11–20 of 102 posts
That's cool! Reminds me of the way the Iranian most likely got control over a US drone a couple of years back. They jammed communication signals and faked GPS data when automatic "go back to home base" landing procedure kicked in. http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/iran-hacked-...
That's cool! Reminds me of the way the Iranian most likely got control over a US drone a couple of years back. They jammed communication signals and faked GPS data when automatic "go back to home base" landing procedure kicked in. http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/iran-hacked-...
That's cool! Reminds me of the way the Iranian most likely got control over a US drone a couple of years back. They jammed communication signals and faked GPS data when automatic "go back to home base" landing procedure kicked in. http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/iran-hacked-...
How can they fake the gps signal, the military uses encrypted GPS?
"By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot... Notably, it's also much easier than trying to crack the encrypted remote-control communications channel. With the drone relying solely on GPS to determine its latitude, longitude, altitude, and velocity, the Iranians then broadcast carefully spoofed GPS coordinates..."
Click bait title(same as the article, for what its worth). $80mil yacht uses same GPS as a $80 sell phone, the 6 zeros dont change that. To the actual issue, i wonder how practical this is? In that i mean what level of power output is required to override the correct signal and at what distance? Is this something that could be a real issue, impractical? What?
First, the fact that expensive machines can be brought down by cheap components is still interesting. Nobody will really care if your $80 cell phone can be spoofed.
Second, GPS receivers are not all the same. There are many different techniques you can use to make your receiver more resilient against spoofing, from cheap and easy things like adding Galileo and GLONASS support to crazy expensive things like adding backup star tracking and inertial navigation systems to cross-check the GPS results.
At the least, one would expect such an expensive ship to cross-check GPS results with internal dead reckoning to reject obviously bad GPS coordinates. That it didn't do this suggests that shipbuilders (or, at least, buyers) aren't aware of the spoofability of GPS. Articles like this make people aware of the problem and its solutions, solutions which simply don't apply to an $80 cell phone.
That's cool! Reminds me of the way the Iranian most likely got control over a US drone a couple of years back. They jammed communication signals and faked GPS data when automatic "go back to home base" landing procedure kicked in. http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/iran-hacked-...
How can they fake the gps signal, the military uses encrypted GPS?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
No they don't, they land with something called ILS https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrument_landing_system
There is more airports in US that have GPS only approaches than airports that have ILS approaches. For example: http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1308/05879R25.PDF 500 ft altitude with GPS only (without vertical guidance). LPV minimum is 300 ft. Category III ILS minimum is 200 ft, Cat II -- 100 ft. But there are a lot of airports where ILS is not available.
Counting airports doesn't give you an accurate picture, because just about any airport can have a GPS approach, since the whole point is that it doesn't require any ground equipment. That doesn't mean those approaches get much use, because people don't fly into those airports all that much, especially not on instrument approaches.
I fly out of an airport with a published GPS approach and no ILS, and people use the GPS approach on well under 1% of the total landings there. Any reasonably busy airport will have ILS.
I am seeing this more and more. I've seen the ability to have a phone take over an airplane, a laptop control a car, now a laptop taking over a ship... where are all the security guys at when this stuff is implemented?
>where are all the security guys at when this stuff is implemented? It doesn't matter where they are, because where they're not is in management. During development, if attacks like this are even considered at all, its a very low probability incident, isolated to a very small number of targeted units and requires people doing things that can be dismissed by rhetorically asking "why would anyone ever do X?" Computer s…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
How can they fake the gps signal, the military uses encrypted GPS?
The article is interesting. Take a look at it. "By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot... Notably, it's also much easier than trying to crack the encrypted remote-control communications channel. With the drone relying solely on GPS to determine its latitude, longitude, altitude, and velocity, the Iranians then broadcast carefully spoofed GPS coordinates..."
Click bait title(same as the article, for what its worth). $80mil yacht uses same GPS as a $80 sell phone, the 6 zeros dont change that. To the actual issue, i wonder how practical this is? In that i mean what level of power output is required to override the correct signal and at what distance? Is this something that could be a real issue, impractical? What?
When gauging the newsworthy-ness of a problem, the scope of its impact is always one of the first factors that journalists consider.