Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
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Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#2Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#3There are some good advice on how to improve the situation in the appendix section.
Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#4The MD5 hash function is broken, that is true. However, TLS doesn't use MD5 in its raw form; it uses variants of HMAC-MD5, which applies the hash function twice, with two different padding constants with high Hamming distances (put differently, it tries to synthesize two distinct hash functions, MD5-IPAD and MD5-OPAD, and apply them both). Nobody would recommend HMAC-MD5 for use in a new system, but it has not been broken.
RC4 is horribly broken, and is horribly broken in ways that are meaningful to TLS. But the magnitude of RC4's brokenness wasn't appreciated until last year, and up until then, RC4 was a common recommendation for resolving both the SSL3/TLS1.0 BEAST attack and the TLS "Lucky 13" M-t-E attack. That's because RC4 is the only widely-supported stream cipher in TLS. Moreover, RC4 was considered the most computationally efficient way to get TLS deployed, which 5-6 years ago might have been make-or-break for some TLS deployments.
You should worry about RC4 in TLS --- but not that much: the attack is noisy and extremely time consuming. You should not be alarmed by MD5 in TLS, although getting rid of it is one of many good reasons to drive adoption of TLS 1.2.
Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#5Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#6Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#7There's interesting technical content here, but it suffers from its alarmist tone. The MD5 hash function is broken, that is true. However, TLS doesn't use MD5 in its raw form; it uses variants of HMAC-MD5, which applies the hash function twice, with two different padding constants with high Hamming distances (put differently, it tries to synthesize two distinct hash functions, MD5-IPAD and MD5-OPAD, and apply them bo…
Sorry about my alarmist tone - from time to time I need to get rid of my conspiracy theories.
Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#8Not sure there, though.
Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#9There's interesting technical content here, but it suffers from its alarmist tone. The MD5 hash function is broken, that is true. However, TLS doesn't use MD5 in its raw form; it uses variants of HMAC-MD5, which applies the hash function twice, with two different padding constants with high Hamming distances (put differently, it tries to synthesize two distinct hash functions, MD5-IPAD and MD5-OPAD, and apply them bo…
Re: Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
#10There's interesting technical content here, but it suffers from its alarmist tone. The MD5 hash function is broken, that is true. However, TLS doesn't use MD5 in its raw form; it uses variants of HMAC-MD5, which applies the hash function twice, with two different padding constants with high Hamming distances (put differently, it tries to synthesize two distinct hash functions, MD5-IPAD and MD5-OPAD, and apply them bo…
With that said, I was under the impression that sites will need to support TLS 1.0 for a good long while, and if that is indeed the case, would they not be better off using RC4? From my understanding, the RC4 attacks seemed less practical than attacks against the implementation of CBC mode in SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0?