I fundamentally don't understand the danger of "traditional" (box cutters, etc.) weapons getting through airport security. I understand that we need to continue testing for bombs and anything that can actually bring a plane down. It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack "defenseless" passengers with "traditional" weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it's not terribly different from a random attack in…
The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect. I think Schneier's point is correct that spending the same amount of money on intelligence, investigations, and emergency response would keep us safer than screening what innocent passengers bring on to air…
Evading Airport Security
41–50 of 166 posts
Re: Evading Airport Security
#42Earlier quoted context omitted.
Boxcutters are no longer effective tools of terror on airliners. They ceased to be so on the morning of 9/11/2001. Why try to stop them now?
I think you're underestimating the havoc that a group of well-trained individuals armed with knives could cause in the middle of a transcontinental flight even with a locked, reinforced cabin door. I agree it's not as clear cut as a ban on firearms or explosives, but it seems like a sensible restriction to me, worth enforcing as best we can.
Re: Evading Airport Security
#43Re: Evading Airport Security
#44Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think you're underestimating the havoc that a group of well-trained individuals armed with knives could cause in the middle of a transcontinental flight even with a locked, reinforced cabin door. I agree it's not as clear cut as a ban on firearms or explosives, but it seems like a sensible restriction to me, worth enforcing as best we can.
Maybe I am. The way I envision such an attack, they pull out their knives and start threatening or cutting people. Then the rest of the passengers, knowing that they will die if they don't stop this, dogpile on the attackers and subdue them. They then tie them to their seats with whatever is handy and hand them over to the police when they land. Where does that go wrong?
Re: Evading Airport Security
#45I fundamentally don't understand the danger of "traditional" (box cutters, etc.) weapons getting through airport security. I understand that we need to continue testing for bombs and anything that can actually bring a plane down. It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack "defenseless" passengers with "traditional" weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it's not terribly different from a random attack in…
The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect. I think Schneier's point is correct that spending the same amount of money on intelligence, investigations, and emergency response would keep us safer than screening what innocent passengers bring on to air…
Re: Evading Airport Security
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
Maybe I am. The way I envision such an attack, they pull out their knives and start threatening or cutting people. Then the rest of the passengers, knowing that they will die if they don't stop this, dogpile on the attackers and subdue them. They then tie them to their seats with whatever is handy and hand them over to the police when they land. Where does that go wrong?
When they pull their knives but immediately grab a child and threaten their life. Who is going to be the one to start this dog pile but also cause the demise of a child?
Re: Evading Airport Security
#47The videos are short on details, and I'm a little sceptical. A lot of it seems to involve removing Lithium from Lion batteries. I'm told that can be done with wire cutters, but I don't think you can buy those inside the sterile zone.
Re: Evading Airport Security
#48The TSA itself has admitted that terrorist threats to aviation are nonexistent: http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/tsa-admits-...
Even if we ignore the independent investigations from third parties, what more evidence could we ask for that the TSA is ineffective and superfluous, if not its own admission?
Re: Evading Airport Security
#49I typically think Schneier is too cavalier about "security theater", but in this case I agree completely. On the other hand, I don't think that means airport security should be drastically scaled back: There are probably 10x as many dumb potential attackers as smart ones, and it makes sense to be eliminate the easy avenues for the dumb ones while you concentrate other resources on the smart ones. It's also important…
> There are probably 10x as many dumb potential attackers as smart ones, and it makes sense to be eliminate the easy avenues for the dumb ones while you concentrate other resources on the smart ones. It's also important not to ignore both the intelligence value of security checks as well as their potential forensic value in the event of a successful attack. This is the point that is always missed when talking about "…
I don't think you are making the point you intend to make - the very fact that pulling off a successful attack is inherently difficult is what stops those people, not any security agency.
Same thing with attacks anywhere else. For example: The Times Square bomber couldn't even build a working bomb despite two college degrees and the 2007 London & Glasgow Airport bombers couldn't figure it out either, for their swan song they put propane tanks in their jeep cherokee, lit themselves on fire and drove into a barricade in front of the airport, despite one of them having a doctor's education.
In all of its existence, the TSA has never detained someone who was later convicted on terrorism charges, despite the vast lowering of the standard of evidence for such charges since 9/11. The fact that we've seen so few attacks on "softer" targets (roughly 3 civilians have been killed in islamic-extremist attacks on US soil since 9/11) means that the size of the actual threat is practically zero - including the fools.
Re: Evading Airport Security
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect. I think Schneier's point is correct that spending the same amount of money on intelligence, investigations, and emergency response would keep us safer than screening what innocent passengers bring on to air…
> The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect. Right, but the GP's point is that it was only possible to do that _once_, because the success of the 9/11 attacks depended on the passengers cooperating with the hijackers. That was a reasonable assumptio…
That said, whenever I read accounts of the actual attack [1] they seem well planned - several "muscle men" clearing the way, using pepper sprays, etc. That is, it is not obvious to me that a group of people would be able to overcome that level of coordination and brute force. What piece am I missing?
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks#Events