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Mailpile – taking e-mail back

indiegogo.com

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Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#111
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think Mailpile is potentially valuable because it immediately solves the encryption problem, but because it solves the MUA problem. All innovation in the secure email space has been blocked for the past 13 years by one primary problem: webmail . It is simply not possible to develop a secure email solution if webmail is the only viable option for accessing mail, so most people who would be interested in innova…

Wouldn't Mailpile make things better even if you kept your GPG keys on the server? Sure, if the authorities targeted you specifically, they could probably pry the unencrypted keys from the server's memory (although with considerable effort it it was a dedicated or collocated machine) but widespread adoption of that model would completely stop dragnets. Only narrowly tailored investigations would be feasible, no mass…

Only the public key should be stored on the virtual mail server, since all it's doing is encrypting incoming mail. It's your local email client (e.g. Thunderbird) that then downloads the encrypted emails to your local machine and decrypts them with your private key. Signing and outgoing encryption are also done locally. At that point, all that someone raiding your VPS gets is a bunch of encrypted messages, which good encryption is supposed to make worthless, and your public key, which they should already have (along with everyone else).

Sure, your local machine could also be raided and the keys grabbed from that, but that's not a problem with using a VPS so much as a problem with your local setup.

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#112
post #58

Okay, so we're crowd-funding an email client now? Is there any reason to not just put up all of my random project ideas on indiegogo and see if they get funded? If I'm having trouble financing the development new features for my SaaS application, should I just create a funding project for it? Because I'm really not seeing the difference between that and this...I wish someone could explain this phenomenon to me.

People have the option of paying people to work on projects. I don't see why this is so complicated. If you want to try to get people to crowd fund your project then go ahead and try. If you don't think someone else's project is worthwhile then don't contribute to it.

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#113
post #105
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We have options already, although we abandoned them once the Internet became ubiquitous. UUCP would allow encrypted envelopes that would only allow trusted nodes to decrypt enough to forward to the next destination or to the local user. It would be ungainly, especially at first, and just as easy to scoop associations between users (although, not subject lines or other metadata) by tracing the limited paths. As a crit…

You might enjoy reading up on how Tor works[1], it's along similar lines. [1]: https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en

Yeah, it's onion routing applied to services. I never know how much detail to go into on HN these days.

I should have just said "TOR back ported to UUCP" and saved time. :)

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#114

How many times do people have to say this: There is no such thing as secure email. Assume everything is being read. You can't bolt security on (SSL, mailbox encryption, PKI). You have to design it in from the start. SMTP/IMAP etc have crudely hacked on TLS implementations which aren't even guaranteed to be operational site to site. PGP is just an encapsulation which is rarely used. It's a mess. This is just a repacka…

Yes, I'm sure a complete redesign will be a success. Let's give it a cool name too... how about "Wave"?

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#115
as ever, the criminals and terrorists have already solved the problem; they communicate privately using closed community forums (search for "carding/carder forums"). The people left using SMTP e-mail are mostly PETA, EFF and other political groups the government is interested in monitoring.

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#116
post #103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Some key differences are that we do not store your emails, your email provider does. We do not ever, at any point, have access to your unencrypted keys. Therefore, we cannot, even if forced to turn over access to your data. That being said, as with all secure systems there may be bugs. The client however, is (will be) open source so that everyone can help solve whatever problems that may arise. The key point is that…

So now I really don't understand how this is any different from using Thunderbird and EnigMail/PGP to encrypt your mail - and if I've understood correctly then it actually isn't any different, you are just providing a glossier interface. I think it's a worthwhile project, but beyond the tech community, I'm not entirely sure how much traction usage will get... Thunderbird/Enigmail is a PITA to setup and use for sure.…

It is different in that it creates a key distribution interface for the average person. This interface allows things like decrypting emails in the browser and transparent security. It also allows you to know who has security and who doesnt (this allows people to incrementally start using encryption without the headaches of wondering who else is using it). These are problems that are not solved with any PGP type interface today.

I think that what you are missing is that the server stores encrypted keys, rather than no key.

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Rome wasnt built in a day, as the saying goes. Our solution here tries to solve a few of the problems to start with. The goal, however, is to maintain a list of urls, sha1 hashes, update times, and a list of verifiers. The sha1 hashes make sure that the js that you have is the one being distributed (although the hash may soon be upgraded to a different one). The update times and list of verifiers are used to be able…

Is the delivered js minimized / compiled or delivered in human readable form?

The container is abstracted, so it can receive whatever type of js the server wants to send. Specifically, the js that we will use will not be compiled so that it can be verified (and it will also be open source). The main problem with this is that it wastes bandwidth which shouldnt be a problem for two reasons: the architecture can cache the js intelligently and the extension will have a lot of the crypto stuff embedded meaning that it wont need to be redistributed per access.

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#118
post #107
post #88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Interesting idea. Instead of a VM though, what about a small, low-power box that you plug into your home network that handles secure communication transparently to the user? I'm thinking something like AdTrap ( http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/600284081/adtrap-the-int... ) but for email or other sorts of communication.

Why the need to sell hardware? I can accomplish what AdTrap does using a USB stick or SD card and any old i386 hardware I might have lying around. You might call this a "System on a Stick". It boots from the USB/SD media and runs in RAM (no hard disk is needed). You set your other devices (running your favorite graphical OS's) to use it as a gateway/router. It can block ads. Easily. I do this via DNS and it works lik…

There are certain advantages to custom hardware. For example, the OS could be flashed onto a tamper-resistant ROM to prevent it from being surreptitiously altered. The device could include a smart card slot used on boot to decrypt the storage mechanism. And the device itself could be very small, light, low-power, and fanless, perfect for stashing out of the way next to your modem.

There's also advantage in offering up a single appliance for people that don't have the technical expertise to set up the necessary services on their own, who don't have a spare i386 they can use, or even people who just want something to work without spending too much time on it.

Secure communication requires parties on both sides to be capable of it, and it stands to reason that more people would buy into a system that provides the capability if you make it really easy to use. Of course, the communication network itself should be fully interoperable with whatever hardware you want to use to connect to it.

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#119

How many times do people have to say this: There is no such thing as secure email. Assume everything is being read. You can't bolt security on (SSL, mailbox encryption, PKI). You have to design it in from the start. SMTP/IMAP etc have crudely hacked on TLS implementations which aren't even guaranteed to be operational site to site. PGP is just an encapsulation which is rarely used. It's a mess. This is just a repacka…

good

Re: Mailpile – taking e-mail back

#120
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

GSM communication is actually encrypted [1], albeit lightly. I remember having an unencrypted NMT handset and ditching it circa 2000 in favor of a GSM handset. NMT support was dropped by my service provider 3-4 years later. So transitions like this are definitely possible, though not overnight. Remember the slow introduction of https. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GSM#GSM_service_security

You're forgetting POTS lines. I can call someone on a POTS line, with a 1992 handset, and it works the same as if I called someone with a brand new GSM phone.

Right. But at the same time, you don't see any of the forklift upgrades that have gone on behind the scenes. All the GSMPOTS or long-distance POTS calls? They're all being converted to VoIP at some point (private network, but still IP).
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