Surely any hashing would be susceptible? Even a slower or more "secure" hash wouldn't help much, because I can take your starting known email address and find comments you have made. i.e. I can start with "bill@example.com", slowly hash that to 901e54d1 and then search google for 901e54d1 to find comments you've made. Speed isn't a big deal if I'm interested in attacking specific subsets of emails. (Which could still…
Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
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Re: Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
It gets a bit awkward when you comment on racist/anti-immigration websites with your (at least semi public) email while you represent a far right party that officially has a zero tolerance on racism. The party has its roots in the skinhead/neo-nazi organizations and they have been trying to shake that image problem for quite some time now. To be fair, putting on suits has helped them.
Yeah well, the person has himself to blame. Either be identifiable or anonymous. Don't use private email and expect to be untraceable. That's just mad.
Re: Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
#33Surely any hashing would be susceptible? Even a slower or more "secure" hash wouldn't help much, because I can take your starting known email address and find comments you have made. i.e. I can start with "bill@example.com", slowly hash that to 901e54d1 and then search google for 901e54d1 to find comments you've made. Speed isn't a big deal if I'm interested in attacking specific subsets of emails. (Which could still…
Re: Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
#34Surely any hashing would be susceptible? Even a slower or more "secure" hash wouldn't help much, because I can take your starting known email address and find comments you have made. i.e. I can start with "bill@example.com", slowly hash that to 901e54d1 and then search google for 901e54d1 to find comments you've made. Speed isn't a big deal if I'm interested in attacking specific subsets of emails. (Which could still…
Re: Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even better, you can be certain a great number of users reuse their password
True. A percentage of the union of Adobe and Disqus users will use the same password for both services.
Re: Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
#36Re: Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
True. A percentage of the union of Adobe and Disqus users will use the same password for both services.
But if they haven't changed their password after the Adobe hack then they're already boned, aren't they? How doe the Disqus vuln add to that?
Re: Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
My email is firstname@companyname.co.nz (I have a few of these at different companies). I'm fairly confident this isn't going to be cracked any time soon by random MD5 hashing. (of course, my real name can be extrapolated from my HN username)
The rainbow table would just need to include alphanumeric letters + '@' for up to 30 letters. I think your emails are in nearly every rainbow table in existence.
Still, I don't think I've ever had a rainbow table that contained plaintexts longer than 12 characters. Are 30+ length tables common these days?
Re: Disqus cracked – Security flaw reveals users’ e-mail addresses
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
Actually, yeah, it will be cracked, by someone . And E-Mail-addresses aren't passwords; trying a few hundred variations for each firstname for each lastname is perfectly feasible and should crack a nice percentage of these hashes.
My email is firstname@companyname.co.nz (I have a few of these at different companies). I'm fairly confident this isn't going to be cracked any time soon by random MD5 hashing. (of course, my real name can be extrapolated from my HN username)
Your call on whether "An adversary can only defeat my security given three hours and a hardware investment of $1,600 2010 dollars" is an acceptable security bound for your users. If it isn't, don't use MD5 for crypto purposes.