The first hack read on hacker new I have seen for a long time.
EDIT: right now on page 1: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6146279
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The first hack read on hacker new I have seen for a long time.
EDIT: right now on page 1: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6146279
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Your typical motherboard's BIOS code is not signed. Your video card's BIOS is not signed. Your network's card firmware is not signed. Your optical disc drive's firmware is not signed. Etc. This threat vector exists with each of these devices. As always security is a trade-off. The threat vector of flashing a backdoored BIOS/firmware is irrelevant for 99% of the market: most people will never be targets of such highly…
There is another thing to consider: Adding security to a system imposes costs on the use, maintenance, and support of those systems. Can you imagine the scale issues associated with maintaining PKI over the millions of devices deployed? How about hundreds of millions? TPM is present in many, many laptops yet most IT departments leave it un-configured. Why? Because when you replace the hard drive and it changes the bo…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Maybe I misunderstood, but didn't the harddrive have direct memory access (DMA)?
The DMA mentioned in the article was internal to the drive, between the hardware interfaces and it's internal cache. The drive did not have DMA access to system memory.
Could this attack compromisse dedicated/rent servers? If so, the attacker could rent, install the exploit on the hardware and terminate the contract. What about cloud servers? Sure there are virtualization layers, but can't those be breached? If so that would pose imense danger given the distributed nature the hardware exploit could render the entire farm vulnerable
The attack could compromise other servers yes. I think the scenario you describe is a possibility, although there are some technical feats that would make wide-scale exploitation difficult - you need to know what you want to modify ahead of time which would be difficult. Virtualised environments that don't pass the vendor specific commands should be immune to the attack though. As others have said, encryption would p…
Careful!
It can, but doesn't always. For example, eCryptfs currently doesn't protect against tampering; it uses Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode without a HMAC or other signature.
(I'm working with some colleagues to add Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) support to eCryptfs, which does provide some form of tamper-detection.)
If you liked this, then you might like Travis Goodspeed's really cool talk about "Writing a Thumbdrive from Scratch" (for antiforensics) [1] at the 29th Chaos Communication Congress [29c3]. [1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8Im0_KUEf8
Any sufficiently complex system will exhibit this trait sooner or later.
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yes there is, you encrypt the OS that is stored on the hard drive edit: sorry, chain looks like this: BIOS reads boot block from hard drive, checks digital signature, signature invalid, boot fails. BIOS check for signature works in concert with TPM to do key storage, so you're fine. albeit, sleeping with 'evil' technology like UEFI and TPM.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The DMA mentioned in the article was internal to the drive, between the hardware interfaces and it's internal cache. The drive did not have DMA access to system memory.
Even though it wasn't discussed in the article, I think firewire and thunderbolt external drives DO have direct DMA access to system memory. Google for SBP-2 and DMA, and a bunch of articles about protecting against firewire attacks against full-disk-encryption (among other things) appear.
This was a great read. One of the things we've done in the past is to modify the firmware of the drive to be able to give errors on command. The purpose was for testing RAID systems in real life scenarios. One can include a 'unit test' drive in a RAID array which will run through a series of known bad disk behaviours. From the simple like returning read failure, to the more complex like returning the wrong block or r…