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How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

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21–30 of 82 posts

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#21

Passwords are a terrible way to authenticate people anyway. The sooner we start using certificates and smartcards, the better.

Aren't both of those a "something you have"?

Technically, a smartcard is both something you have (the card) and something you know (the PIN). Even if there were no PIN, smartcards are better than passwords:

1. The public key stored by the server cannot be used for authentication. That means that hacking a server will not give the attacker access to anything beyond that server.

2. More randomness; there are no dictionary attacks on secret keys, and brute force attacks are hard to mount.

3. Defense against phishing: the attacker cannot trick you into giving your secret key, because the card does not export secret keys.

All of the above address the biggest problems we have with passwords right now. You are not likely to be tortured for your card or your PIN, just like you are not likely to be tortured for your password. Sure, smartcards come with their own set of problems, like dealing with lost/stolen/destroyed cards; yet these are not terribly hard to solve (banks are able to deal with lost/stolen/destroyed credit cards). The benefits far outweigh the cost.

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#22

Passwords are a terrible way to authenticate people anyway. The sooner we start using certificates and smartcards, the better.

Aren't both of those a "something you have"?

For the attack profile "something you have" is often pretty good. It protects you against criminal gangs getting pasword files.

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#23
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hi there! Thanks for the great comment. I had a similar one on my blog that I responded to in the following way (I hope it helps!): "Good question! You're right - in these cases it is assumed malware is already present on the system and running in the context of the user. But there can simply be better protection. Consider Firefox's use of a Master Password. Even if an attacker is on the otherside of the airtight hat…

But if there is already malware on the user system, it just needs to wait until the user authenticates once in Firefox to get the master password, then it can fetch all the other passwords. Right?

Yes, precisely. Local running malware = owned, period.

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#24
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Firefox will use the OSX keychain only if you install Keychain Services Integration: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/keychain-serv... . I highly recommend it.

Like I said, I opt to use 1Password instead for cross platform usage.

Same here, amazingly happy with LastPass and it even makes logging in on mobile a breeze :)

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#25
One thing I've been meaning to test. Does Chrome's form-autofill (the thing where it fills in as much of a form as it can when you specify an email address) populate hidden fields if they match? If-so, it seems like potential for mischief to create some form inputs of type "hidden" or just some visually-hidden form inputs using style sheets to capture more information than a user is aware is being populated and submitted.

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#26
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

On OS X, the passwords are probably stored in the Keychain which would be much better than this. Personally, I just disable all password storage on all browsers and use 1Password.

Firefox will use the OSX keychain only if you install Keychain Services Integration: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/keychain-serv... . I highly recommend it.

Chrome OSX stores in OSX keychain out of the box.

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#28

Also in Chrome: Go to Settings -> Show advanced settings -> Manage saved passwords -> Click on a "hidden" password -> Click on "Show" button -> Voila, password shown in plain text

I did this on a Mac and got a modal dialog saying "Do you allow Chrome access to keychain item blah.com?" Click anything, get another modal dialog for bleh.com. I realized it was going to go through each and every password I've ever saved in Chrome. With modal dialogs. kill -9.

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#29

Other side of an airtight hatchway? For this to be at all relevant, you're already got me running your binary with my user's permissions.

Or, for example, attacker stole your backup via vulnerability in your NAS. Or, for example, some idiots share whole system volumes in e2k and Direct Connect networks. Or ever web: https://www.google.ru/search?client=opera&q=intitle:%22index...

Just getting the file would not help you for the attack vectors shown in the article for Chrome (need user account's CryptProtectData), IE-pre-10 (need copy of registry keys + CryptProtectData), or IE 10 (need binary on user account).

Firefox would appear to be vulnerable to that approach. Not sure about Opera's wand.dat, probably vulnerable as well.

Re: How Browsers Store Your Passwords (and Why You Shouldn't Let Them)

#30
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Firefox will use the OSX keychain only if you install Keychain Services Integration: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/keychain-serv... . I highly recommend it.

Like I said, I opt to use 1Password instead for cross platform usage.

So locally running malware only needs to keylog your master 1Password password to decrypt your 1Password data file?
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