A thorough PGP tutorial
futureboy.us
A thorough PGP tutorial
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Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#2Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#3Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#4A great tutorial, however. Very accessible in my opinion and considering it's purpose my previous paragraph is more of an aside.
Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#5Scary bit is it's not server on HTTPS, which is probably a must-have for sites that publish public-key information. Much easier to MITM attack the site and claim to be posting "his" public key and email address while really publishing your own info, etc. A great tutorial, however. Very accessible in my opinion and considering it's purpose my previous paragraph is more of an aside.
Still, I suppose it's possible for an adversary to work around this as well. If you can find enough people who are 1) willing to falsely sign a key, and 2) trusted by others, you can have these people sign a spoofed key. But then these people would be putting their reputations on the line, and the probability of being exposed is high. Thus the cost of the attack is high.
The lesson being: If you're emailing info that is valuable enough to warrant such a costly attack, verify the key through some other means. Meet the message recipient in person, for example. And consider a thorough security audit of everything in your digital and physical life. You're obviously operating in a far more dangerous world than I do. There are probably many vulnerabilities available to attackers that have nothing to do with your email.
Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#6Scary bit is it's not server on HTTPS, which is probably a must-have for sites that publish public-key information. Much easier to MITM attack the site and claim to be posting "his" public key and email address while really publishing your own info, etc. A great tutorial, however. Very accessible in my opinion and considering it's purpose my previous paragraph is more of an aside.
That's the purpose of key signing. The author--like almost all PGP users--has gotten his key signed by third parties. This means that its integrity can be verified. E.g., if a man in the middle were to intercept the HTTP response and change the contents of the key, it would lack the signatures. Still, I suppose it's possible for an adversary to work around this as well. If you can find enough people who are 1) willin…
My warning was truly an aside, and given the nature of a large group of visitors, of course a handful might not follow best practices and verify the signatures, etc.
Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's the purpose of key signing. The author--like almost all PGP users--has gotten his key signed by third parties. This means that its integrity can be verified. E.g., if a man in the middle were to intercept the HTTP response and change the contents of the key, it would lack the signatures. Still, I suppose it's possible for an adversary to work around this as well. If you can find enough people who are 1) willin…
Of course, you're entirely correct in that :) My warning was truly an aside, and given the nature of a large group of visitors, of course a handful might not follow best practices and verify the signatures, etc.
Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#8gpg --armor --export --sign
I changed to
gpg --armor --export
and it works. Just pointing this out as a typo.
Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#9It seems as though many of the web-of-trust issues that impeded PGP 15+ years ago could be helped by current day social networking practices, if a social network pushed it. PGP/GPG could be used under the hood, as long as the user never has to deal with an actual file anywhere unless they wanted to.
The consequences of evil twin attacks [1] may be worse, but if the 'verify' action was not as casual as mere friending, then perhaps it would be less susceptible.
Are any startups working from this angle?
[1] http://my.safaribooksonline.com/book/-/9781597495455/chapter...
Re: A thorough PGP tutorial
#10A very small (but rather important, depending on occasion/readership) detail:
[...]
gpg --encrypt --sign --armor -r recipient@email -r your@email.com filename
[...]
-r recipient Specifies recipients of the message. You must already have private keys of the people listed. [...]
The author probably meant, "You must already have public keys of the people listed," not private. (Probably just a typo-level thing, they doubtlessly know what they are talking about.)