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Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

yle.fi

61–69 of 69 posts

Re: Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

#61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You haven't answered the question. If a runaway slave showed up at your door, would you ask him to turn himself in? Would you suggest to him that he should go through the justice system, which he has good reason to perceive as being hostile to his cause? The way you mince words is quite adept, actually. Are you a politician? You mention slavery being "clearly unconstitutional." Then you contrast that with the surveil…

You haven't answered the question. I assumed you couldn't possibly be serious when comparing Snowden's actions to those of a runaway slave. 150 years ago there was no indication that slavery was illegal in slave states. Not remotely true. Many argued that it was unconstitutional for decades before the civil war or 13th amendment (Lysander Spooner[1] most famously). That there are convincing arguments that the governm…

Certainly a politician. You still evade the question, but that's all the time we have for now.

We'll be back next Sunday, because if it's Sunday, it's Meet the Press.

Re: Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

#62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> How would you define "rational," then? Following a consistent internal logic given its factual and aesthetic premises. > Philosophy, or "love of wisdom", of which law is a branch, is all about trying to apply aesthetic ideals to the real world. This would be something other than a non-sequitur if "philosophy" was equivalent to "reason" rather than the latter being a tool used by the former but which is not coextens…

> This would be something other than a non-sequitur if "philosophy" was equivalent to "reason" rather than the latter being a tool used by the former but which is not coextensive with it. I'm having trouble seeing this as anything other than a purely semantic distinction.

Well, yes, the issue of what words mean is by definition purely semantic.

Re: Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

#63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You are advocating for arrest first, charge second. You seem to think that keeping the desire to arrest and prosecute Snowden a secret would somehow help the government's position. What kind of precedent would it set if this information was kept secret and folks could then seek asylum citing a presumed yet not stated threat from their government. When asked about it, how should the government respond? Plus assuming t…

> You are advocating for arrest first, charge second. No, I'm not. > You seem to think that keeping the desire to arrest and prosecute Snowden a secret would somehow help the government's position. No, I said that not making the kind of public threats they are making would improve their ability to serve a particular , clearly specified national security interest, if it was their goal. > What kind of precedent would i…

The government is not making threats - they are stating their intentions. I find your stance laughable and I don't think it would work once, and certainly not twice.

Re: Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

#64
post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Good -- I agree with that as well :) Which means I think we're in agreement that whether fleeing is appropriate depends on the probability of fair trial.

Not really. :-) A society needs an objective process ("trial") to determine whether someone's acts were good or bad. It also needs need an objective process to determine whether that trial will be fair. That process, which must be independent from political pressures, rests with a judge in the United States and/or an appellate court. One can't excuse flight by waving one's hands claiming "unfair process", without sub…

So... what you've said is that it depends on whether or not you can get a fair trial, only you've assumed that it is. All I've said is that that isn't necessarily the case.

If you (a "criminal") determine that there might not be a chance that you'll be treated fairly I have 0 problem with you running.

Re: Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

#66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> This would be something other than a non-sequitur if "philosophy" was equivalent to "reason" rather than the latter being a tool used by the former but which is not coextensive with it. I'm having trouble seeing this as anything other than a purely semantic distinction.

Well, yes, the issue of what words mean is by definition purely semantic.

Well, then this,

> Following a consistent internal logic given its factual and aesthetic premises.

is better described as "consistent" than as "rational". The language Brainfuck is consistent, but it would be a stretch to call it a rational language to build stuff with.

Rationality carries with it a connotation of deeper underlying symmetry to surface reasoning. The "aesthetic ideals" you're referring to.

A reasoning is different from a rationale. A rational person makes optimal decisions, renorming his expectations as needed. A consistent person makes the same decision over and over based on some unchanging principle.

We want our laws to be rational, not consistent. To seek out an ideal regulation of behavior that's fair and useful to everyone. It is certainly consistent within a specific framing of law that useful actions be outlawed, but it is not rational.

Re: Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

#67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, yes, the issue of what words mean is by definition purely semantic.

Well, then this, > Following a consistent internal logic given its factual and aesthetic premises. is better described as "consistent" than as "rational". The language Brainfuck is consistent, but it would be a stretch to call it a rational language to build stuff with. Rationality carries with it a connotation of deeper underlying symmetry to surface reasoning. The "aesthetic ideals" you're referring to. A reasoning…

>Rationality carries with it a connotation of deeper underlying symmetry to surface reasoning. The "aesthetic ideals" you're referring to.

I disagree. Rationality is orthogonal to aesthetic ideals.

> A reasoning is different from a rationale.

No, its not.

> A rational person makes optimal decisions,

That's true pretty much only if you are referring to the definition of a rational actor in rational choice theory, in which "rational" has a very special definition that isn't very much like its use anywhere else (since it presumes both perfect and total knowledge of the utilities and disutilities, both immediate and distant, that will result from any choice, and a universal decision rule of action in which the actor always maximizes his own utilities.)

> We want our laws to be rational, not consistent.

"Rational" in the sense it has to make your previous sentence true cannot be applied to laws except as acts of individual legislators, and if it was it would mean that they were acts maximizing the legislators personal utilities.

> To seek out an ideal regulation of behavior that's fair and useful to everyone.

"fair and useful to everyone" is "just", more than "rational".

> It is certainly consistent within a specific framing of law that useful actions be outlawed, but it is not rational.

In the sense that your stated definition of "rational" is an unattainable ideal and, consequently, any real world law regardless of its attributes will be "not rational" by it, I agree; OTOH, I don't think that -- even aside from the fact that "rational" is the wrong word for it -- its really useful to use such a definition in a binary sense to discuss real world laws.

OTOH, using a continuous scale, even the most just law possible is going to occasionally prohibit some acts with social utility.

Re: Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

#68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, then this, > Following a consistent internal logic given its factual and aesthetic premises. is better described as "consistent" than as "rational". The language Brainfuck is consistent, but it would be a stretch to call it a rational language to build stuff with. Rationality carries with it a connotation of deeper underlying symmetry to surface reasoning. The "aesthetic ideals" you're referring to. A reasoning…

>Rationality carries with it a connotation of deeper underlying symmetry to surface reasoning. The "aesthetic ideals" you're referring to. I disagree. Rationality is orthogonal to aesthetic ideals. > A reasoning is different from a rationale. No, its not. > A rational person makes optimal decisions, That's true pretty much only if you are referring to the definition of a rational actor in rational choice theory, in w…

OK, at this point our disagreement is purely semantic. If you or I were to s/rational/just/g, then we would agree on everything.

I do not agree that the law could never attain rationality/justness. I believe that it can, but it can only ever stay there temporarily. Eventually society will change and make the laws irrational again. Which is why my focus would be on the tuning the machinery of state rather than each individual law. With enough work, we could build a system that anticipates societal changes rather than simply reacts to it.

> OTOH, using a continuous scale, even the most just law possible is going to occasionally prohibit some acts with social utility.

In this case a jury can exercise discretion and refuse to convict someone even when the law and evidence would demand it.

Re: Putin: Russia can't turn over Snowden

#69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Rationality carries with it a connotation of deeper underlying symmetry to surface reasoning. The "aesthetic ideals" you're referring to. I disagree. Rationality is orthogonal to aesthetic ideals. > A reasoning is different from a rationale. No, its not. > A rational person makes optimal decisions, That's true pretty much only if you are referring to the definition of a rational actor in rational choice theory, in w…

OK, at this point our disagreement is purely semantic. If you or I were to s/rational/just/g, then we would agree on everything. I do not agree that the law could never attain rationality/justness. I believe that it can, but it can only ever stay there temporarily. Eventually society will change and make the laws irrational again. Which is why my focus would be on the tuning the machinery of state rather than each in…

> In this case a jury can exercise discretion and refuse to convict someone even when the law and evidence would demand it.

Right. Or (in the abstract, though there are pretty strong signs that its not the current intention in this case) prosecutorial discretion or executive pardon can be used before or after the point where the jury would get involved. There are numerous tools available to fine tune the justice of the application of criminal law beyond just the scope of its prohibitions, and trying to foresee all the low-probability future possibilities in crafting the statutory prohibitions gets you into nasty trap; you've got to find a balance. And, most importantly, not view criminal law (or any law) as a machine that produces justice automatically without considering the people involved in its application.

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