"If you want to be extra safe, check that there's a big block of jumbled characters at the bottom."
:)
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"If you want to be extra safe, check that there's a big block of jumbled characters at the bottom."
:)
Snowden, just remember that Kevin Poulsen and Adrian Lamo helped the US Government in catching Bradley Manning. EDIT: Also, a pretty safe way to carry an interview would be VPN + Tor + Bitmessage. EDIT2: Users sneak and tlb claim Tor isn't safe because of timing attacks. Read below.
Not safe at all. Timing analysis can detect correlations between data arriving at the interviewers computer with data sent by the suspect's computer. Encryption is good at keeping the contents secret, but not the source of traffic.
Bitmessage has deniability, but if the receiver end is compromised or untrustworthy, then the deniability is gone, and the timing attack might be possible.
Combining Bitmessage and I2P would be solution, I think, but I don't know of any Bitmessage nodes on I2P.
The NSA is known[1] to be able to take advantage of weaknesses found (or planted) in crypto algorithms, however, not in PGP[2] and other strong ones.
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography#NSA_involvement
2. http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/faq/faq.html (3rd question)
From http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/x110.html "A public and private key each have a specific role when encrypting and decrypting documents. A public key may be thought of as an open safe. When a correspondent encrypts a document using a public key, that document is put in the safe, the safe shut, and the combination lock spun several times. The corresponding private key is the combination that can reopen the safe…
In a world where the US government is scanning all your electronic communications, and (we'll next discover) searching your OS X- and Windows-based computers at will, how do you, as a practical matter, keep your private key "private"?
What more is there to glean from this bogus message? $ gpg -vvv -d letter-to-snowden.txt gpg: using character set `utf-8' gpg: WARNING: using insecure memory! gpg: please see http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/faqs.html for more information gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP MESSAGE gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.19 (Darwin) gpg: armor header: Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org :pubkey enc packet: version 3,…
Snowden, just remember that Kevin Poulsen and Adrian Lamo helped the US Government in catching Bradley Manning. EDIT: Also, a pretty safe way to carry an interview would be VPN + Tor + Bitmessage. EDIT2: Users sneak and tlb claim Tor isn't safe because of timing attacks. Read below.
That's not safe at all, considering the organization tracking him.
Snowden, just remember that Kevin Poulsen and Adrian Lamo helped the US Government in catching Bradley Manning. EDIT: Also, a pretty safe way to carry an interview would be VPN + Tor + Bitmessage. EDIT2: Users sneak and tlb claim Tor isn't safe because of timing attacks. Read below.
What about that it isn't safe because of who is running many of the exit nodes?
Snowden, just remember that Kevin Poulsen and Adrian Lamo helped the US Government in catching Bradley Manning. EDIT: Also, a pretty safe way to carry an interview would be VPN + Tor + Bitmessage. EDIT2: Users sneak and tlb claim Tor isn't safe because of timing attacks. Read below.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not safe at all. Timing analysis can detect correlations between data arriving at the interviewers computer with data sent by the suspect's computer. Encryption is good at keeping the contents secret, but not the source of traffic.
I2P has protection against timing attacks. Bitmessage has deniability, but if the receiver end is compromised or untrustworthy, then the deniability is gone, and the timing attack might be possible. Combining Bitmessage and I2P would be solution, I think, but I don't know of any Bitmessage nodes on I2P.