Do GPS signals not correlate themselves with a compass reading? I would think that comparing the change in coordinates to the external fact would prevent spoofing.
Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
31–40 of 102 posts
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#32[deleted]
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#33I wonder how this compares with previous 'pseudolite' ideas? The University of New South Wales (et al.) were active here but I think the point was more an augemtation to provide better positioning at GPS-unfriendly latitudes or topographies.
These ran into all sorts of problems, largely to do with the proximity of the pseudolites to the receivers such as synchronisation and signal strength issues. Locatanets (http://locata.com/) are the in thing nowadays.
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
What do you suppose a drone does if the command channel and the encrypted GPS signal are both unavailable/jammed but the unencrypted GPS signal is available? In any case, you don't have to be able to decrypt a GPS signal to be able to replay it - you fly a plane 200m above the drone, record whatever's coming over the air from the satellites and you know precisely what would be at the drone's antenna if it were 200m h…
That would only work if it had a really silly default similar in a way to "automatically connect to available Wi-Fi network" even when it's unsecured. It's possible the manufacturer may have overlooked something like that, but if it is in a military capacity, I doubt they would have left a gaping hole like that. Electronic countermeasures have been in use for several decades now so jamming/hijacking etc... would have…
Traditionally, I believe receivers had to lock onto the civilian GPS signal before even trying to lock the encrypted military GPS.
Besides, encryption doesn't stop you from receiving the existing signal and repeating it with a well-tuned delay, which is all you really need to do to fake GPS...
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
Parent comment says the military uses encrypted GPS , which should protect against this type of attack.
What do you suppose a drone does if the command channel and the encrypted GPS signal are both unavailable/jammed but the unencrypted GPS signal is available? In any case, you don't have to be able to decrypt a GPS signal to be able to replay it - you fly a plane 200m above the drone, record whatever's coming over the air from the satellites and you know precisely what would be at the drone's antenna if it were 200m h…
[deleted]
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
True, they are less busy, but it does not mean GPS is not used for instrument approaches (as parent implied). I fly airplane without IFR GPS (IFR student), but ATC is trying to assign us GPS approach all the time (when coming into airport with ILS). As far as I understand, GPS approaches are used, even if they are less critical in busier airports. Besides, sometimes ILS is not available in bigger airports as well.
ILS was not available on the SFO runway the Asiana aircraft crashed on ~2 weeks back: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asiana_Airlines_Flight_214
Yes, but the weather was clear. No need for ILS in such weather.
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#37So a $80 million yatch can't afford an $3000 high quality gyroscope? Now you could buy amazing laser gyroscopes, for planes the Inertial navigation system error could be great, but for ships(that move more than 20X slower) is not.
Humans, like water, take the easiest route. Unless someone is particularly vigilant and routinely checks the gyroscope to verify the course the GPS is using you wouldn't notice the "hijack" till it was too late. Most people I know wouldn't be paranoid enough to verify their own course against a gyroscope, or any other means of determining coordinates.
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is more to it than that though. Aircraft often fly instrument approaches using GPS alone, getting to within 500 feet of the ground while still in clouds. If someone could make the aircraft think it was just a couple extra miles in the wrong direction it could be disastrous.
No they don't, they land with something called ILS https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_landing_system
>Limitations
Glide slope station for runway 09R at Hannover Airport in Germany
>Due to the complexity of ILS localizer and glide slope systems, there are some limitations. Localizer systems are sensitive to obstructions in the signal broadcast area like large buildings or hangars. Glide slope systems are also limited by the terrain in front of the glide slope antennas. If terrain is sloping or uneven, reflections can create an uneven glidepath causing unwanted needle deflections. Additionally, since the ILS signals are pointed in one direction by the positioning of the arrays, glide slope supports only straight-line approaches with a constant angle of descent. Installation of an ILS can be costly because of siting criteria and the complexity of the antenna system.
>ILS critical areas and ILS sensitive areas are established to avoid hazardous reflections that would affect the radiated signal. The location of these critical areas can prevent aircraft from using certain taxiways[3] leading to delays in takeoffs, increased hold times, and increased separation between aircraft.
You don't think that the ILS system could be vulnerable to an attack similar to this? The main point of the article is that we rely on tech that is insecure to give us our location and that can be influenced by an outside source. If that outside source is nefarious in nature then we can experience some real issues.
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#39I am seeing this more and more. I've seen the ability to have a phone take over an airplane, a laptop control a car, now a laptop taking over a ship... where are all the security guys at when this stuff is implemented?
The security guys best friends right now are these Texas Students. Want to get funding for your security audit - hack the CFO's laptop
Re: Texas students fake GPS signals and take control of an $80 million yacht
#40So a $80 million yatch can't afford an $3000 high quality gyroscope? Now you could buy amazing laser gyroscopes, for planes the Inertial navigation system error could be great, but for ships(that move more than 20X slower) is not.
Humans, like water, take the easiest route. Unless someone is particularly vigilant and routinely checks the gyroscope to verify the course the GPS is using you wouldn't notice the "hijack" till it was too late. Most people I know wouldn't be paranoid enough to verify their own course against a gyroscope, or any other means of determining coordinates.
That "someone" could simply be the computer.