Earlier quoted context omitted.
> You mean changing the number of "2048" to "4096"? No, certainly not. I agree with you; the change from 2048 to 4096 isn't interesting. The interesting part is that he 1) generated a new key (okay, not actually interesting in itself) , 2) is using it in an isolated install, 3) this isolate install is on entirely separate hardware, not just a VM, 4) this separate hardware is new hardware that has never been networked…
> Is going to such an extreme... really necessary? Since Schneier's now doing analysis of unreleased Snowden documents for the Guardian, he now has reason to believe that the NSA has a strong motive to see what documents he's working on. Seems to me that the level of tin-foil-hattery that's reasonable to protect against an organisation likely to be targeting you specifically needs to be an order of magnitude greater…
However, Schneier was a target well before this due to the nature of his work. It is exactly the scope of the recent revelations that throws the conventional thinking on where the fuzzy line between an appropriate risk assessment based on position of interest and the general population. When the potential dragnet is widespread and permanent I no longer have to only consider how important I am now (which I'm not), but I also have to consider if I will ever be take on a role that IS important not just now, but then.