Earlier quoted context omitted.
Your typical motherboard's BIOS code is not signed. Your video card's BIOS is not signed. Your network's card firmware is not signed. Your optical disc drive's firmware is not signed. Etc. This threat vector exists with each of these devices. As always security is a trade-off. The threat vector of flashing a backdoored BIOS/firmware is irrelevant for 99% of the market: most people will never be targets of such highly…
There is another thing to consider: Adding security to a system imposes costs on the use, maintenance, and support of those systems. Can you imagine the scale issues associated with maintaining PKI over the millions of devices deployed? How about hundreds of millions? TPM is present in many, many laptops yet most IT departments leave it un-configured. Why? Because when you replace the hard drive and it changes the bo…
Now, security is a process. You can expect breaches of high value hardware, and need to react to them.
The security model for consoles STARTS with the assumption that the attacker has physical possession of the hardware. This makes things interesting; it's certainly a big differentiator for PCs versus tablets, and one of the reasons why the Windows group at Microsoft has had a lot of trouble making their stuff secure on non-PCs.
But for a hard drive, things should be pretty contained. I estimated it would have taken a couple of weeks to secure one major embedded system I worked on; assuming the interfaces are limited, it's not a huge deal.