> E-mail marketers will no longer be able to get any information from images—they will see a single request from Google, which will then be used to send the image out to all Gmail users. Unless you click on a link, marketers will have no idea the e-mail has been seen. Absurdly wrong, marketers already use a unique image URL for each email recipient, and Google has no way to know that all of those point to the same im…
> Now, an open question is if Google will make that request when the email is actually opened, which would allow marketers to determine if and when the email was read by the user, or if Google will make the request as soon as the email is received. The latter would enhance users' privacy at the cost of bandwidth for Google, but early tests indicate that they don't actually do that, waiting for the user to click the e…
I don't understand. It probably has to do with the Zeitgeist.
The images were originally blocked because of security and privacy concerns.
Rendering of images is potentially insecure because of bugs in the browsers. By proxying the images, Google as an webmail provider, screens you from your browser bugs. Solved.
Rendering of images is a privacy concern because of tracking. By fetching the images from another place, the attacker cannot know your location, your OS, language setting, etc... Solved.
Rendering the image allow checking when and if the email is ever opened, which can be useful in marketing^Wspam primarily because they can understand whether an email is active/exists or not. Not Solved.
The latter however is a general problem. There are many other ways to know whether an email account exists or not. Many mail servers respond with bounce emails anyway. They won't bounce on detected spam, but that's not the point; this feature is an additional barrier for image tracking for content that has passed through the spam filter already.