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How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

nytimes.com

41–45 of 45 posts

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#41
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ah, but sometimes two points is not so bad if the clock is a factor and you're about to turn over possession regardless. Down by one and facing a fourth down against the Broncos from his own one yard line with three minutes to go, Bill Belichick famously took an intentional safety[1]. The field position gain from the free kick was worth the two points, and the Patriots went on to win. [1] http://sports.espn.go.com/es…

Ah interesting, I have never heard about this game specifically. It seems though he gave up some amount of EV by giving up the 2 points to the Broncos, thus a FG later on would only tie the game instead of winning it. But I assumed this was offset by the risk of having to punt and the Broncos end up getting a FG where then they'd be up by 4 points. I don't know if Belichick was right to do this, but it paid off for h…

Exactly. Punt from the 1 and the Broncos will have the opportunity to burn clock and still likely kick a field goal, forcing you into a touchdown-required situation. As it was, the free kick netted even more yards than expected.

Going for it on 4th and 2 in the '09 game was the right decision, and few knowledgeable commentators disparaged Belichick for it. Manning was dissecting the Pats defense at that point in the game: He had a much greater chance of scoring a touchdown than the Colts defense had of stopping the conversion.

Now the playcall...

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#42
It's the same thing with penalty kicks in soccer. Statistically, you are more likely to score if you kick the ball down the middle. The goalie is going to go one way or another and there's a 50% chance he'll guess right. So why don't players kick it down the middle..because if they kick it down the middle and the goalie manages to block the kick, they'll come off looking like idiots and it would look real bad on the highlight shows.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#43
post #21
post #10

Tough to take everything into account, but I find it troubling that all non-success/failure outcomes are not part of the calculation (ex: 8-yard gain on a 4th and 10; a fumble on a 4th and 2 run, etc). It simplifies the formula to the layman, but I have to imagine that it adds enough additional variance to matter, especailly considering we're talking in variances of less than half a point in their stated example. Als…

This is especially true of 4th down plays. A surprise play-action pass on 4th and 1 can go for an especially long gain and thus should have higher expected value. There's also the fake-punt scenario, which I suspect tends to be more successful than a regular 4th down.

Absolutely. And I'm sure if coaches started trying to run more 4th down plays, that would dramatically change the algorithm as well.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#44
post #20
post #6

Why would you ever go for it on 4th and 1 inside your own 10 yard line? You would put yourself at a severe disadvantage if you failed. Since the data from this is from previous plays in the last 10 or so seasons it is flawed. There probably isn't very little data of a team going for 4th and 1 and that deep in their own territory. The only time this has probably happened is in extraordinary circumstances - specificall…

I think statistically, if you punt from the 9 yard line, the other team is going to get excellent field position (around the 50 yard line). The difference between failing on 4th and 1 from your own 9 and the other team getting the ball around the 50 yard line is 41 yards of field position. That may sound like a lot, but I'd imagine the actual point difference is on the order of 2 points. The more interesting thing to…

If you turn the ball over before reaching your own 30, you give the other team at least 3 points, because a field goal at that distance is trivial.

This bot also requires both coaches to follow it's recommendations, because otherwise the comparison between what they call "point values" of the two teams becomes meaningless.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#45
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ask Nick Saban how trying to kick a field goal with 1 second left in the Baylor game is working out for him. There are plenty of people saying that any other coach would be fired.

That particular outcome had happened less than 5 other times in the history of the modern NCAA. 99/100 times that game ends with either an Alabama win or O.T. He hardly made a controversial decision.

The bar that I was watching the game in exploded when that happened. You wouldn't believe the number of people calling him all sorts of names for making that call. And, I think it was a good call too. The point is that being risk averse is the right way for a coach to keep his job.
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