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How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

nytimes.com

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Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#11

Post by Zimahl »

thejteam wrote: post #8
Zimahl wrote: post #6

Why would you ever go for it on 4th and 1 inside your own 10 yard line? You would put yourself at a severe disadvantage if you failed. Since the data from this is from previous plays in the last 10 or so seasons it is flawed. There probably isn't very little data of a team going for 4th and 1 and that deep in their own territory. The only time this has probably happened is in extraordinary circumstances - specificall…

In place of 4th and 1 data AdvancedNFlStats would substitute 3rd and 1 stats. And I would agree that this substitution is suspect. Just a bit shy of bogus in fact.

Well, getting a yard in the NFL isn't typically a big problem and 3rd and 1 vs 4th and 1 are feasibly no different. But turning the ball over inside 30 yards is at least 3 points for the other team with only rare exceptions.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#12

Post by slg »

These type of articles never take into consideration the reason why coaches don't go for it as often as a computer might. The coaches face a reverse moral hazard when taking risks because the negative outcomes are multiplied for them. Even if the statistics support their decisions, a coach will be fired for taking too many risks and failing. Is gaining an extra 2% (or whatever) in expected returns worth the risk of losing everything if the low(er) percentage outcome does actually happen? It is the same idea behind the whole "no one gets fired for buying IBM/Microsoft".

Until you get a coach's motivations more in line with the motivations of the team, you won't get a coach that is as aggressive as these computer simulations suggest they should be.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#13

Post by symbaton »

slg wrote: post #12

These type of articles never take into consideration the reason why coaches don't go for it as often as a computer might. The coaches face a reverse moral hazard when taking risks because the negative outcomes are multiplied for them. Even if the statistics support their decisions, a coach will be fired for taking too many risks and failing. Is gaining an extra 2% (or whatever) in expected returns worth the risk of l…

People always say this, but it is actually true? Has any coach ever been fired for missing too many fourth downs?

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#14

Post by vacri »

There's an interesting hole in the data at 4 & 10 on the opponent's 36. In a sea of punting and kicking, this one data point has actual coaches going for it.

Also, looking at the overall pattern of the data, my gut tells me that the optimal rubric is somewhere in-between the 'bot and the meatcoach. There are some strange holes as well - at 4th&3, you should go for if you're on your own 8 or 9, but punt if you're on your own 7 or 10?

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#15

Post by slg »

symbaton wrote: post #13
slg wrote: post #12

These type of articles never take into consideration the reason why coaches don't go for it as often as a computer might. The coaches face a reverse moral hazard when taking risks because the negative outcomes are multiplied for them. Even if the statistics support their decisions, a coach will be fired for taking too many risks and failing. Is gaining an extra 2% (or whatever) in expected returns worth the risk of l…

People always say this, but it is actually true? Has any coach ever been fired for missing too many fourth downs?

I can't think of one off the top of my head. Mike Smith was under a lot of pressure a little while back for his aggressive decisions on 4th down (that were statistically correct IIRC) but wasn't actually fired.

However, the obvious counter to your question is how many coaches really go for it frequently on fourth downs? Most coaches just follow the conventional wisdom unless they are already in a desperate situation like Ron Riviera or they have built up a lot of good will like Bill Belichick.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#16

Post by judk »

symbaton wrote: post #13
slg wrote: post #12

These type of articles never take into consideration the reason why coaches don't go for it as often as a computer might. The coaches face a reverse moral hazard when taking risks because the negative outcomes are multiplied for them. Even if the statistics support their decisions, a coach will be fired for taking too many risks and failing. Is gaining an extra 2% (or whatever) in expected returns worth the risk of l…

People always say this, but it is actually true? Has any coach ever been fired for missing too many fourth downs?

Not even missing too many. Just missing more visibly, compared to coaches with equivalent records.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#17

Post by judk »

vacri wrote: post #14

There's an interesting hole in the data at 4 & 10 on the opponent's 36. In a sea of punting and kicking, this one data point has actual coaches going for it. Also, looking at the overall pattern of the data, my gut tells me that the optimal rubric is somewhere in-between the 'bot and the meatcoach. There are some strange holes as well - at 4th&3, you should go for if you're on your own 8 or 9, but punt if you're on y…

Without confidence levels, the differences are meaningless. Maybe that's the flip from 49% to 51%

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#18

Post by vacri »

Zimahl wrote: post #6

Why would you ever go for it on 4th and 1 inside your own 10 yard line? You would put yourself at a severe disadvantage if you failed. Since the data from this is from previous plays in the last 10 or so seasons it is flawed. There probably isn't very little data of a team going for 4th and 1 and that deep in their own territory. The only time this has probably happened is in extraordinary circumstances - specificall…

I was thinking the same thing about 4th&short in your own red zone - generally the data points you'll get are from desperate late-game plays where the defence is also not playing to their standard playbook.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#19

Post by thejteam »

vacri wrote: post #14

There's an interesting hole in the data at 4 & 10 on the opponent's 36. In a sea of punting and kicking, this one data point has actual coaches going for it. Also, looking at the overall pattern of the data, my gut tells me that the optimal rubric is somewhere in-between the 'bot and the meatcoach. There are some strange holes as well - at 4th&3, you should go for if you're on your own 8 or 9, but punt if you're on y…

That makes sense. At the 36, it is a 53 yard or so field goal. At the outer range of most kickers and pretty low percentage, so you give the ball to the opponent at the 40 something yardline with high probability. On the other hand, its also close enough to be very difficult for a punter to pin in inside the 5 or 10, so even if you fail you only give the opponent 16 yards over a punt.

But the holes at the your own end you mentioned, that makes no sense at all.

Re: How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare

#20

Post by altoz »

Zimahl wrote: post #6

Why would you ever go for it on 4th and 1 inside your own 10 yard line? You would put yourself at a severe disadvantage if you failed. Since the data from this is from previous plays in the last 10 or so seasons it is flawed. There probably isn't very little data of a team going for 4th and 1 and that deep in their own territory. The only time this has probably happened is in extraordinary circumstances - specificall…

I think statistically, if you punt from the 9 yard line, the other team is going to get excellent field position (around the 50 yard line). The difference between failing on 4th and 1 from your own 9 and the other team getting the ball around the 50 yard line is 41 yards of field position.

That may sound like a lot, but I'd imagine the actual point difference is on the order of 2 points.

The more interesting thing to consider would be whether taking a safety there is ever a positive.

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