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N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

nytimes.com

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Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#241

Post by icambron »

tptacek wrote: post #137
guelo wrote: post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That security systems are designed in the most paranoid fashion possible doesn't tell you anything about the real nature of the threat. Schneier's book doesn't tell you that the NSA has been strong arming corporations into giving up their private keys and into installing backdoors on chips. In fact Schneier himself is outraged to the point that he seems to be calling for a redesign of basic Internet protocols and gov…

Yeah, I'm a little baffled by Schneier's reaction to this. The revelation is advanced cryptanalytic capabilities at NSA, which is literally an article of faith with Schneier. Why is he freaking out about this when he didn't instead freak out about wholesale call record database dumps or AT&T fiber taps?

There's a difference between assuming something because it's prudent to do so and actually knowing it's true. And even if Schneier was extremely confident about it, he was still, in the minds of most people, just a paranoid guy on the corner screaming conspiracy theories about what the NSA may have and what they may be doing with it. Now he has some ammo, and he'd be foolish not to use it.

Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#242

Post by tptacek »

cbr wrote: post #213
tptacek wrote: post #160

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They pin certificates, so that a CA compromise that would enable MITM attack by the global passive adversary would be detectable (and in fact that mechanism has already been used to detect CA compromises.)

Why do you say "passive adversary"? I wouldn't call an MITM with a fake cert "passive".

I wouldn't call a MITM with a fake cert an effective global attack in 2013.

Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#244

Post by mrb »

leokun wrote: post #165
mrb wrote: post #149

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think we know very well which encryption has been foiled by the NSA. This is not speculation, but quasi-certainty: 1024-bit RSA. - Crytographers all acknowledge 1024-bit RSA is dead [1]. - Attack cost 10 years ago was estimated to be a few million USD to build a device able to crack a 1024-bit key every 12 months [2]. - "Much of" the "secure" HTTPS websites use such weak key sizes [3]. - NSA had a budget of 10.8 bi…

Some popular browsers still do not support newer versions. We tried turning this on with a newer, more secure key and ended up having downtime for some customers.

Very unlikely. Virtually all browsers support 2048-bit RSA. Keys larger than 2048 bits, however, are not always supported (which is probably what you tried).

Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#245

Post by __david__ »

wvenable wrote: post #114
jonknee wrote: post #42

> The N.S.A. hacked into target computers to snare messages before they were encrypted. I wonder which computer viruses belong to the NSA.

Windows, Mac OS, Android, iOS, Symbian, and any Linux distribution you haven't culled together and compiled yourself.

> ...any Linux distribution you haven't culled together and compiled yourself.

And maybe even ones you have compiled yourself "from scratch":

http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html

Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#246

Post by socceroos »

tptacek wrote: post #242
cbr wrote: post #213

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why do you say "passive adversary"? I wouldn't call an MITM with a fake cert "passive".

I wouldn't call a MITM with a fake cert an effective global attack in 2013.

As we've already seen, NSA and other such agencies already have direct connections into the under-sea cables that connect countries across the globe. MITM is exactly what they do ALL THE TIME. To not see it as effective is to miss the point of Total Information Awareness.

Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#247

Post by mrb »

aliston wrote: post #192
mrb wrote: post #149

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think we know very well which encryption has been foiled by the NSA. This is not speculation, but quasi-certainty: 1024-bit RSA. - Crytographers all acknowledge 1024-bit RSA is dead [1]. - Attack cost 10 years ago was estimated to be a few million USD to build a device able to crack a 1024-bit key every 12 months [2]. - "Much of" the "secure" HTTPS websites use such weak key sizes [3]. - NSA had a budget of 10.8 bi…

The article you linked to in [1] doesn't explicitly say that generalized 1024-bit RSA is dead. They found a way to exploit a special case key (Mersenne number keys). Searching around the internet, I found a bunch of articles about supposed cracks, but they all involved additional sources of information. I'm not doubting that the NSA has found ways to crack all sorts of crypto, but is there really a known way to break…

When asked whether 1024-bit RSA keys are dead, Lenstra said: "The answer to that question is an unqualified yes."

Generalized 1024-bit RSA keys are dead. Lenstra is making a comment on generalized 1024-bit RSA keys in this sentence. Not on Mersenne number factorization (which is, yes, the main topic of this article).

My link [2] tells you concretely how to break 1024-bit RSA and estimates the cost to $10M, well within NSA's capabilities.

Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#248

Post by tptacek »

socceroos wrote: post #246
tptacek wrote: post #242

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wouldn't call a MITM with a fake cert an effective global attack in 2013.

As we've already seen, NSA and other such agencies already have direct connections into the under-sea cables that connect countries across the globe. MITM is exactly what they do ALL THE TIME. To not see it as effective is to miss the point of Total Information Awareness.

This is parody, right?

Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#249

Post by Zariel »

untog wrote: post #29

Because strong encryption can be so effective, classified N.S.A. documents make clear, the agency’s success depends on working with Internet companies — by getting their voluntary collaboration, forcing their cooperation with court orders or surreptitiously stealing their encryption keys or altering their software or hardware. That's the money quote there- the NSA hasn't cracked encryption. They've just put back door…

Isn't this the fact that NSA has access to the internet companies private key for the SSL certificate? There by giving them the tools to decrypt the initial TLS handshake and then from there you can get the symmetric key and decrypt the rest? Or is there more to it, reading the article I didn't see any hard proof of this.

Re: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption

#250

Post by Filligree »

mcpherrinm wrote: post #133
mcherm wrote: post #109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Quantom computing cannot break all of crypto. Correct (except for the spelling of "Quantum"). > Anything based on P!=NP is believed to be secure against quantom computing, and there are several encryption methods backed by P!=NP Incorrect, well mostly. The deal is that there are problems that can be done in "polynomial time" (how long it takes is not exponential in the size of they key) for a normal computer (or pe…

> the ones that CANNOT be done on polynomial time is "NP". I see you've solved one of the great open problems! NP is defined as problems that a nondeterministic turing machine can solve in polynomial time. Imagine, if you will, a turing machine that when it "branches" always chooses the right path (Or: chooses "both" without overhead)

The latter of which sounds suspiciously like what a quantum computer does.

How sure are we that BQP != NP?

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