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As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

lauren.vortex.com

231–240 of 295 posts

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#231
post #177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Self signed certificates throw up all kinds of nasty "you're taking lots of risks" in browsers (if they're allowed at all). I would not expect that they will be more broadly used than before, particularly since installing a self-signed certificate locally is very hard to do for the average person.

And looping back to the tin-foil hatters, many of us have called into question why all browsers have, over time, decreased their support for self-signed certificates. There are modes wherein Firefox will not even offer the "proceed anyway" option [1]. Conspiracy theories abound, but the browsers' marginalization of self-signed certificates has always struck me as devious. Yes, please do alert users that self-signed c…

You can, pretty trivially, import your private CA's public key into your keychain, and boom, no more warnings.

I do think that the average joe, doesn't know what a certificate or CA is, should be protected from automatically trusting an unknown CA.

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#232

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Does the Federal government not understand that this (idiotic) mass scale surveillance is bad for business? Emmm, it's the business interests that ask for those kind of things. You think the politicians operate on a vacuum? The idea is to get a stable climate where the business interests (multinationals and such) can do as they please, and citizens are afraid.

That's objectively false - Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Facebook (among others) have all been at pains to distance themselves from NSA data collection precisely because they understand how bad the NSA's behavior is for their business.

[deleted]

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#233

Please forgive my rudimentary (and possible erroneous understanding. There are three things important to public-key encryption. The public key, the private key (together called the key pair) and a certificate. If I understand it the cert is just to give confidence that you have the correct public key. So the NSA having access to the cert is a non issue as everyone has access to same. That's its purpose in life. Also…

Your understanding of keys is about right. It is the OP article that your are not understanding.

You ask "so how can the NSA decrypt such a message?" That's what the article is telling you: Either by 1) getting the private key from the corporation you are communicating with, or by 2) cracking the cryptography.

Most people don't encrypt every email, they just use https to their email server. You say you're not sure about https, but that is the big vulnerability. So NSA just needs to ask your emailserver corp for their private key (to decrypt the packets, and then everyone can deny that the NSA obtained your email from the corp). This is case 1) above.

For people who encrypt the message end to end (as in your example "encrypt a message to someone I need to use that person's public key"), this is case 2). It is controversial whether the NSA can crack the best ciphers, which are postulated to be near-impossible to crack. But the NSA has resources we cannot imagine and/or secret resources we cannot even know about. When the first encryption schemes came out, they were strong in the day but were later brute forced by more power computers. So there are some who think the NSA can or will be able to crack the current crypto (that's what the OP is referring to when he says "the means to subvert widely used mechanisms"). As others have said, in targetted cases like this, it may be easier for the NSA just to plant a bug on the receiving computer, to read contents after it has been decrypted.

Now certs, which you have half wrong. Yes, certs give confidence that you have the correct public key. But certs are mostly used by companies (case 1 above) not individuals (case 2).

In case 2, peer-to-peer encryption, individuals rarely go to the expense of getting trusted certificates. You say "let's take this private", and you send him your public key, or he sends you his--no cert involved. Instead you both rely on publishing your public keys everywhere and all the time (at the bottom of every email, on their website, etc.). That provides some history for you to trust the key he sends you--and vice-versa. In other words, public keys MUST be displayed publicly before you want to use it to gain credibility.

Certificates are a way for companies to publish their public key with a credible certificate authority (CA). A certificate is essentially another public-private key pair that lets you determine that the CA really endorses the public key you are interested in. The credibility of the CA is determined by their record in the marketplace as to whether they endorse credible companies and whether they keep their master keys secure.

The original article really doens't address certs, except to say that if master keys can be deciphered, we cannot trust certs anymore. That's because a malicious party could create a cert that looked real but wasn't (this happened recently when somebody stole one of the master keys used by a CA--they were able to make fake certs).

My question to you is: if you misunderstood the article, why are you taking such strong positions in your other comments?

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#234

> To be clear, this is not to assert that targeted, justified intercepts should not be possible under appropriate and realistic court supervision. Why make this disclaimer? To avoid being branded a fringe anarchist? It seems to me that we should absolutely be building intercept-proof communication privacy to the best of our ability since A) there's no such thing as perfect security and B) anything of importance event…

It's worth noting that prior to the internet there was absolutely no way of creating intercept-proof communication. Whilst I don't want companies handing over the SSL keys any more than you do, we have only had truly secure communication protocols available to the public for the past 10 or so years of human history.

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#235
post #129

> Public-key cryptography as we know it today may be rapidly approaching the end of its useful lifespan. No evidence in the article substantiates this bold statement. - "pressuring major Internet firms to provide their "master" SSL keys for government surveillance purposes": this demonstrates a weakness of centralized public-key infrastructures, it does not follow that public-key cryptography is doomed. (See: web of…

Agreed. Public-key cryptography is fine. Entrusting third parties to protect your privacy is dying.

This is something I have been thinking about a lot lately. Users need to take more responsibility for guarding their own privacy. I think there are a lots of business opportunities here: easy to use tools that keep control entirely in Alice's and Bob's hands and public key cryptography is certainly part of the solution.

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#236

The only defense against government snooping is air gap. Don't connect your stuff to the Internet.

From the article, I got the impression that the only way to really have secure communications is to create your own crypto. Now that you mention "air gap," I think that is the key (pun intended): it would have to be a crypto device that communicates with a PC through an air gap. Not USB nor bluetooth, actually nothing digital. The device I'm thinking of would rely on certain kinds of digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital conversions.

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#237
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I know that's a popular thing to say, but the mainstream media broke the story . In what way are they a government mouthpiece?

The media didn't break anything. Snowden gave them the story, which they have mostly ignored in favor of hit pieces against him as a traitor and a coward.

Perhaps you need to look up the definition of "breaking a story":

"to be the first to broadcast or distribute the story of an event."[1]

Snowden provided the information, the media absolutely broke the story.

[1] http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/break+a+story

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#238

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Vivtek's point was that most people don't care about this, and consider the Paula Deen incident far more noteworthy.

That may have been true for whichever couple of days the talking heads devoted to the unfortunate Ms. Dean, but it simply isn't borne out over the long haul. If you look really hard, I doubt you can find a single piece about Dean that was produced today , while most outlets have several about Snowden.

You can't find a piece about Paula Deen today because the attention has shifted to Prince George. Which, by the way, is exactly the point: While there are people who care about Snowden, NSA, etc., they are not currently any kind of substantial part of the public. We all ignore that at our peril.

The fact that Snowden may be a larger-than-normal individual news story doesn't change the fact that the story doesn't capture public attention in the face of the multitudes of other news stories continually cropping up and then going away again.

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With all the outcoming gov scandals, with government forcing you to vaccine your kids... All other points aside for a moment: the government should force each and every parent to vaccinate their children. Herd immunity is a key factor in protecting most of the population from many awful diseases, and herd immunity is only effective if the vast majority are vaccinated. There's no credible evidence that vaccination cau…

Yes vaccination is NOT a billion dollar business, vaccines do not kill people, and its perfectly logic you need to get shots against other peoples diseases BUT at the same time those who don't become a danger to you, yes. http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/199... http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2008/03/1... http://vaccinedangers.com/ http://www.mercola.com/article/vaccines/neu…

> I could go on and on here like the vaccines business is create problem & offer solution infinite loop

Except that we know the backstory to this particular chicken/egg problem, and we know that in this case vaccines came last, after the problem they were meant to solve (and, substantially speaking, have solved).

America's longest-serving President was crippled no less than 100 years ago by a disease which vaccination can now prevent, and you're blaming Big Pharma for that???

Re: As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption

#240
post #129

> Public-key cryptography as we know it today may be rapidly approaching the end of its useful lifespan. No evidence in the article substantiates this bold statement. - "pressuring major Internet firms to provide their "master" SSL keys for government surveillance purposes": this demonstrates a weakness of centralized public-key infrastructures, it does not follow that public-key cryptography is doomed. (See: web of…

Agreed. Public-key cryptography is fine. Entrusting third parties to protect your privacy is dying. This is something I have been thinking about a lot lately. Users need to take more responsibility for guarding their own privacy. I think there are a lots of business opportunities here: easy to use tools that keep control entirely in Alice's and Bob's hands and public key cryptography is certainly part of the solution…

I've been thinking quite a lot about that exact thing as well. There must be a way to build great commercial tools that are also truly secure. I'd love to discuss further. Contact info in my profile.
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