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Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

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Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#41

Post by danielweber »

Flenser wrote: post #5
xradionut wrote: post #4

I don't see the usefulness. You can sign a lie cryptographically just as well as a fact.

The government isn't allowed to force you to lie; they can force you to be silent. By updating this regularly it then becomes apparent when you have been forced into silence.

If you put a gun to your own head by setting up a situation where you will have to lie to your customers in order to comply with a court order, you aren't likely to get much sympathy.

You can find these specific requirements for secrecy onerous and undemocratic, and I might even agree with you. But these "I'm not really violating the law" posts by non-lawyer geeks are boring. There are all sorts of reasons society can demand you not to make certain communications. If you stop communicating to make the communication, you are still doing the communication in violation of the law.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#43

Post by danielweber »

dpcx wrote: post #32
AnIrishDuck wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You'll be forced to tell your overseas colleagues that you have received no such warrants, and they should update the canary to reflect that. Unless your architecture is set up so they would somehow immediately become aware of these warrants, there's no way they're even going to know they exist. Legal "hacks" like this rarely work.

Do you have any examples of them not working?

Courts tend to look at results.

If you have been ordered not to communicate X, and you communicate X, then you are in violation of whatever statute or court order was in place.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#44

Post by mythz »

rsync wrote: post #27
zachrose wrote: post #22

As discussed in a previous HN thread, the courts might still see this as a notice that a warrant has been served, despite it being "said through not saying." Has rsync.net had the opportunity to see these arguments play out?

No, we haven't, and that was the reasoning behind the canary being posted on the individual storage arrays (not just individual foreign locations, but each individual storage array). As of today, I know of no other firm running a warrant canary, and I don't think any of the librarians[1] were ever challenged with theirs. As with all of this, it is uncharted. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary

I think you should try to come up with a url convention that other sites can adopt similar to /favicon.ico

This is too deep to be followed: /resources/notices/canary.txt

What about something like /warrant-canary.txt ?

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#45

Post by jlgaddis »

interestinecom wrote: post #6
ripperdoc wrote: post #3

Instead of the somewhat fuzzy method of dating via news, couldn't they combine this approach with that recommended by Errata Security to use bitcoin as a public ledger? http://erratasec.blogspot.com/2013/05/bitcoin-is-public-ledg...

Not everyone loves or wants any involvement with bitcoin

The same could be said for PGP/GPG but that doesn't mean it couldn't be made useful for purposes like this.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#46

Post by danielweber »

dllthomas wrote: post #9
Flenser wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The government isn't allowed to force you to lie; they can force you to be silent. By updating this regularly it then becomes apparent when you have been forced into silence.

"The government isn't allowed to force you to lie" Is that actually the case?

If I set up a contract with you saying that I will not submit to any government subpoenas, and then the government subpoenas me, can I refuse, because "the government cannot force you to break contracts?" (The answer is No.)

If you want to practice civil disobedience, do it, and be straightforward about it. If Rsync.net were really to try to exercise this silly clause, it would be a giant distraction from what I presume is their actual complaint.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#47

Post by c1c2c3 »

rsync wrote: post #19
mperham wrote: post #15

Feds: "Continue to update the canary or you disclosed the secret warrant and we throw you in prison."

Yes, but note that this is updated not just on our website, but on the storage arrays themselves - some of which are in Zurich and Hong Kong. So the above scenario is a possibility, but then imagine the followup: Feds to Zurich Canton: Tell swiss national X to update the warrant canary or ... We have it spread out geographically for a reason.

How do I check the canary on a storage array?

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#48

Post by interestinecom »

jlgaddis wrote: post #45
interestinecom wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not everyone loves or wants any involvement with bitcoin

The same could be said for PGP/GPG but that doesn't mean it couldn't be made useful for purposes like this.

There are many thins that could be useful as a way of proving date or making a mark on a public ledger. Shall we list all of them?

You used bitcoin as an example because of your fanboyism. In no way is it obvious to use a currency or it's surrounding infrastructure for this (non intended) purpose.

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#49

Post by Flenser »

xradionut wrote: post #35
Flenser wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The government isn't allowed to force you to lie; they can force you to be silent. By updating this regularly it then becomes apparent when you have been forced into silence.

They don't have to force you into silence, they can force you thru duress not to be silent. All that is needed is some sort of incentive or leverage. (Keep up the good work citizen or ...) If the actual system is robust enough to be a "dead-man" switch then you have to plan for "false positives/negatives" and have more than one person involved in the process in case of emergencies. This increases your social attack s…

True, rsync.net state as much at the bottom of the page: "This scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration makes it impossible for a third party to produce arbitrary declarations, it does not prevent them from using force to coerce rsync.net to produce false declarations."

Re: Rsync.net Warrant Canary (2006)

#50

Post by dllthomas »

danielweber wrote: post #46
dllthomas wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"The government isn't allowed to force you to lie" Is that actually the case?

If I set up a contract with you saying that I will not submit to any government subpoenas, and then the government subpoenas me, can I refuse, because "the government cannot force you to break contracts?" (The answer is No.) If you want to practice civil disobedience, do it, and be straightforward about it. If Rsync.net were really to try to exercise this silly clause, it would be a giant distraction from what I pres…

I more or less agree with the second half of your post.

Regarding the first part, I've seen a couple places the claim that the government can't force people to lie - I don't know of any support for this, but also haven't conclusively heard that it's not the case (certainly not from a lawyer). I'm highly skeptical, but wanting to know what support the people claiming this think they have. The fact that you can name another potential constraint that doesn't hold is irrelevant, isn't it?

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