41–50 of 243 posts
"The best part is the fine: $12m, despite the resulting audit also revealing that the system was systematically sending naked shorts." Cool - all you have to do to get away with financial crimes is create a system with no protections against breaking the law.
This connects back to the 'autonomous corporation' being discussed on the bitcoin discussion on HN today.
"The best part is the fine: $12m, despite the resulting audit also revealing that the system was systematically sending naked shorts." Cool - all you have to do to get away with financial crimes is create a system with no protections against breaking the law.
This connects back to the 'autonomous corporation' being discussed on the bitcoin discussion on HN today.
"The best part is the fine: $12m, despite the resulting audit also revealing that the system was systematically sending naked shorts." Cool - all you have to do to get away with financial crimes is create a system with no protections against breaking the law.
I'm shocked they didn't have a killswitch or automated stop-loss of some kind. A script that says "We just lost $5M in a few minutes; maybe there's a problem." Or, a guy paid minimum wage to watch the balance, with a button on his desk. $172,222 is a lot of minimum-wage years.
"Moreover, because the 33 Account held positions from multiple sources, Knight personnel could not quickly determine the nature or source of the positions accumulating in the 33 Account on the morning of August 1. Knight’s primary risk monitoring tool, known as “PMON,” is a post-execution position monitoring system. At the opening of the market, senior Knight personnel observed a large volume of positions accruing in the 33 Account. However, Knight did not link this tool to its entry of orders so that the entry of orders in the market would automatically stop when Knight exceeded pre-set capital thresholds or its gross position limits. PMON relied entirely on human monitoring and did not generate automated alerts regarding the firm’s financial exposure. PMON also did not display the limits for the accounts or trading groups; the person viewing PMON had to know the applicable limits to recognize that a limit had been exceeded. PMON experienced delays during high volume events, such as the one experienced on August 1, resulting in reports that were inaccurate."In my previous life working with telcos, I once tried to teach a particularly huge customer how to use CVS how to manage configurations across a 10+ machine cluster of machines. They didn't see any value in it, so they stuck to their good old process of SSHing into each machine individually, "cp config.xml config.xml.20131022", and then editing the configs by hand. Didn't take too long until a typo in a chmod command took down the whole thing (= the node couldn't take down a network interface anymore, so failover stopped working), and they spent several weeks flying in people from all over the planet to debug it... and they still didn't learn their lesson!
"The best part is the fine: $12m, despite the resulting audit also revealing that the system was systematically sending naked shorts." Cool - all you have to do to get away with financial crimes is create a system with no protections against breaking the law.
Yes, these criminal masterminds found a way to swindle honest hard-working themselves out of 440 million dollars and "get away with" a cool extra -12 million.
Out of interest, what would have been the outcome for Knight if their positions had caused them to be winners? $12m fine, keep the spoils and "carry on" ?
I'm shocked they didn't have a killswitch or automated stop-loss of some kind. A script that says "We just lost $5M in a few minutes; maybe there's a problem." Or, a guy paid minimum wage to watch the balance, with a button on his desk. $172,222 is a lot of minimum-wage years.