I'm just happy the FBI doesn't know how to run OCR. Hell they could have mechanical turked segments, like captcha farms.
How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
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Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#32Other wonderful delivery methods: - Baked into cuneiform - Wax tablets. "Oh, sorry, it got hot in my car and they're a little runny..." - In the form of a crossword puzzle. - Knitted into a scarf. "Perl one, skip two..." Best to have hardware from which it is impossible to export a key.
In all seriousness, is it possible to design a system where it is simply impossible to hand over data to a third party?
It's not exactly the same, but a TPM does something very similar by keeping it at the hardware level.
Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#33Other wonderful delivery methods: - Baked into cuneiform - Wax tablets. "Oh, sorry, it got hot in my car and they're a little runny..." - In the form of a crossword puzzle. - Knitted into a scarf. "Perl one, skip two..." Best to have hardware from which it is impossible to export a key.
In all seriousness, is it possible to design a system where it is simply impossible to hand over data to a third party?
If you can access it, then so can someone else. If you can't access it, then why bother building the system in the first place?
Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#34>To make use of these keys, the FBI would have to manually input all 2,560 characters, and one incorrect keystroke in this laborious process would render the FBI collection system incapable of collecting decrypted data That would take an intern less than an hour to digitize. Maybe three interns if you needed redundancy. This seems like a completely useless action on Levison's part since it end up giving the FBI the i…
Probably he was confident that they were too lazy to do it, and infact they didn't but just whined..
Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#35Other wonderful delivery methods: - Baked into cuneiform - Wax tablets. "Oh, sorry, it got hot in my car and they're a little runny..." - In the form of a crossword puzzle. - Knitted into a scarf. "Perl one, skip two..." Best to have hardware from which it is impossible to export a key.
In all seriousness, is it possible to design a system where it is simply impossible to hand over data to a third party?
Its at two levels.
Its trivial to make a system where the content of the messages can only be read by the recipient. PGP and GPG email is an example of this end-to-end encryption.
The weakness in these schemes is two-fold: the update mechanism for the software (e.g. if its web-based, do you trust the server that serves the page?) and authentication: how do you know that the credentials you have for the recipient are accurate?
Its less trivial to make a system where who-is-corresponding-with-whom is obscured. Onion Routing (e.g. TOR) is in this direction, but there are laborious ways to peel the onion.
All in all, a hard problem.
Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#36Off topic, but brings to mind another technique famously used by Goldman when they dumped over a billion pages to the 50 staffers in the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission:
http://money.msn.com/top-stocks/post.aspx?post=00000065-0000...
Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#37Upvoted because of the story, but I like NPR less and less these days. So far they've been mainly pro-government than pro-Snowden.
Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
After studying the requirements Lavabit said they could write code to do it for $3500. But the FBI said they didn't trust Lavabit to do it right and thought it cost too much. They demanded direct access. http://imgur.com/A3RNQWY
Why is scp redacted? And only partially so...
Because it refers to http://www.scp-wiki.net/scp-087
Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#39>To make use of these keys, the FBI would have to manually input all 2,560 characters, and one incorrect keystroke in this laborious process would render the FBI collection system incapable of collecting decrypted data That would take an intern less than an hour to digitize. Maybe three interns if you needed redundancy. This seems like a completely useless action on Levison's part since it end up giving the FBI the i…
at font size 4 this is infeasible. He might have introduced a single error somewhere for good measure.
Re: How Snowden's Email Provider Tried To Foil The FBI Using Tiny Font
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
In all seriousness, is it possible to design a system where it is simply impossible to hand over data to a third party?
I believe Julian Assange worked on a system that would make it impossible for an external entity to determine if there is any useful information on a data partition. Basically you would have a hard drive full of random numbers and it would be unfeasible to determine if there is any actual information on it, without the right keys and tools.
I have never heard Assange's name in connection with this, but that's what Truecrypt purports to do: http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume