> From the pessimistic point of view, why would anyone choose to work a crappy job at Walmart or McDonalds when the government would give them the same money without having to do anything.
Because, unlike current poverty support programs, where the having a benefit program that gives you $X and a job that gives you $X the most you can get is $X, with basic income, you can have the basic income of $X and the job of $X and have $2X.
So, given constant wages, the marginal income effect of working would be the same for anyone not getting a means-tested program now, and greater for anyone who would get a means-tested program now. (The marginal benefit might be less in the former case because of the declining marginal utility of additional income, though.)
> Walmart and McDonalds (and everyone else) would therefore either go out of business or raise their wages.
Entry level wages are artificially high compared to market labor supply because of the minimum wage, so even if BI did reduce the supply of labor for minimum wage jobs, it wouldn't necessarily stop them from being able to fill positions at the existing wage levels. Many BI proposals also include eliminating the minimum wage, which would make work that is not currently economically viable (because, while it provides value, it doesn't provide enough value to warrant the minimum wage) viable.
> Raising their wages would increase the price of their goods. Increasing prices of goods would increase the cost of living which would increase the poverty level which would increase the minimum guaranteed income.
This, OTOH, is a real potential issue with inflation-pegged basic income: if you set the level too high for the current economy to support initially and peg it to inflation, you'll get caught in an inflation cycle.
The solution to this, as I see it, is fairly simply; dedicate a set share of the revenue from progressive income taxes to the basic income, and set benefit levels based on the lower of the levels by equally distributing the revenue from that tax to beneficiaries or the inflation-adjusted level of the starting benefit amount.
You get better self-regulation and signalling of when you need to reexamine the assumptions in your benefit levels and revenue structure, and if you initially set it at a level that would actually pull people out of the work force in a way that would trigger run away inflation, then barring direct intervention it will regulate itself back down (in real terms) until that's not the case.