bill of Rights thought it necessary to have this: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place…

If the NSA was engaged in hacking people's personal computers then the Fourth Amendment would definitely apply. Anything else is fair game and has been fair game (even the postal mail, which is protected by statute law and not the Fourth Amendment).

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#182
post #88
post #32

"Even if you are not a citizen of the Five Eyes, you shouldn't be worried about your data being viewed unless you're involved with a group of interest, such as a foreign government or violent organization." Huh, so: - My best friend's dad was a spy in the CIA - During the 70s and 80s my dad worked with Russian scientists (also ones from Poland and other Communist Bloc countries). Ecology stuff, mostly. - I've been in…

> "Even if you are not a citizen of the Five Eyes, you shouldn't be worried about your data being viewed unless you're involved with a group of interest, such as a foreign government or violent organization." This really is a key quote. Even if OP's assertions about the NSA are totally correct, even if all security protocols are followed to the letter, the problem still remains that they have a tremendous amount of p…

So, an interesting question is, how many people do you think believe that all COINTELPRO targest in fact were 'worthy of targetting'? For some targets, the number of people who today think they were 'worth of targetting' may be way different than the number who may have thought so at the time. (If MLK was held in as high regard 40 years ago as he is now, he would have had a lot less work to to do).

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#183
post #177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I take away "the NSA is full of the kind of person who won't look at the big picture, who will follow orders without exercising critical thinking, and who can be counted upon to be a Good German." That is exactly right. Employees of intelligence agencies are selected primarily for loyalty, not critical thinking. Most people find that hard to believe, especially those inside who tend to have a very high opinion of the…

It feels like saying Bletchley Park just needed more diligent and loyal crib workers and they would have solved the Enigma. Without Turing and the Bombe where would we all be?

Yeah well back then we had actual opponents. North Korea are crackpots, and some fundamentalists prefer living with goats in caves to comfortable air travel, but never in a million years will those cranks be the threat that the Axis or even the Soviets were.

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#184
I can confirm much of this article. (A couple years ago I provided some comments here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3296691)

There's lots of condemnation of the poster, and the NSA practices and some of the murkier parts of this article. I thought I'd tip in with some explanations as possible while staying outside of anything classified or naughty.

jonknee: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910978

- "It's compartmentalized enough that the individual actors can justify their actions by the assumed competence and benevolence of the others."

It's compartmentalized a bit more than the OP lets on for mostly security/separation of concerns/need-to-know reasons. For example, a Air Force analyst who is cleared to view TS//SI material won't have access to the NSA systems directly. Some of the NSA systems have external (Intelligence Community (IC)) facing equivalents that omit quite a bit of the information that less scrutinized IC analysts shouldn't have access to. w/r to the information the NSA collects, NSA employees and contractors are held to stricter standards about how that material is used and treated. An analogy, a minor commits a crime and his record is sealed. The local court employees who handle the record, the judge etc. have really nothing that prevents them from leaking that information to an overzealous cop or lawyer or some such other than the standard to which their held for their job. It's more or less the same thing with the NSA.

> The mental leap here is subtle, but substantial. Since I have been told I can't use US selectors , I assume the system enforces this.

Actually, one of the higher standards the NSA employees are held to, and I believe they sign something to effect is that it's outright illegal for them to do so and even one misuse could result in loss of employment, clearance (a death sentence in IC heavy employment areas) and possibly time in prison as a felon. This is taken very seriously and I've never known an NSA employee to not treat this rule and US citizen data as radioactive to them.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911054

> Definitely a bizarre mix, I thought it was a parody a couple of times. To combat the threat of nuclear war with the completely isolated totalitarian state of North Korea we must create and store copies of all global communication...

It's easy to generalize, and if the world worked as simply as the model you propose here, then things would be much better for everybody, but it simply doesn't. For example, to uphold various sanctions regimes, by law, the U.S. must know if a business has connections two hops out that are linked to any bad activity. For example, how did Kim Jong Il buy all his whiskey? It's outright illegal for a U.S. company to sell to the North Korean government. Okay, so they sell to an overseas distributor who then sells to the North Korean government. Turns out that's illegal as well and the government must take action to not allow the U.S. whiskey maker or the distributor to operate in the U.S. any longer. Okay, so the whiskey make checks out their distributors finds one who doesn't sell to NK, but one of their customers does. Same deal, it's illegal for anybody in that chain to operate in the U.S. After that, the chain becomes so long it's not worth looking into and Kim Jong Il was eventually able to get his whiskey.

Just talking whiskey and North Korea here, but you can guess it goes for all kinds of goods and countries under various sanction regimes. So how do you propose things should be collected? Collecting only on North Korea gets you nowhere, it's everybody else who may or may not be supplying whiskey to the Norks that makes things much harder and requires a much larger collection apparatus.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911216

> It's helping diplomats illegally snoop on our allies.

Good! Our allies are most definitely snooping on us! Spying and espionage is sometimes called the second oldest profession for a reason. There's been no time in history that two countries aren't doing a bit of spying on each other, most especially at the diplomatic level.

rst: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911150

> In fact, it's been known for months that the DEA receives intercepts from the NSA in such volume that they have an office devoted to handling them (the DEA's "Special Operations Division").

This is a problem. In general, the work the IC does in collection does not hold up to LE scrutiny. Having worked on both sides of the fence, LE is both more difficult in some cases and easier in others to work in. For example, you need a warrant to gather phone records in LE, but you can share those records more freely once you have them. In the IC the opposite is true, you can pretty much get whatever you need, but it's virtually useless if a criminal approach is taken. That's why it's often simpler to blow up the target then to arrest and try them. Parallel Construction is an investigative focusing approach that saves LE from getting collection warrants that go nowhere. The IC approach is to find the connections or whatever, then help LE figure out where to focus their warrant-based approach in doing the same collection from their side. Scrubbing U.S. Persons IC data and reusing it directly for LE is highly illegal for all of the participants involved.

revelation: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911022

> Well, following his explanations, you can fail the polygraph and just do it again. The cost of failure is zero, so really just keep trying.

Actually the penalty after enough tries is no clearance which means no job and a permanent record that you were denied a clearance...which pretty much deep sixes any attempt in the future to get one. In some parts of the country, like the Washington D.C. area, that's virtually a career death sentence.

kabdib: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910969

> My best friend's dad was a spy in the CIA

> During the 70s and 80s my dad worked with Russian scientists

> So, how likely is it that my email is read, that my phone records are looked at, and so on? What are the chances that I'll have trouble the next time I cross a border or try to board a plane? One percent? Fifty percent?

Assume it is collected but probably not read, but not for the reasons you gave above. There's just simply not enough manpower to read everybody's email, and it's a useless thing to try to accomplish. Now suppose one of the guys you email also emails somebody who's "nefarious" in some way. Then yeah, maybe your email is read. And if all you talk about in your emails are things that don't involve an armed insurrection against the United States you'll probably be filed into the "don't give a shit" bucket and the analyst will move on.

A common thread here is that everybody who's worried about their email being read seems to assume that whatever they're doing is important enough for it to get read. Trust me, it isn't.

(continued next comment)

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#185
post #150

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> nor guided in its contents by the government. Are you sure about this? The government tells you what is classified and what isn't. If you have ever been privy to any classified material, you will have made the decision to self-censor that information, to keep the essay unclassified. In other words, you will have removed information that the government told you it didn't want published. Granted the control wasn't ov…

I just mean that I wasn't told what to write by a USG PR person. The only thing I heard from the NSA about it was that I didn't have to redact anything.

Thanks for replying.

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#186

I can confirm much of this article. (A couple years ago I provided some comments here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3296691 ) There's lots of condemnation of the poster, and the NSA practices and some of the murkier parts of this article. I thought I'd tip in with some explanations as possible while staying outside of anything classified or naughty. jonknee: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910978 - "It's…

md224: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911261

> Anyone who defends the NSA on the grounds that it only targets those who are worthy of targeting needs to convince me that another COINTELPRO will never happen. I would actually welcome such an argument, since it would make me feel a whole lot better about this.

You raise a very good point. I don't think there are many in the IC who would have a problem with more (and better) oversight...it helps them feel more legitimacy in what they're doing. All that being said, assume that there will be another COINTELPRO or similar. It sucks, but to be perfectly honest with you, you aren't important enough to convince one way or the other about it or about approving of the various collection programs the NSA is running. If half of the comments here are to be taken at face value, almost nobody on HN knows enough about the issues involved to be consulted or for their opinion to be considered. I'll draw a parallel here to the outcry over technology centered court cases or software patents, an opinion often given here is that engineers or software experts should be involved in deciding those cases because the layman doesn't know enough about it to have an informed opinion. It's just as true with IC issues. What's troubling is that oversight is via Congress, who until the last election were likely laypeople themselves. So the expertise to properly evaluate, oversee and monitor what's going on simply isn't there.

sedev: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911078

> This reads like it was penned by someone who's never heard of the Stanford Prison experiment or Milgram's research...

You bring up good points. One of the issues with the IC is one of internal monitoring (as we're all now seeing). Who watches the watchers? There's notionally a number of very serious laws, or committees and counter-X professionals who are supposed to be doing this, but to be honest. Once you're cleared and stuck on a project, there's really very little day-to-day oversight of any kind. I personally would welcome a higher level of scrutiny, but I think the equation of "spend manpower watching watchers" vs. "spend manpower looking for bad guys out in the world" has, and will continue to, balance on the later.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911091

> If you'd never heard of parallel construction before today, that seems to powerfully undermine your credibility.

He only worked there for two years on a single program. I challenge anybody here who works for any organization larger than 3 people to have perfect knowledge of every single thing their organization is doing. Unless you work on the bits that interface with the LE community you'd probably never have had opportunity to know anything about it. I bet he also doesn't know the details of companies the NSA contracts to do their plumbing or handle their trash.

EthanHeilman: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910896

> The NSA has a history of sharing intelligence with LE, to state that the NSA is not a LE agency is extremely misleading, if not an outright lie.

I don't think you understand what a LE entity is, the powers and limitations that LE organizations operate under or how they differ from IC organizations. Saying the NSA is LE because they cooperate with LE is like saying the Department of Agriculture or Labor is an LE agency because they sometimes have to cooperate with LE.

jjoonathan: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910922

> It's good to hear that many NSA employees take the police/military distinction seriously, but we know for a fact that some higher-ups don't...

This is true, and it's particularly vexing to work in the IC and have senior officials asking you to participate in outright illegal activities. It doesn't happen often, but I've seen both people ruin their careers saying no and those that want to keep their job and say yes. It's usually under the auspices of "helping out to stop bad things", and it's very hard to say no when activities are couched that way...despite very many of the people on here talking publicly about their very righteous and moral high ground, placed in the same position, the vast majority of HN users would want to stop bad things from happening even if it meant crossing the line a bit here or there. Because, honestly, if you choice is help stop innocents from getting killed vs. sit on your hands because of some futzy law someplace that ties your hands, most of us would feel like we'd rather take the immediate action to stop the bad guys. "Mission Expediency" is the word of the day when it comes to these matters.

mtgentry: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910911

> No offense to OP, but this reads like propaganda to me.

I can confirm that this represents the mindset of most of the people I've worked with in the IC. It does take a certain kind of personality to sign-up and go through all the hassles involved with getting employed in the IC and that self-selection seems to attract a certain kind of personality type.

> But I wouldn't be surprised if there was some sort of concerted effort by the NSA to encourage a dialogue with hackers on platforms like HN.

There really isn't, other than to not discuss classified information. Keeping track of what's classified and not when you spend near a third of your life and half of your waking hours dealing with only classified things is complex enough that most people just don't engage with the "unclean" public.

jurjenh: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911235

> What I'd be more interested in is how much this issue is being discussed internally. If these discussions are allowed, or even surreptitiously encouraged, then I'd take that as a possible internal propaganda push, subtle as it may be.

Discussions about these issues, in the way that they're being discussed here, are not terribly common. The milieu of working in the IC just doesn't lend itself to these kinds of topics, in these kinds of ways, as focuses of conversation. Mostly what's discussed is the lines you aren't supposed to cross and the penalties for crossing them. But more often then not, casual conversation is about anything other than IC topics. After a hard day of spying, you really want to just engage in something else.

Bizarrely, discussing Snowden might be tricky inside of the IC because you might discuss something that was leaked that you technically don't have a need-to-know for. So specific cases like this are not often serious topics of conversation.

(continued next comment)

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#187

I can confirm much of this article. (A couple years ago I provided some comments here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3296691 ) There's lots of condemnation of the poster, and the NSA practices and some of the murkier parts of this article. I thought I'd tip in with some explanations as possible while staying outside of anything classified or naughty. jonknee: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910978 - "It's…

md224: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911261 > Anyone who defends the NSA on the grounds that it only targets those who are worthy of targeting needs to convince me that another COINTELPRO will never happen. I would actually welcome such an argument, since it would make me feel a whole lot better about this. You raise a very good point. I don't think there are many in the IC who would have a problem with more…

pera: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911100

> Really? why should anyone trust in anything coming from the NSA when you are systematically lying again and again? why should we listen to anything you say when historically, part of your strategy is to try to influence the PoV of society || specifics groups?

OP is not the NSA. OP was an employee for a couple years and can only comment about what he specifically knows about, just like anybody. Take what he says with that context.

alfiejohn_: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911106

(ex-)Employees can write about anything, but if it involves IC related topics, they have to submit to a review before publication. All those various books about life in the Spy world or Special Forces etc. all went through similar reviews.

malloreon: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911226

> There are articles suggesting this is happening many thousands of times per year - shouldn't each of these 'regular employees' be put on trial? They have committed serious crimes.

Quite often they are. The minimum penalty is loss of clearance and job (which is a career death sentence in the IC), and depending on what they did and if the agency feels like it's a good expenditure of resources, some kind of criminal prosecution may be involved.

e.g.

- Employee sees if his own cell phone number has been collected (violates rules regarding looking up U.S. persons): probably a firing, but not worth criminal prosecution

- Employee starts a side business and starts monitoring communications of his competitors to get a leg up, probably a firing + prison time.

te_chris: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910858

> Thank you so much, kind American intelligence guy, for having the grace to not look at USA citizens emails, all the while not even mentioning foreigners, who should apparently just lie down and take it.

Foreigners don't just "take it", they have their own nation's intelligence apparatus collecting against their foreigners. Let me know when there are mass protests against foreign collection in the rest of the world and maybe then your complaint will make some kind of sense. Until then it's just bitter complaining about something you knew all along anyway. It's kind of the point of Intelligence.

lucb1e: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911262

> Why is a distinction made between US and non-US people?

Because, at least in the U.S., there's a distinction between IC and LE entities -- this is not a distinction shared by most countries. LE deals with domestic events and U.S. people, while IC deals with non-domestic actors and locations. There's a bit of overlap, for example, a U.S. citizen doing bad things in a foreign country gets a bit of both, or a foreign national in the U.S. But that's generally where the line is drawn. U.S. law doesn't apply outside of the U.S. and it shouldn't. Can you imagine the world if the U.S. suddenly decided that France had to apply by all U.S. laws including the U.S. Constitution? If people think New Zealand cooperating on

> What makes me a potential criminal, and Mr. Smith not?

The reverse is true of U.S. citizens w/r to other country's intelligence apparatus as well.

IC agencies generally aren't looking for criminals...meaning they aren't looking for people who broke U.S. law. They're basically looking for threats to U.S. soil, citizens and concerns. LE agencies look for law breakers. That's one of the reasons why the trials at GTMO are such a mess, guys were wrapped up and sent off to Cuba for interrogation based on "Intelligence" but not using information collected as part of a criminal prosecution. IC and LE really do operate under very different methods (at least in the U.S.).

princeverma: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911007

> I am a foreign national, I and my company uses services provided by a US company (email etc.), and this gives right to you guys to collect and ready my emails?

Yes. Look at your question from a different angle, under what legal regime is the U.S. not allowed to do so? Or the contrapositive, what are you doing to prevent your country from spying on U.S. Citizens?

Tarang: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910916

> If an employee had a contrarian opinion to the NSA would it be declassified like this one?

Yes. You can check Amazon yourself for books by former NSA employees who don't side with the Agency. Their books were all reviewed by the NSA for classified information, but not for dissenting opinions.

muglug: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910838

> Do you think Snowdon's revelations had any beneficial impact, or is your view of them entirely negative?

Disappointingly no. At least in my circles, Snowden is not mentioned in polite terms. The likely outcome will be no change in NSA collections or capabilities, but automation in system administration, better collection of auditable information on IC employees and more compartmentalizing of the activities even further.

room271: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6910827

> My question to the OP: even if you believe that at the moment abuses are rare and that your colleagues are trustworthy and law-abiding, does the capability and level of information concern you in terms of the potential for future abuse it enables?

I'll toss in my answer too. I think it is serious cause for concern. But the kind of work the IC does is hard and I'd say impossible to get right. Anybody who thinks the kinds of work that most of us do in our day-to-day businesses is hard have no idea how really difficult the industry is. In a normal business, if you get things wrong you might get sued or shut down. In the Spy industry? countries might fall, nukes might loose and people might die. Doing that kind of work in balance with people's rights, or at least not negatively impacting truly innocent people is among the hardest things to do in the world.

aaron695: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6911046

> "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing."

Doing nothing would be for the U.S. to not spy at all, which is a sentiment shared by many in this forum. And then bad things would certainly happen for the U.S. because no other country would do the same. Sometimes doing the right thing really involves doing hard things that don't feel good. I won't make any apologies for it and nor should the OP. The kind of work that the IC and the military does, make no mistake about it, is ugly ugly work. It is very important though that this public debate be held often, and constantly. The IC/Military construct is like a huge guard dog. You want it a bit mean and angry, but you don't want it to bite you, the mailman or the neighborhood kids...it's not so bad if it goes after the occasional solicitor or burgler. So it's very important that you keep a constant eye on it and keep it in check. Because it will dig up your yard, chew up the sofa and otherwise misbehave.

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#188

No offense to OP, but this reads like propaganda to me. It feels like someone at the Pentagon realized they weren't winning the war of the minds of hackers, so they encouraged some of their own to blog about their experiences. I hate to sound like a tin hat wearing conspiracist. I really do. But I wouldn't be surprised if there was some sort of concerted effort by the NSA to encourage a dialogue with hackers on platf…

I set up an account to reply to this comment; I have an informed opinion.

I expect that the blog post is sincere. If the NSA or another government agency wanted to manipulate the discourse on this or a similar site, however, they would (not could, would) do so by setting up a large number of active accounts over a long period of time. These would promote articles without triggering voting ring algorithms.

For the last couple of years I have been an active participant in a part of the blogosphere that is inspired by Unqualified Reservations, a contrarian ("(neo)reactionary") blog. I recently discovered that many of the (active and quite long-standing) blogs and commenters in this online community are fraudulent. It is the situation described in Wikipedia's article on COINTELPRO: "pseudo movement groups run by government agents". This includes people with whom I've had email and even a Skype conversation.

Since the realisation, I've managed to have a little awkward and plausibly deniable dialogue with these "bloggers" and "commenters". The message seems to be that they view neo-reactionaries as a group of potentially violent dissidents whose memes, if they were to spread, would lead to serious public disorder. So it's a political broken windows theory, in which the NSA or FBI are guardians of public opinion (although I happen to be English). Apparently they have been watching closely and collecting "data" for over a year.

So, mtgentry, I don't think you are too paranoid at all. (Although I would have done until quite recently.)

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#189
post #4

Is this the best defense of the actions of NSA employees publicly available? He spends a lot of time denying pervasive surveillance puts us in a panopticon where the FBI and other LEAs can observe everything we do. And never mentions parallel construction once. He tries to justify a Cold War sized, and then some, security state by invoking North Korea. This is a big bowl of very weak sauce. The director's standard of…

  EVERY revelation where people in this forum have given the
  NSA benefit of a doubt in the form of "they could, but they
  wouldn't" has max'ed out at "would do, did do, and trying
  hard to do it more" once more revelations have emerged.
I find it increasingly scary how people continue to defend the NSA's actions in the face of these escalating revelations. It almost feels like Stockholm Syndrome.

Re: The NSA: An Inside View

#190
post #160
post #37

Interesting to get a look at what it's like to be inside the bubble. It's compartmentalized enough that the individual actors can justify their actions by the assumed competence and benevolence of the others. > I didn't test it, but I'm sure there was automated analysis that prevented or flagged use of US selectors. The mental leap here is subtle, but substantial. Since I have been told I can't use US selectors , I a…

> The mental leap here is subtle, but substantial. Since I have been told I can't use US selectors , I assume the system enforces this. As such, US citizens have nothing to worry about. For the life of me I cannot figure out why people refuse to accept the concept of training and policy as being relevant to proper civil liberties safeguards in addition to technical ones. Imagine applying that idea to any other field,…

> Imagine applying that idea to any other field, and keep in mind the unintended consequences

The difference from other fields, is that the consequences in other fields are public. If a soldier shoots someone, that someone is dead and can prompt an investigation.

If someone in the NSA abuses his powers, it is very likely that nobody will ever know. Or be able to know. No investigation will be triggered, and even if one is, it cannot possibly gather any evidence.

Post reply on HN