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Evading Airport Security

schneier.com

21–30 of 166 posts

Re: Evading Airport Security

#21
post #10

I fundamentally don't understand the danger of "traditional" (box cutters, etc.) weapons getting through airport security. I understand that we need to continue testing for bombs and anything that can actually bring a plane down. It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack "defenseless" passengers with "traditional" weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it's not terribly different from a random attack in…

I don't think it's about the danger to the passengers as much as forcing your way to the pilot. I.e. someone capturing/torturing passengers until the pilot comes out.

I guess I simply don't buy that any terrorist on board -- even if there were several of them and they were armed with box-cutters and the like -- could ever take the cockpit. The doors are locked, the pilots are sometimes armed; and mostly, the passengers would never let it happen.

Even in the most extreme scenarios imaginable, the passengers would have a 20-1 advantage, and would understand that the cost of failing to neutralize the threat would likely result in their personal demise (not to mention the greater threat of using the plane as a weapon).

Re: Evading Airport Security

#22
post #6
post #3

I typically think Schneier is too cavalier about "security theater", but in this case I agree completely. On the other hand, I don't think that means airport security should be drastically scaled back: There are probably 10x as many dumb potential attackers as smart ones, and it makes sense to be eliminate the easy avenues for the dumb ones while you concentrate other resources on the smart ones. It's also important…

I agree. But I am really tired of having problems because the deodorant I use has 150ml of liquid instead of 100.

I have never, ever been stopped due to what I consider reasonable amounts of liquid/gel/aerosol beyond the 100ml limit. Typical culprits: deodorant, shaving cream and sunscreen. I do my best to fit everything in a 1qt baggie, but typically the shaving cream and sunscreen are just jammed into a running shoe or put in a separate pocket in my carry-on. Never, ever been stopped. Also, never been confiscated by the TSA random checked bag checks in the couple of cases I've had to gate check a carry-on.

For anyone who doesn't already know or wouldn't be willing to spend the $100 for Global Entry + PreCheck, the AMEX Platinum card covers the cost for both (along with free access to most AIrline lounges, and a free membership to Priority Club, which gives you access to even more lounges). Totally worth the annual fee for frequent travelers, especially ones who find themselves on random airlines connecting random airports.

Re: Evading Airport Security

#23
post #10

I fundamentally don't understand the danger of "traditional" (box cutters, etc.) weapons getting through airport security. I understand that we need to continue testing for bombs and anything that can actually bring a plane down. It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack "defenseless" passengers with "traditional" weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it's not terribly different from a random attack in…

I don't think it's about the danger to the passengers as much as forcing your way to the pilot. I.e. someone capturing/torturing passengers until the pilot comes out.

I don't think passengers would ever allow this to happen.

Re: Evading Airport Security

#24
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Boxcutters are no longer effective tools of terror on airliners. They ceased to be so on the morning of 9/11/2001. Why try to stop them now?

I think you're underestimating the havoc that a group of well-trained individuals armed with knives could cause in the middle of a transcontinental flight even with a locked, reinforced cabin door. I agree it's not as clear cut as a ban on firearms or explosives, but it seems like a sensible restriction to me, worth enforcing as best we can.

A "group of well-trained individuals" is going to manage to create the weapons mentioned in the link in the OP. You're never going to be able to stop someone who really puts their mind to it.

The rationale in this sub-thread was to leave the current security in place "to weed out the idiots, mentally unstable, etc", and those people will be stopped by passengers after the mindset of what the goal of an airplane is changed on 9/11 (it used to be "they want to redirect the flight to Cuba" now it's "they want to redirect the flight into a building").

Re: Evading Airport Security

#25
"I think the answer is simple: airplane terrorism isn't a big risk. There are very few actual terrorists, and..."

This is very true. Terrorism isn't a very serious problem or threat - it just got disproportionate attention from a combination of 9/11 and ignorance of the American public. I almost hate to say it, but it is sadly true.

I've 'evaded' airport security a few times - and they give me extra hassle for being an arab. I have nothing against profiling - even if it wastes my time it is /sensible/ and not racist at all.

By far the worst case is the one time I turned up at an airport suited and booted and looking especially white. They found the liquids in my hand luggage that I accidentally left there, and let me keep them.

Its all for show, the idea that a government is in control and secure when they make 101 security fuckups like meeting in the same place regularly (!).

If I was in anyway inclined to be a terrorist the result would be devastating - I'm glad the people we are dealing with in that regard are exceptionally rare and stupid (stupid enough to try what they do... as well as stupid enough to not have anything like an organised or well prepared strategy).

Re: Evading Airport Security

#26
It may be my libertarded paranoia, but I think airport security screening in the last decade has been largely about diverting public money into private hands.

Metal detectors are so cheap now that they can be placed in urban public schools, and every airport already has plenty of them. Pass-through x-ray luggage scanners are likewise already nearly ubiquitous. Automated gas chromatographs, microwave passenger scanners, and x-ray backscatter passenger scanners--those things are new, big, and shiny, and no one responsible for budgeting knows how much they should cost.

Meanwhile, Schneier repeatedly and convincingly argues that the measures that we are paying through the nose for them to use are worthless to increase the physical security of the airplanes and their passengers. But the TSA already bought them. It doesn't matter if they work. They have them: they use them.

All that remains now is to justify the budget for the labor force. The ID checker, that's a job. The pat-down guy, that's a job. The guys that stand in front of the tablet app that digitally flips a coin to see if you get your hands swabbed and chromatographed, apparently that's three jobs. The guy who stands at the exit to make sure no wrong-way traffic gets through, that's a job for every exit.

Except they're proposing that the exit guard jobs be replaced with expensive machines now, too. Give it another few years and you'll have DNA sequencers and single-use biological test chips involved somehow. Perhaps after the next airborne pathogen scare, they will be introduced to reassure passengers that no one on their plane has ebolaria or influengue or tubercuningitis or whatever.

Conspiracy hypotheses are easy if you just follow the money.

Re: Evading Airport Security

#27
post #5
post #2

airport security is not built to prevent evil geniuses to act out a brilliant act of terror macguyver style. airport security is there to prevent someone to walk onto a plane carrying a boxcutter knife - which they failed to prevent at 9/11. it's to weed out the idiots, mentally unstable, etc. the times square bomber types. it relies on underpaid, undereducated personnel. because it exists in reality, which means it…

Boxcutters are no longer effective tools of terror on airliners. They ceased to be so on the morning of 9/11/2001. Why try to stop them now?

What the press will say if someone gets a boxcutter onto a plane and tries to do something with it.

Re: Evading Airport Security

#28
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Boxcutters are no longer effective tools of terror on airliners. They ceased to be so on the morning of 9/11/2001. Why try to stop them now?

I think you're underestimating the havoc that a group of well-trained individuals armed with knives could cause in the middle of a transcontinental flight even with a locked, reinforced cabin door. I agree it's not as clear cut as a ban on firearms or explosives, but it seems like a sensible restriction to me, worth enforcing as best we can.

Maybe I am. The way I envision such an attack, they pull out their knives and start threatening or cutting people. Then the rest of the passengers, knowing that they will die if they don't stop this, dogpile on the attackers and subdue them. They then tie them to their seats with whatever is handy and hand them over to the police when they land. Where does that go wrong?

Re: Evading Airport Security

#29
post #27
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Boxcutters are no longer effective tools of terror on airliners. They ceased to be so on the morning of 9/11/2001. Why try to stop them now?

What the press will say if someone gets a boxcutter onto a plane and tries to do something with it.

Who cares?
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