One of the things I built out of Java when I was hanging out on the cypherpunks list was a 'Noise Sphere' applet. Basically this is a way of testing a PRNG visually. It was fun to put various ideas through it to see how they panned out (most really sucked) One of the cool things was using the alpha emitter RNG from a smart card and finding out that it too was slightly biased in the presence of foil on one side (never did find out why that was, but it did stick out)
Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
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Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#22Earlier quoted context omitted.
I upvoted this because, of course, it confirms my own biases, but kind of wish I hadn't, because we're not helping with comments like these.
Whether Cryptocat programmers suck or not, I've seen worse errors from better programmers. I'm not sure what's the metric to follow here when it comes to correlating these two items.
People with no programming experience should be literally banned by law from writing critical software. You should take those bugs way more seriously.
PS: I have seen a programmer's face fear when asked to write crypto software. They know enough to be shit scared. You need that kind of people.
Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#23I'm a complete noob when it comes to cryptography. I understand that having a PRNG that doesn't return numbers with even distribution across a range is bad. Extreme example would be something like http://xkcd.com/221/ . But could someone explain how an attacker can take advantage of the fact that 0 is returned ~1% more often than other digits? It this flaw alone sufficient to break cryptocat? Or does it simply make b…
Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#24Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#25I'm a complete noob when it comes to cryptography. I understand that having a PRNG that doesn't return numbers with even distribution across a range is bad. Extreme example would be something like http://xkcd.com/221/ . But could someone explain how an attacker can take advantage of the fact that 0 is returned ~1% more often than other digits? It this flaw alone sufficient to break cryptocat? Or does it simply make b…
The essence is that in modern cryptography you're creating a provably secure system. One of those proofs is that your prng outputs a uniform distribution.
[0] http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2013-06-17-crypto-science-no...
Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#26As the lead developer for Cryptocat, I must say this is really a great example of how to write a post-mortem for a security bug. Sophos bloggers are always worth reading.
Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
Whether Cryptocat programmers suck or not, I've seen worse errors from better programmers. I'm not sure what's the metric to follow here when it comes to correlating these two items.
You are dangerously fooling yourself by minimizing the importance of those bugs. Cryptography software is not like regular software. It is critical software, like the kind used to run planes or nuclear power plants: People's lives depends on it. People with no programming experience should be literally banned by law from writing critical software. You should take those bugs way more seriously. PS: I have seen a progr…
Even unrelated code is heavily audited to make sure that it can't somehow impact the main control loop and cause an invalid state.
Cryptography software should be much the same.
Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#28Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#29Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure but the author(s) of Cryptocat have been so uniquely resistant to help/input, over a fairly long period of time. Maybe your euphemism 'unserious' is worth adopting for every time one wants to say 'bad' or 'incompetent', in cases like this.
I think the project is worth criticizing, but that the concerns are serious enough to deserve better than snark.
Makes it a lousy, toxic topic for message boards but that seems a comparatively small price for a defense against the notion that Cryptocat is (or likely, ever will be) secure.
Re: Anatomy of a pseudorandom number generator – visualising Cryptocat's buggy PRNG
#30 Cryptocat's hacktivist credibility was cemented in 2012 when
its Canadian developer, Nadim Kobeissi, was stopped at the
US border and interviewed about his Cryptocat-related
programming activities.
s/was/claimed to be/. This software clearly is not Ft. Knox, and its becoming less and less believable that US intelligence would ever feel the need to interrogate the author of an open source project, and with such brittle security, about the cryptography techniques used therein.I find it far more believable that the young developer with a penchant for dramatics and a reply for everything has a talent for PR. And a shallow understanding of the grave consequences of faulty crypto software.