51–60 of 112 posts
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http://adobe.cynic.al/
Is there a better way than typing my email address into a site of questionable integrity?
The consequences of this release are going to be felt for a long time. It's the worst thing I've ever seen happen on the Internet, and I've been around a while.
Anytime I register anywhere, I do the following: 1. Use a new or willing-to-be-spammed email address. 2. Use a new phrase-based password. I write all of this information down on pieces of paper that I keep at my desk. I have a lot of scribbled up paper at this point.
I don't know about the passwords, but my card was successfully stolen[1] and a malicious transaction was initiated from another country. I know this was because of Adobe for sure because I (co-incidentally) used a brand new, fresh, unique e-mail address just for Adobe, and that email was released recently in the dump that the hackers provided. Luckily the malicious transaction was declined by my bank and they blocked…
To play devil's advocate here, isn't this actually more secure than something like MD5 or SHA1 without stretch factors or multiple invocations, assuming that the key was not also stolen? My reasoning is, that in order for an attacker to get the passwords out of this dump, they have to break the 3DES encryption. Brute forcing the key is, as I understand it, still very difficult, and without it they can't get any of th…
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This is a relatively recent development for Rails. Lots of major Rails-backed products were developed during the 2.x era and still have salted SHA1 passwords.
"When security code fails, you find out 4 years from now, when a DVD with all your customer’s credit card and CVV2 information starts circulating in Estonia."
Written by some familiar-sounding guy about 6 years back (which, based on the wikipedia timeline, is 7 major Rails releases ago):
http://www.securityfocus.com/blogs/262
;-)
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Why is SHA-2 in the list? [Looks like cperciva beat me to it, 0 minutes ago] Something I've always wondered about SHA and MD5, though: if you feed the output of a hash function into its input enough times, will you eventually reach the original value? Will you have traversed the entire output space of the hash, or will there be multiple closed loops, or perhaps even multiple starting points converging on a single ter…
There has to be at least one loop (or fixed point that maps to itself). There's only a finite set of outputs, and the input space of strings as long as a hash is at least that large (in theory, some output hashes may not be possible to generate). Ideally you'd have very large, long loops, which implies few collisions.
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You're right --- had they used something other than ECB mode. For example, if they used CBC mode with a proper IV, assuming the key is not stolen or compromised , the passwords would be quite secure. The issue becomes verifying the passwords, then: supposing you have a CBC mode oracle, like a HSM, how can you verify two passwords are the same? (This is probably the reason they chose ECB mode in the first place.) In f…
> The issue becomes verifying the passwords, then: supposing you have a CBC mode oracle, like a HSM, how can you verify two passwords are the same? (This is probably the reason they chose ECB mode in the first place.) Why is that? What's wrong with verifying a password in CBC mode with different IV?
Some calculate an IV using existing components (such as has of email or name or such), some always use 0x0 as IV. But safest method is to have a random IV (preferably also stored in a HSM along with the key) per encrypted account.
I don't know about the passwords, but my card was successfully stolen[1] and a malicious transaction was initiated from another country. I know this was because of Adobe for sure because I (co-incidentally) used a brand new, fresh, unique e-mail address just for Adobe, and that email was released recently in the dump that the hackers provided. Luckily the malicious transaction was declined by my bank and they blocked…
I don't know about the passwords, but my card was successfully stolen[1] and a malicious transaction was initiated from another country. I know this was because of Adobe for sure because I (co-incidentally) used a brand new, fresh, unique e-mail address just for Adobe, and that email was released recently in the dump that the hackers provided. Luckily the malicious transaction was declined by my bank and they blocked…
So you know for sure your email was stolen in the attack, but how do you know the credit card was?
There is only one other service I am using this card with - A stock photo site and they haven't announced any security issues, yet. Plus, I always am required to enter my card details on their site each time I buy something, in all likelihood, they aren't probably storing the card on their servers, which leads us to the culprit, Adobe.
Also, I am very security conscious in general. I am no security expert, but I always use Linux/Mac to make transactions, with Firewalls, stuff like that.
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Is there a better way than typing my email address into a site of questionable integrity?
It's not too hard to find a link to the .tar.gz on Mega.co.nz, if you don't mind burning 9 GB of disk space. It's a plain text file, so you can just grep it. The consequences of this release are going to be felt for a long time. It's the worst thing I've ever seen happen on the Internet, and I've been around a while.
I have a possibly-not-too-paranoid suspicion that "the worst thing resulting from the 2013 Adobe compromise" may yet be to be revealed. People have joked for years about the "Adobe updater virus" – but what's protecting everybody who's now so familiar with weekly or monthly Acrobat/Flash/Air update boxes popping up asking for admin credentials? If they lost the Photoshop source code, is it even vaguely plausible to suggest they couldn't possibly have also lost root on the update servers, or their SSL private keys, or admin access to the dns zonefiles, or the adobe.com registrar credentials, or any of the other steps in the chain that'd allow attackers to push a malicious Adobe update?