101–110 of 112 posts
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It checks if your email is in the dump. What would you want, just a full list of everyone's emails in plaintext for the world to see?
Given they're no longer secret, that would seem safer than typing my e-mail address into an untrusted site to see if it has been compromised.
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I am assuming that the DB server cannot decrypt. If the DB server has decryption permissions, and it is compromised, then there's little need in encrypting the passwords anyway as an attacker will simply decrypt them by hand. (They may not get all of them before being detected, but they'd still get some or most --- and they might look for high-value targets!) Unlike ECB mode, you can't just encrypt the same password…
Why go through all that when you could use the username or email together with the password to encrypt it with 3DES ECB mode? Those would be unique and users who have same passwords would still have different ciphertexts.
3DES has a block size of 64 bits, or 8 bytes. Unlike a hash function where the whole input affects the whole output (the strong avalanche criterion and whatnot), in ECB mode encryption, data is only changed on 8-byte block boundaries.
So, for example, suppose the user's username was 8 characters, their email was 16 characters, and their password was some more characters. Then if you use
3DES-ECB(uname || email || passwd)
Since the uname/email lengths are public, you still might be able to cross-reference sections of identical passwords with other users, depending on how the blocks line up. In any case, this scheme still doesn't offer the unconditional security level you'd like.
I'd recommend the Matasano crypto challenge [1]. It covers some material similar to this pretty early on, so you get your feet wet here.
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If Photoshop, basically industry standard in image-editing software, isn't an achievement... then nothing qualifies as an achievement. And this is coming from someone who prefers GIMP on linux. I would love to produce something even a quarter as popular & usable as Photoshop.
It's not. Have a look at what it's users have to put up with on a daily basis. http://bad-adobe.tumblr.com
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Is there a better way than typing my email address into a site of questionable integrity?
It's not too hard to find a link to the .tar.gz on Mega.co.nz, if you don't mind burning 9 GB of disk space. It's a plain text file, so you can just grep it. The consequences of this release are going to be felt for a long time. It's the worst thing I've ever seen happen on the Internet, and I've been around a while.
Edit: just for laughs: warnock@adobe.com was found. You need to change your passwords now
I wonder what his password is. I guess we'll find out eventually.
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Depends on the number of rounds used. It can be brought up to a reasonable time complexity this way and is definitely not inadequate. Worse than some alternatives? Sure. But it still gives reasonable protection.
If they said SHA-256 with salt, excuse us to think it is just that, with no iteration. If it's iterated SHA-256 it becomes a lot closer to PBKDF and one wonder why they would not use it. Given Adobe history wrt security, let us assume the worst.
Unless they implemented the whole thing from scratch, they wouldn't be using a single run of sha-256. It's not impossible, but I'd say at this point it's unlikely they're doing something silly - it would be a job terminating mistake for whoever implemented the new system after the last fiasco.
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It's not. Have a look at what it's users have to put up with on a daily basis. http://bad-adobe.tumblr.com
So you are saying any software cannot be an achievement if it has bugs and UX issues? Or does it have to have a tumblr?
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> The issue becomes verifying the passwords, then: supposing you have a CBC mode oracle, like a HSM, how can you verify two passwords are the same? (This is probably the reason they chose ECB mode in the first place.) Why is that? What's wrong with verifying a password in CBC mode with different IV?
I am assuming that the DB server cannot decrypt. If the DB server has decryption permissions, and it is compromised, then there's little need in encrypting the passwords anyway as an attacker will simply decrypt them by hand. (They may not get all of them before being detected, but they'd still get some or most --- and they might look for high-value targets!) Unlike ECB mode, you can't just encrypt the same password…
I am not an expert in security/cryptography, but to decrypt you need a secret key, don't you? In this case Adobe believes the cracker doesn't have the secret key which means if Adobe engineers did use CBC and random IV for each password, the cracker can't learn much even provided with hints in the database.
So if you store the IV and the ciphertext in DB, and when you want to authenticate, you encrypt the plaintext with that IV with your secret key. I don't see why that can't be done. Encryption is really only as strong as your secret key security and the IV in this case looks like a salt in hashing scheme. The difference encryption is bi-directional and hashing is one-way.
So I don't understand why they have to use EBC mode. I am not getting your point.
Anytime I register anywhere, I do the following: 1. Use a new or willing-to-be-spammed email address. 2. Use a new phrase-based password. I write all of this information down on pieces of paper that I keep at my desk. I have a lot of scribbled up paper at this point.
How long have you been doing that? There's an email address of mine in that list that is much more likely to have been given to Macromedia back in the late '90s or very early 2000s - I was working at a different company in '02 and am quite unlikely to have given the older email address out after then…
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So you are saying any software cannot be an achievement if it has bugs and UX issues? Or does it have to have a tumblr?
No. I'm saying that a program that costs a massive monthly fee and is pretty much impossible to avoid in this industry is should not be this constantly bad.
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It checks if your email is in the dump. What would you want, just a full list of everyone's emails in plaintext for the world to see?
A form to enter the sha1 of your email address so they can check against a list of addresses they've already sha1ed? And a form that takes the email for people that don't give a shit or don't know wtf a sha is. Maybe just a .txt of the hashes too, but then no ones coming to your web service I guess.